Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

George Klein
James T. Vincent
Dennis Reinhartz
Andrzej Korbonski

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1977



CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY • Edward Gonzalez

Social Change in Eastern Europe • Walter D. Connor

Albania Today • Nicholas C. Pano

The Communist Powers and South Asia • William J. Barnds

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Problems of Communism

6

NOV-DEC 1977 VOL XXVI

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ANNOUNCEMENT:

This December marks the retirement of Marie T. House from government service and from the post of Managing Editor of *Problems of Communism.* Her intellectual and managerial skills have been a crucial ingredient in the vitality of the journal from its inception in 1952, and she will be missed by her colleagues. She will be available for consultation and professional correspondence through the editorial offices of *POC.*

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Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy

By Edward Gonzalez

Cuba's international behavior in the last several years has proceeded in a complex series of zigs and zags toward apparently divergent policy goals. On the one hand, Havana seems intent on pursuing an activist global policy in support of various governments and national liberation movements in the Third World. On the other hand, it has been seeking some normalization of political and economic relations with the United States.

One could point to a number of examples of this complex behavior. Thus, in early 1976, Cuban combat troops were fighting in Angola, bringing victory to the Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and heightening the Cuban (and Soviet) presence in Southern Africa, while scarcely 18 months later, on June 3, 1977, the Cuban and US governments announced their agreement to open respective "interests sections" in each other's capitals—a development which took place on schedule on September 1.[1] Even before this latter step, the Castro government had played host to US business delegations in Havana in an effort to win support for the lifting of the US embargo on trade with Cuba and the reopening of US-Cuban trade. Also to this end, Cuba's Minister of Foreign Trade, Marcelo Fernández, paid an unofficial visit to Washington on October 3, 1977, to hold out to members of the East-West Trade Council prospects of US export sales to Cuba in the vicinity of US$350 million in the first year after the end of the trade embargo and more than $1 billion three or four years after resumption of trade.[2]

Just a few months prior to these last developments, in March 1977, Fidel Castro had pledged his country's solidarity with and active support of various governments and liberation movements in Africa during a triumphal month-long tour of that continent.[3] From there, the Cuban President went on to Moscow in early April for what Western observers considered to be high-level strategy sessions to discuss ways in which Cuba and the USSR could better coordinate their activities in Africa.[4] Indeed, despite the damper which it would seem to place on prospects for the reopening of ties with the United States, Cuba's presence in Africa continues to grow. Havana reportedly dispatched an additional 4,000 troops to Angola in September, bringing the total number of Cuban troops stationed there to some 19,000.[5] Cuba has also been active in the Horn of

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[1] The agreement specifies that Cuban and US officials operate a section of their closed embassy buildings in Washington and Havana, respectively. However, the buildings continue to fly the flags of Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, the two countries representing Cuban and US interests since 1961. For details, see the *Los Angeles Times*, June 4, 1977, pp. 1, 7. In opening the interest sections on September 1, both governments stressed that important issues would have to be resolved before normal diplomatic relations could be restored. On the US side, these were the fate of Americans held in Cuba, Cuba's military intervention in Africa, and the US$1.8 billion in corporate and individual claims against the Cuban government; on the Cuban side, the major obstacle remains the US economic and trade blockade. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1977, p. 3.

[2] Ibid., Oct. 4, 1977, p. 10.

[3] See *Granma* (Havana), March 20 and 27, 1977. (This and all subsequent references to *Granma* are to the Weekly Review Edition, unless otherwise stated.)

[4] *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1977, p. 4.

[5] *The New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1977, p. 11.

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Africa, where it preceded the Soviet Union in shifting from the backing of both Somalia and Ethiopia to concentrated support of the latter country alone. By late June, some 400 Cuban military advisers, plus additional medical personnel, were reported to be in Ethiopia aiding that country's struggling Marxist regime in its war against the Eritrean separatist movement and other opposition forces.[6]

In attempting to understand the complex factors behind these seemingly divergent policies, we might first look briefly at three commonly offered interpretations of Cuba's international behavior. As shall be seen, each of these interpretations provides a useful but only partial insight into the matter.

One school of thought, prevalent at the time of the Angolan incursion, holds that Cuban foreign policies and activities are essentially Soviet-directed.[7] Evidence in support of this interpretation—which one might call the "surrogate thesis"—can be found in Cuba's staunch pro-Soviet policies after 1968, the modeling of its party and administrative institutions along Soviet lines in the post-1970 period, and its growing economic integration with the USSR throughout the 1970's.[8] Above all, this thesis rests on Cuba's high level of indebtedness to the Soviet Union, stemming from Moscow's willingness to subsidize the island's economy over the years at an estimated rate of US$1.0-1.5 million a day and to supply the Cuban armed forces with essential military hardware. Cuba's military operations in Angola and elsewhere in Africa, by advancing Soviet global objectives, can be seen as repayment of debts owed to Moscow.

The surrogate thesis is useful in that it stresses the Soviet connection, and thus reminds us that Cuban policy currently is acted out within the parameters set by the superpower and is now generally supportive of the latter's interests. But it provides little insight into Cuba's long-standing involvements in Third World areas *prior* to the 1970's; nor does it adequately explain why Cuban activity in such areas has intensified even after Angola—which one

[6] *The Observer* (London), June 26, 1977, p. 6.

[7] For example, see George Volsky, "Cuba's Foreign Policies," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), February 1976, pp. 69-72, 81; and Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," *Strategic Review* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1976, pp. 92-103.

[8] On these developments, see Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1976, pp. 1-19.

A Soviet-built tank manned by Cuban troops dominates a road junction in the Angolan capital of Luanda in February 1976, during the civil war in the former Portuguese colony. Cuban support helped Agostinho Neto, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), install his regime in power.

—Wide World.

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might think had cleared the Castro regime of much of its indebtedness. In short, the surrogate thesis fails to account for Cuba's own domestic and foreign policy interests in its capacity as an autonomous, albeit dependent, actor in world affairs.

A second line of interpretation maintains that Cuban behavior is largely motivated by ideology. Not only is Cuba viewed as autonomous, but it is also seen as a revolutionary actor committed to the national liberation of other countries, and to the defense of radical and socialist regimes.[9] Evidence of Cuba's internationalism and revolutionary solidarity can be found in the material assistance that it furnished to Latin American guerrilla forces in the 1959-68 period, the arms and medical personnel that it supplied to the Algerian independence movement in the early 1960's, the antiaircraft and construction crews that it sent to Vietnam beginning in the mid-1960's, the more than 500 tank troops that it dispatched to Syria following the start of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the military advisers that it has provided to several African states, beginning as early as 1960—to cite a few examples.[10] Thus, Angola and other recent large-scale Cuban operations can be viewed as simply further manifestations of Cuba's long-standing internationalism.

Emphasis on Cuba as a revolutionary actor is worthwhile because it draws our attention to the ideological motivation in Castro's policies. This thesis is inadequate in itself, however, for ideology is but one of the motivational forces at work. In particular, it does not afford an explanation of Cuba's more accommodative posture toward the United States in recent months.

A third school of interpretation of Cuba's behavior stresses factors of economic necessity and the rise

[9] For example, see Nelson P. Valdés, "Cuba and Angola: the Politics of Principles and Opportunism," paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Cuba in World Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, Nov. 15-17, 1976. A revised version of this paper will be published in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming in 1978.

[10] In addition to the Valdés study cited in the previous footnote, one should read the comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of Cuban overseas activity written by William J. Durch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Professional Paper No. 201, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, September 1977.

[11] Arguments for this thesis can be found in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1974; Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Cuba: Time for a Change," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Fall 1975, pp. 65-86; and Gonzalez, loc. cit., pp. 1-19. None of these authors, however, explicitly propounds the thesis itself.

Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernández (left) talks with US Senator Frank Church at a reception for Fernández at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 4, 1977, during the Cuban's US trip.

—UPI.

within the Cuban regime of leaders of a more pragmatic bent.[11] The need for US spare parts, manufactured goods, and agricultural and other technology, together with the precipitous fall in world sugar prices after 1974, may have impelled Havana to seek a more normalized relationship with the United States. This policy can be linked to the expanding influence of pragmatic, technocratic elements within the Cuban leadership—elements headed by Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and supported externally by the Soviet Union. (Cuba's opportunities to respond to its pragmatic needs by working toward the normalization of relations with the US were, of course, enhanced by the greater receptivity of the new Carter Administration to the idea than the Ford Administration had evinced.)

While this view does explain why Cuba sought new economic ties with the United States, it tells us little about why Havana appears prepared to jeopardize those very ties by global activism. Hence, like the previous two interpretations, the economic-pragmatic thesis does not take full account of the complexities of Cuban foreign policy and the many interests and objectives behind Cuban behavior.

Rather than work from one or another of these interpretations, the present study will use a somewhat different approach, concentrating on the perspectives of three distinct elite groups discernible within Cuba's newly enlarged ruling coalition. First,

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we shall briefly survey how the world—international and domestic—must have looked to the Cuban leadership in the mid-1970's. Then, we shall identify the three leadership groupings which have emerged in Cuba in the 1970's, and we shall attempt to show how the broad mix of Cuban foreign policies has tended to reflect the various interests of these groups. Next, we shall examine how the Angola experience—and the increased leverage in world affairs it seemed to afford Havana—affected the alignment of elites within the Cuban leadership. In conclusion, we shall try to suggest what all this means about the future course of Cuba's international behavior.

Domestic and International Perspectives

By the mid-1970's, Cuba's leadership had reason to be emboldened by developments on both the domestic and international fronts.[12] At home, the Castro regime had recovered politically as well as economically from the devastating effects of the ill-fated 1970 sugar harvest. The "institutionalization of the revolution" had proceeded, and new leadership elements had been appointed, without disturbing the essential continuity of the regime. On the contrary, the regime was now better able to govern, owing to the strengthening of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in the post-1970 period and to the reorganization of the government in late 1972. The administrative structure was to be further bolstered by the creation of new state and government bodies under Cuba's socialist constitution, promulgated in 1976. A partial rationalization of the system of economic management, together with Soviet assistance and greatly inflated sugar prices on the world market, had meanwhile restored vitality to the Cuban economy.[13] As a result, the Cuban government could claim an average annual growth rate of 8 percent for the island's gross material product in the period 1970-74.[14]

Cuba's international position also improved greatly in the post-1970 period. To begin with, there no longer could be doubt regarding the Soviet commitment to the Cuban Revolution. The visit of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to Havana in late January 1974 signaled full-fledged Soviet acceptance of the Castro regime. Cuba's admission to the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in July 1972 and new long-term agreements signed at the end of that year with the USSR likewise assured Havana of sustained and favorable levels of external support for the Cuban economy. The December 1972 agreements were especially important in that they deferred to 1986 repayment of Cuba's large debt to the USSR, provided new short-term Soviet credits, and set higher Soviet purchase prices for Cuban sugar and nickel exports. These agreements resulted in a tripling of the volume of trade between the two countries—from US$1.02 billion in 1972 to an estimated US$3.5 billion in 1975.[15]

The increased Soviet commitment, of course, had its price: greater orthodoxy in Cuba's domestic and foreign policies, as well as heightened integration into and dependence on the Soviet economy.[16] However, the growth of Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR was checked momentarily by the skyrocketing price of sugar on the world market in 1973-74, which reached a record high of 66 cents a pound in November 1974. The sugar boom enabled Cuba to diversify its trade by expanding ties with Japan, Canada, and West European nations. Thus, 41 percent of Cuba's total imports in 1975 was accounted for by these countries, in contrast to only 17 percent in 1972.[17] Much of this increase in trade with noncommunist countries was generated by Cuba's heightened creditworthiness, as booming

[12] The following discussion is drawn from Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, *Post-Revolutionary Cuba in a Changing World*, R-1844-ISA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, December 1975, pp. 32-50.

[13] On these developments, see Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," loc. cit.

[14] Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Desarrollo y perspectivas de la economía cubana* (The Development and Prospects of the Cuban Economy), Havana, 1975, p. 12, as cited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Present and Future of Cuba's Economy and International Economic Relations," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, op. cit. The Banco Nacional's 8 percent figure is based on constant prices. Mesa-Lago notes that Cuba's "gross material product" differs from the Western concept of "gross national product" in that it excludes the value of transportation, communication, and commerce, along with services not directly related to production.

[15] For details of the December 1972 agreements, see Castro's speech in *Granma*, Jan. 14, 1973, pp. 2-3.

Cuba's exports to the USSR rose from US$244 million or 29 percent of total exports in 1972, to US$2.01 billion or 57 percent of exports (preliminary calculation) in 1975. Imports from the USSR for the same period also increased, from US$799 million to a preliminary US$1.53 billion, but decreased sharewise from 60 to 41 percent of Cuba's total imports, owing to increased trade with noncommunist countries as a result of higher sugar prices on the world market. Data compiled from US Central Intelligence Agency Research Aid, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review, 1968-76* (hereafter, CIA, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review)*, ER 76-10708, December 1976, p. 7.

[16] See Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Othodoxy," loc. cit., pp. 12-14.

[17] CIA, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, pp. 7, 9.

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Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev with Fidel in Havana in January 1974.

—Photo from Cuba Internacional (Havana), February 1975, p. 2.

sugar sales enabled then Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to obtain US$900 million in Spanish credits in December 1974, followed by US$350 million in French credits in January 1975, US$155 million in Canadian credits in March 1975, and US$850 million in British credits in May 1975.[18]

Meanwhile, Cuba ceased to be the pariah of the Western Hemisphere. Dropping its line of violent revolution, the Castro regime succeeded in restoring diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American states, including Chile (until September 1973), Peru, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela. In the Caribbean, Cuba managed to develop close political and economic ties with Guyana and especially Jamaica, and it became active in Caribbean regional associations as well. Havana scored still further diplomatic advances with the decision of the Organization of American States (OAS) in July 1975 to lift sanctions on Cuba, with the visit of Mexican President Luis Echeverría to Cuba that same month, and with the return visit by then Lt. General Raúl Castro to Mexico City the following month.

Finally, even the US Government adopted a more flexible Cuba policy under the administration of Gerald Ford. Responding to Cuban overtures, the US State Department held informal talks with representatives of the Cuban government between late 1974 and late 1975. (As we shall see, these talks lapsed with the Cuban military build-up in Angola.)

Most heartening of all to the Cuban leadership was a perceived dramatic change in the international correlation of forces. As the Cubans saw things, the US defeat in Vietnam, along with the increased strategic might of the USSR, indicated a relative weakening of US "imperialism." But even more important in Havana's view, the October 1973 Arab oil embargo and the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in organizing it seemed to tilt the balance of power toward the Third World and the socialist camp. In October 1974, Fidel Castro declared:

. . . capitalism and imperialism are living in a crisis hour. . . . For many, the capitalist world is on the brink of the most serious disaster it has confronted since . . . the great depression of the '30's.[19]

Five months later, he pointed out:

. . . [under OPEC] a group of underdeveloped countries have managed to set their own terms of trade.

[18] For more details on credit transactions, see Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

[19] *Granma*, Oct. 27, 1974, p. 3.

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. . . And they are accumulating extraordinary amounts of surplus funds formerly under the exclusive control of the developed capitalist countries.[20]

In light of this perception of the world, the Castro government intensified its overseas military activities in Africa and the Middle East after the early 1970's. Prior to Angola, the largest contingents of advisers went to South Yemen (600-700 Cuban military personnel in 1973-75) and Syria (500-750 tank troops in 1973-74).[21]

Elites and Foreign Policies

Cuba's foreign policies were affected not only by world developments, but also by changes within the Cuban leadership itself. The new elite structure and the resulting internal distribution of power have been discussed in a previous article in this journal[22] and hence need not be reconstructed here in detail. What follows is merely a brief recapitulation and updating of changes in the Cuban leadership.

The post-1970 process of institutionalization led both to the diversification of political elites within Cuba's ruling coalition and to the reconcentration of political power in the hands of the two Castro brothers and their followers. The Cuban leadership circle was broadened as veteran *fidelistas* from the July 26 Movement now shared party or government posts with new elements drawn from the "old Communists" formerly affiliated with the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), from the new technocratic-managerial class, and from military officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), under Raúl Castro's command. At the same time, in the course of this broadening of the ruling coalition, Fidel and his brother managed to reestablish themselves and their personal followings as the predominant core of the leadership. They did so by means of an alliance between the old-guard *fidelistas,* who had earlier occupied most of the strategic posts in the party and government, and the increasingly prominent *raulistas.* The latter thus emerged as a pivotal elite element, comprising principally those military officers with long-standing personal ties to Raúl who either remained on active duty in the FAR/MINFAR or had been reassigned to high-level posts in the party and government after 1970.

This distribution of power was confirmed by the PCC Congress of December 1975 and by the new lineup of state and government officials unveiled in December 1976.[23] As the table shows, the two Castro brothers monopolize the top leadership positions of the party, state, government, and armed forces. Together with their civilian and military followers, they dominate the PCC Political Bureau and Secretariat, and also the new Council of State and the Executive Committee of the new Council of Ministers.

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez stands out as a unique representative at the top of both the old PSP elements and the new generation of civilian technocrats —by virtue of his high posts in all four of these ruling bodies of the party, state, and government. The representation of civilian technocratic and managerial elements may be greater in the enlarged PCC Central Committee (CC). There civilian heads of ministries and agencies account for 39 percent of the membership, whereas active-duty officers attached to the FAR/MINFAR make up 28 percent of the total. However, if former military officers assigned to civilian ministries and agencies in the post-1970 period are treated as still identified with the military, the share of civilian ministerial figures on the CC declines to 29 percent, and FAR/MINFAR representation runs to 37 percent, once more underscoring the importance of the military—among them many *raulistas*—in the new power constellation.[24]

[20] Ibid., March 30, 1975, p. 4.

[21] In the 1972-74 period, smaller missions were also sent to Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, and Algeria, where they served in an advisory or technical capacity. In some instances, the missions consisted of personnel attached to Cuba's Ministry of Interior, or other security organs, as well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). See Durch, op. cit., pp. 25-33.

[22] Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," loc. cit., pp. 14-19. For a different point of view, see William M. LeoGrande, "Continuity and Change in the Cuban Political Elite, 1959-1976," paper presented at the annual meeting of the New York State Political Science Association held in Albany, NY, March 26, 1977.

[23] The National Assembly of People's Power, elected under the new Constitution, met in Havana in December 1976. It, in turn, elected a new presiding organ, the Council of State, with Fidel as President. In this capacity, Fidel nominated members of a new Council of Ministers and of a new Executive Committee of that body, with himself as presiding officer. The latter contained no new faces. See *Granma*, Dec. 12, 1976, p. 5.

[24] The new Central Committee consists of 112 members and 12 alternates. In computing the percentages, the author excluded the members of the Political Bureau and Secretariat, but included the remaining full members and the alternates of the Central Committee. This approach produced an adjusted base figure of 107 Central Committee members.

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The Cuban Leadership—Party, State, and Government: December 1976

Name [a]	Political origins and allegiances [b]	PCC Political Bureau	PCC Secretariat	Council of State	Council of Ministers	Other posts [c]
Fidel Castro	(M-26-7)	First Secretary	First Secretary	President	President [d]	Commander-in-Chief, FAR
Raúl Castro	(M-26-7)	Second Secretary	Second Secretary	First Vice President	First Vice President,[d] Minister of FAR	Army General, FAR
Juan Almeida	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Vice Pres.		
Ramiro Valdés	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Vice Pres.	Vice Pres.[d]	
Guillermo García	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Vice Pres.	Vice Pres.[d]	
Blas Roca	(PSP)	Member	Member	Vice Pres.		President, Nat'l Assembly
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez	(PSP)	Member	Member	Vice Pres.	Vice Pres.[d]	
Celia Sánchez	(M-26-7:f)			Secretary		
Pedro Miret	(M-26-7:f) [e]	Member	Member			
Osvaldo Dorticós	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Member	Vice Pres.[d]	
Armando Hart	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Member	Minister of Culture	
Sergio del Valle	(M-26-7:f)	Member		Member	Minister of Interior	Division General, FAR
José Ramón Machado	(M-26-7:r)	Member		Member		
Arnaldo Milián	(PSP) [f]	Member		Member		
Diocles Torralba	(M-26-7:r) [e]			Member	Vice Pres.[d]	
Belarmino Castilla	(M-26-7:r) [e]			Member	Vice Pres.[d]	
Flavio Bravo	(PSP) [e]			Member	Vice Pres.[d]	
Joel Domenech	(PSP)			Member	Vice Pres.[d]	
Luis Orlando Domínguez	(M-26-7)			Member		First Secretary, UJC
Roberto Veiga	(M-26-7)			Member		Secretary General, CTC
Jorge Lezcano	(M-26-7)			Member		National Coordinator, CDR
Vilma Espín	(M-26-7:r)			Member		President, FMC
José Ramírez	(PSP)			Member		President, ANAP
Haydée Santamaría	(M-26-7:f)			Member		Director, Casa de las Americas
Osmany Cienfuegos	(M-26-7)			Member	Secretary	
Juan Marinello [g]	(PSP)			Member		President, Peace and Sovereignty Movement
Severo Aguirre	(PSP)			Member		
Reinaldo Castro				Member		
Marta Deprés				Member		
Senén Casas	(M-26-7:r)			Member		Division General, FAR First Vice Min., MINFAR
Abelardo Colomé	(M-26-7:r)			Member		Division General, FAR Vice Min., MINFAR
Isidoro Malmierca	(PSP) [h]		Member		Minister of Foreign Affairs	
Jorge Risquet	(M-26-7:r)		Member			
Antonio Pérez	(M-26-7:r)		Member			
Raúl García	(M-26-7:f)		Member			

[a] In the order given in listing of Council of State in *Granma* (Havana), Dec. 12, 1976.
[b] M-26-7 signifies the July 26th Movement; PSP—the Popular Socialist Party; f—*fidelista*; r—*raulista*.
[c] FAR—Revolutionary Armed Forces; UJC—League of Young Communists; CTC—Cuban Workers' Confederation; CDR—Committees for Defense of the Revolution; FMC—Federation of Cuban Women; ANAP—National Association of Small Farmers; MINFAR—Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
[d] Member of the Executive Committee, Council of Ministers.
[e] Formerly attached to FAR/MINFAR.
[f] Appointed to the Secretariat in June 1977.
[g] Deceased in March 1977 and replaced on the Council of State by former Foreign Minister Raúl Roa (M-26-7) in July 1977.
[h] Dropped from the Secretariat in January 1977.

SOURCES: Adapted from a table to appear in Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming in 1978. The table is based on a table in Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1976, p. 17, and has been updated on the basis of news items published in *Granma*, Dec. 12, 1976, Jan. 30, June 19, and July 24, 1977.

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The Cuban leadership shares a basic consensus as to broad foreign policy goals. But the very diversity of the post-1970 coalition has contributed to an increasingly complex mix of foreign policies, for different elites stress one or another priority or advocate different strategic lines.[25] By the mid-1970's, three distinct foreign policy tendencies had emerged—tendencies which essentially mirror the general policy interests, mentality, or organizational mission of the principal elites within the Cuban leadership.

The pragmatic tendency. The first of these tendencies reflects the post-1970 influence of the civilian technocratic and managerial elites, who are led by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. A charter member of the PCC Secretariat, Rodríguez assumed direction of Cuba's foreign economic affairs in 1970. His growing prominence was confirmed by his appointment to the PCC Political Bureau in December 1975 and by his selection a year later as a vice-president of both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. His allies continue to be Council of Ministers Vice-President Osvaldo Dorticós, Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernández, and other civilian ministers and specialists in the economic field. These pragmatists, in turn, are generally supported by "old Communists" from the PSP, and by technocratic counterparts in the Soviet bloc countries.[26]

Attaching highest priority to developmental needs, the pragmatic leaders have been the principal force behind Cuba's improved economic ties with the USSR and the diversification of Cuba's trade ties with the West. In September 1974, for instance, then President Dorticós insisted that Cuba's "scientific and technological poverty" had to be overcome through the importation of capital-intensive "vanguard-technology" from the West.[27] Early the following year, Rodríguez acknowledged that Cuba

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (right), member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party and then Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Relations, discusses Cuban-British trade relations with UK Secretary of Commerce Peter Shore during the latter's visit to Havana in November 1975.

—Camera Press.

needed to expand its trade ties with capitalist countries because "a whole range of technologies is not yet available in the socialist camp."[28] As has been noted, soaring world prices for sugar enabled Rodríguez to expand Cuba's trade and lines of credit with capitalist countries in 1974 and 1975. Indeed, Cuba's improved trade and credit situation may well have strengthened his own political position and that of the technocrats within the regime. In this period, Rodríguez began to seek a new opening with the United States in order to obtain needed US agricultural equipment, technology, computer facilities, and other items.[29]

The revolutionary tendency. The second tendency in Cuban foreign behavior bears the stamp of Fidel and his followers, and reflects their renewed dominance within the regime. These elements view

[25] The following sections are drawn in part from Edward Gonzalez, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, op. cit.

[26] The heightened role of the USSR in Cuban affairs in the post-1970 period worked to the advantage of the pragmatists. Following the near paralysis of the island's economy that resulted from the 1970 harvest, the Soviets obtained major policy and administrative reforms, and promoted the ascendancy of pragmatic leaders to insure the greater efficiency of the Cuban economy. Foremost among these pragmatists was Rodríguez, who received Soviet backing owing to his former role in the PSP, his leadership of a highly qualified team of economic experts, and his acceptability to Fidel, which in turn made him an effective bridge between Moscow and Havana.

[27] See *Granma* (daily edition), Sept. 14, 1974, pp. 2-3.

[28] See his interview in *Le Monde* (Paris), Jan. 16, 1975, pp. 1, 4.

[29] For instance, Rodríguez granted a lengthy interview to Abraham Lowenthal and Samuel Huntington in mid-1975 in which he proposed an arrangement for settling the issue of compensation for nationalized US properties as a means of overcoming one of the many obstacles to restored relations. See Lowenthal, loc. cit.

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Cuba's principal foreign task to be promotion of anti-imperialism and revolution, principally in Third World areas. This is not to say that proponents of the revolutionary tendency are oblivious to other considerations. Like the pragmatists, Fidel is also concerned with Cuba's developmental needs. Hence, the *fidelista* revolutionary line has been applied more selectively in the 1970's than in the past in order not to jeopardize Cuba's trade and credit relationships with a number of capitalist countries.

Fidel's combative posture does not stem from ideological motives alone. To the contrary, Fidel is vitally concerned with disparities in world power relationships, and he employs various leverage strategies as the principal means by which to obtain security, economic development, and global influence for his small and vulnerable island.

Alignment with the USSR—by enabling Cuba to tap Soviet economic and military resources—has long been the principal source of international leverage for Cuba. However, Fidel has also sought to further the "revolutionary" cause and augment Cuba's limited power capabilities by policies of active solidarity with the Third World and promotion of a united Latin America separate from the US.[30]

In his self-appointed role as a Third World spokesman, Fidel has time and again called for OPEC to unite with the less-developed countries to ease dependency and further swing the global balance against imperialism.[31] The extension of new military and technical assistance to Middle Eastern and African states after the early 1970's became still another avenue for solidifying Cuba's links with the Third World.

On the Latin American front, restoration of diplomatic relations with the Andrés Pérez government in Venezuela in 1974; development of close ties with the regimes of Brigadier General Omar Torrijos Herrera in Panama, of Forbes Burnham in Guyana, and especially of Michael N. Manley in Jamaica; and active membership in regional associations[32] have enabled Cuba to emerge as a regional power in the Caribbean. By early 1975, Fidel felt able to claim that Latin America was demonstrating ". . . a greater understanding of what imperialism is and a willingness to confront that imperialism." [33]

The "military mission" tendency. The last tendency derives from the outlook of Raúl Castro and other politically influential FAR/MINFAR officers. They stress the external role or mission of the Cuban armed forces. Their impact on Cuba's foreign activities stems not only from their enhanced political influence within the Cuban regime but also from the strengthened military capabilities of the FAR.

In large measure, the emphasis on the armed forces' foreign role grows out of the success of post-1970 efforts to institutionalize and strengthen the civilian administration. The latter increasingly took over administrative and economic tasks that the FAR had performed in earlier years, because of its relatively higher level of professional competence, technical training, and organizational skills.[34] Consequently, the Cuban army could now devote itself primarily to its military tasks. In keeping with this shift in priorities, FAR was leaned down to a professional standing army of about 100,000 men. With Havana's perception that the direct US threat had been reduced by great-power détente, the army was thus in a position to expand its military mission from the traditional one of defending the homeland to one including new overseas activity in support of other Cuban foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the high levels of professionalization attained by the army may well have impelled it to seek new organizational roles abroad.[35]

[30] During the first part of the 1970's, Fidel repeatedly called for the formation of a bloc of Latin American and Caribbean countries that would exclude the United States on the ground that the former countries and the US formed ". . . two worlds as different as Europe and Africa: they do not belong in the same community." *Granma*, Oct. 6, 1974, p. 3.

[31] For instance, addressing a Havana meeting of delegates from the nonaligned countries, Fidel declared: "If the petroleum countries stand united and firm, . . . and if they seek the alliance of the remainder of the underdeveloped world, the industrialized capitalist countries will have to accept as inevitable the disappearance of the shameful and unjust terms of trade that they imposed on our peoples." Ibid.

[32] Specifically, Cuba joined the Latin American Economic System (SELA), cosponsored by Mexico and Venezuela, in October 1975; became an active member of the Caribbean Multinational Shipping Enterprise (NAMUCAR); and has sought to play a leading role in the Caribbean Development and Corporation Committee.

[33] See his interview with Mexican newsmen on Jan. 10, 1975, cited in Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, op. cit., p. 37. More recently, Fidel has taken a gloomier view. In an interview for *Afrique-Asie*, he declared that, "Fascism is on the increase in Latin America because it's the last thing resorted to, to prevent the triumph of socialism." See *Granma*, May 22, 1977, p. 2.

[34] Regarding the high state of professionalism and training in the FAR, and FAR's civic roles during the 1960's, see Jorge I. Domínguez, "Institutionalization and Civil-Military Relations," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* (Pittsburg, PA), January 1976, pp. 39-66.

[35] Domínguez observes that ". . . the civilian organizations of Cuba have been strengthened in the first half of the 1970's, and they may confront the military organization more effectively in the second half of the decade." Ibid., pp. 61-62. Such a challenge could have provided a major incentive for the FAR to expand its role to include overseas missions.

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Reflective of the "military mission" tendency was the announcement by Fidel during military exercises in November 1974 that the Cuban armed forces were at the service of ". . . our sister peoples of Latin America in their struggle against imperialism, and . . . on the side of the peoples who face up to imperialism in all parts of the world." [36] Consonant with their expanded mission, Cuba's armed forces worked to improve their combat readiness and to develop offensive-type capabilities in new mobile-defense operations carried out in 1974 and 1975.[37]

Use of these improved capabilities was not long in coming. In late August 1975, then Foreign Minister Raúl Roa moved to legitimize Cuba's forthcoming Angolan incursion by declaring to the Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Lima, Peru, that the nonaligned states ought to act "in whatever manner required" to speed the decolonization of Angola and southern Africa.[38] In September, Cuba committed its first combat forces. By mid-month, an estimated 1,000 Cuban troops had embarked from Cuba enroute to Angola, thus constituting even at that point the largest overseas mission ever mounted by the FAR. Subsequently, the commitment escalated to some 15,000 troops by February 1976, and to 19,000 troops by September 1977.

From what has been said above, it is clear that the revolutionary and the military mission tendencies were in the ascendancy and were cohering in mutually supportive policies by the time of Angola. This state of affairs reflected the new dominance within the Cuban leadership of the *fidelista* and *raulista* elites, which in turn produced a lowering of the priority attached to pragmatic concerns. That such was, in fact, the case is suggested by the fate of the secret talks between Havana and Washington that were held on four occasions between November 1974 and November 1975.[39] These talks between high-ranking US and Cuban officials led to a temporary relaxation of mutual hostility, with the US government even voting for the removal of OAS sanctions against Cuba in July 1975. On September 23, US Assistant Secretary of State William Rogers also announced that the United States was prepared "to enter into a dialogue with Cuba" for purposes of improving relations. But Cuba was at that very moment already engaged in its military operation in Angola. At the fourth and final round of talks, in November, Rogers voiced strong opposition to that Cuban involvement, but still urged a continuation of the talks. By the following month, however, Washington and Havana were engaged in acrimonious exchanges over Cuba's military buildup in Angola,[40] and the dialogue broke down. The episode is instructive. In spite of the visibly improving climate between the US and Cuba in the summer and fall of 1975, and the interests of Havana's pragmatists in furthering this development, the Cuban leadership opted for Angola.

Cuba as a Paladin

Detailed examination of Cuba's Angolan operation is beyond the scope of this study.[41] Here, that involvement will be viewed primarily in terms of its impact on Cuba's international behavior since 1976. Nonetheless, two observations should be made regarding the Angolan venture itself.

First, Cuba does not appear to have been serving as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in Angola despite the latter's massive logistical support for the operation. Rather, as has been suggested above, the Cubans seem to have been promoting their own Third World interests—interests which, to be sure, coincided with, and were supportive of, Soviet political and strategic objectives in Southern Africa. From this perspective, Cuba's role approaches that of an international paladin, which pursues its own interests as an autonomous actor in the guise of championing proletarian internationalism.

Second, the Cubans appear to have been drawn far more deeply into the Angolan struggle than they had anticipated at the time that Cuban soldiers

[36] *Granma*, Dec. 1, 1974, p. 1.

[37] On these changes in the FAR's military doctrine, as well as other aspects of the Cuban armed forces, see Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Cuban Armed Forces and International Order," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, op. cit.

[38] For Roa's speech, see *Granma*, Sept. 7, 1975, pp. 8-9.

[39] The following is based on David Binder's account in *The New York Times*, March 29, 1977, pp. 1, 8.

[40] For example, see President Gerald R. Ford's statement of Dec. 20, 1975 (*The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1975, p. 3), and Fidel's reply two days later at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (ibid., Dec. 23, 1975, p. 5).

[41] For such examinations, one should see, in addition to the Valdés and Durch studies cited earlier, the detailed reconstruction of the Angolan episode written by Gerald J. Bender, "Kissinger and Angola: Anatomy of Failure," September 1976 (draft manuscript, to be published in René Lemarchand, Ed., *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance*, Washington, DC, The University Press of America, forthcoming). Also see Abraham Lowenthal's imaginative presentation of the sort of policy memorandum Cuban foreign-policy advisers might have given their leaders on the decision to dispatch troops to Angola, in his "Cuba's African Adventure," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1977, pp. 3-10.

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first embarked for Angola in September 1975. In fact, after Havana's initial decision to commit troops, the increase in Cuba's involvement was essentially incremental and reactive. What evidently occurred is that the sudden South African incursion into southern Angola on October 23, 1975, together with the combined offensive of troops of Zaire and of the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) that followed in the north a few days later, endangered the first Cuban contingents already in Angola. To counter this threat to the vital interests of its politically powerful armed forces, the Castro regime commenced the second stage of the Angolan operation in late October by airlifting reinforcements across the Atlantic in Soviet and Cuban transport planes and by shipping additional troops by sea.[42] A third stage followed in December when the battlefield situation finally began to shift in favor of the FAR and MPLA forces. It was then, according to Fidel, that "Cuba sent the men and weapons necessary to win that struggle," [43] with the Cuban buildup eventually reaching some 15,000 or more troops by February 1976, when the war ended. A fourth stage may have begun in September 1977, when Havana, apparently perceiving its gains of 1975 threatened by the continued strength in southern Angola of the forces of Dr. Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), expanded its troop contingent once again, to a reported 19,000 personnel.

But let us return to our primary concern—the impact of the Angolan experience on the Cuban leadership. The success in Angola had the political effect of strengthening the *fidelista* and *raulista* elites and their respective foreign policy tendencies. At the same time, it weakened the pragmatists headed by Rodríguez and their tendency. The pragmatic tendency was weakened further, and perhaps even more signficantly, by the sharp decline in world sugar prices, to less than 8 cents a pound by the fall of 1976. This decline restricted Cuba's trade and credit relations with the noncommunist world.[44]

Evidence for these conclusions can be seen in the table above. Veteran *fidelistas* and *raulistas* dominated the PCC Political Bureau elected in December 1975. Fidel, Raúl, and their followers were likewise in full control of the new state and government organs chosen by the National Assembly a year later. (At that time, Division Generals Senén Casas and Abelardo Colomé were named to the new Council of State in recognition of the key roles they had played in Angola.) By contrast, the technocratic and managerial elites were only represented by Rodríguez and Dorticós on the new Political Bureau, the new Council of State, and the new Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, in the December 1976 National Assembly proceedings, former President Dorticós was appointed only

Raúl and Fidel Castro applaud the display of new Cuban military equipment in Havana in December 1976, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The statue in the background is of Cuban revolutionary hero José Martí.

—From *Cuba Internacional* (Havana), January-February 1977, p. 10.

[42] On the critical urgency of the military situation at the time, see Fidel's speech of April 19, 1976, in *Granma*, May 3, 1976, pp. 4-5. There is some question, however, as to the accuracy of his statements regarding when Cuban troops first embarked from Cuba, when they first arrived in Angola, and in what numbers. For an authoritative examination of these issues, see Durch, op. cit.

[43] *Granma*, May 2, 1976, p. 5.

[44] Cuba's imports from noncommunist nations, which had reached US$1,064 million in 1974 and US$1,793 million in 1975, dropped to an estimated US$1,250 million in 1976. See CIA, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, p. 7.

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as one of eight vice presidents of the Council of Ministers and not as one of the five vice presidents of the prestigious Council of State.[45]

The enhanced status of the armed forces in the aftermath of Angola is also suggested by the establishment of a new ranking system for members of the FAR. Effective December 2, 1976, the top FAR/MINFAR ranks were designated Army General (Raúl Castro), Army Corps General (vacant), Division General (Senén Casas, Abelardo Colomé, and others), and Brigadier General. This table of ranks replaced the previous two-tiered system of Lieutenant General and Major General, which had itself only been in effect for three years.[46]

The awards accorded the FAR were also tangible. In December 1976, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the FAR, General of the Army Raúl Castro confirmed that the FAR had been outfitted with "new and modern arms which will be viewed by our people for the first time."[47] Having succeeded in establishing a new Marxist regime in Southern Africa and hence in furthering Soviet as well as Cuban objectives in the region, the FAR thus became the recipient of new arms deliveries from the USSR.

Fidel's leadership position and the revolutionary tendency were also strengthened by the Angolan operation, for this venture generated new international leverage for Cuba in Third World circles and particularly with the Soviet Union. As a political and military paladin, Cuba had proved itself to be an invaluable ally in furthering Soviet objectives in Africa. Consequently, in addition to extending new military assistance to Havana, Moscow concluded a five-year economic and technical agreement with Havana for 1976-80 which seems highly beneficial to Cuba. Signed on April 14, 1976, the agreement called for a 250-percent rise in total Soviet-Cuban trade from the level of the previous five-year period; for the installation of Cuba's first nuclear power plant and steel mill; and for indexing Soviet crude oil prices to Cuban sugar prices.[48] Thanks to Angola, therefore, Fidel found the USSR committed to still higher levels of economic, technological, and military support for his country.

Both the revolutionary and the military mission tendencies were much in evidence in the post-Angola period. As in the past, Fidel continued to seek increased international leverage in the Third World. In December 1976, for instance, he again called on the oil producers of OPEC to unite with other less-developed countries in "one single front in the common struggle against their historical exploiters."[49] In March 1977, he resumed his role as political paladin in his extended tour of the Middle East, North Africa, and the "front-line" black African states around Rhodesia.[50]

Fidel's month-long journey overlapped that of then Soviet President Nikolay V. Podgornyy. Each leader pledged his country's military aid for the guerrilla struggle against the white minority government in Rhodesia.[51] Earlier in his tour, moreover, Fidel visited both Ethiopia and Somalia, two Marxist states in the Horn of Africa where both the Soviets and Cubans had a military presence, but which found themselves in bitter conflict with one another over the disputed Ogaden region and other territories. In an effort to head off open war between the two states, and thereby safeguard Soviet and Cuban interests, Fidel actively interceded. He arranged a secret meeting between the Ethiopian strongman, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Somalian President Mohamed Siad Barre, in the South Yemen capital, Aden, in March 1977, at which he proposed some kind of federation between the two Marxist regimes. The effort, however, proved of no avail.[52]

[45] Dorticós' apparent demotion may be related to a sharp drop in sugar sales to Japan, for which he may have been held responsible. In December 1976, Fidel disclosed that ". . . Japan, which in recent years purchased as much as a million tons of Cuban sugar, bought only 130,000 tons in 1976, and the same thing has happened in other convertible-currency markets. This causes problems for us and forces us to apply drastic restrictions in the trade with those markets. . . ." *Granma*, Dec. 12, 1976, p. 3.

[46] For the new nomenclature of ranks, see *Granma*, Dec. 5, 1976, p. 12.

[47] Ibid., Dec. 12, 1976, p. 12.

[48] Ibid., April 25, 1976, p. 9.

[49] Ibid., Dec. 5, 1976, p. 2.

[50] In the words of a leading Africanist magazine, "For a full month, Cuba's Prime Minister [sic] Fidel Castro, safaried through the African continent, and in every country he visited he was accorded a hero's welcome." The commentary went on to observe: "What has emerged most strikingly from Castro's grand African Safari, is Cuba's willingness and ability to provide Third World countries not only with military assistance to defend themselves and modernize their armies but also expert technical aid in the economic and social fields." *Africa* (London), No. 69, May 1977, pp. 84, 85. The Cuban President's itinerary began with his arrival in Algeria on March 1; he then proceeded to Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola, after which he returned briefly to Algeria on March 31. Castro subsequently went to the German Democratic Republic en route to Moscow.

[51] See *Granma*, March 27, 1977, p. 1, and *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1977, p. 4.

[52] See the dispatch by David B. Ottaway, in *The Washington Post*, May 17, 1977, p. 13. War between Ethiopia and Somalia broke out in July.

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During his March 1977 African tour, Cuban President Fidel Castro visits Col. Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria.

—Camera Press.

Subsequently, as noted earlier, the Cubans shifted their support, and their military advisory personnel, to Ethiopia alone.* Hence, Cuba continued to demonstrate assertiveness and global reach in its role as international paladin.

Alternate Strands and the Future

Yet, despite its global activism, Cuba moved with dispatch to improve relations with the new Carter administration. On April 28, 1977, Havana reached agreement with Washington on fishing rights in the 200-mile zones claimed by the two countries, while five weeks later it agreed to the establishment of interest sections in Havana and Washington. Meanwhile, US tourism to the island was being encouraged, US businessmen were being invited to Havana, and US television and newspaper correspondents were interviewing Cuban leaders. On first inspection, therefore, it might appear that the pragmatic tendency had recovered and that the Cuban leadership is now committed to improving relations with Washington, at least to the extent of obtaining needed two-way trade with the United States. Such a conclusion may, as we shall see shortly, be premature.

There are tangible interests behind Havana's more accommodating posture toward the United States—the major one being economic necessity. Cuba has experienced depressed sugar prices on the world market and, with them, a slowdown of its economy. Cuban officials now anticipate an annual growth rate of 4 percent, instead of the 6 percent earlier planned, for the 1976-80 period.[53] Moreover, owing to world market conditions, Cuba's surplus of unmarketed sugar, after scheduled deliveries to the Soviet Union and to other smaller markets in socialist and nonsocialist countries, could amount to well over a million tons by the late 1970's. Consequently, access to the US sugar market becomes increasingly vital to the Cuban economy. Such access also emerges as a sine qua non if Cuba is to be able to purchase US manufactured goods and technology.

Accordingly, Havana's economic bargaining power with the United States is relatively weak because of the limited size of Cuba's import market. Its leverage is also conditional, since Cuba's ability to import US products depends on Washington's granting Cuba privileged access to the important US market. To improve their bargaining posture, such technocrats as Vice President Rodríguez, Foreign Trade Minister Fernández, and Hector Rodríguez, head of the State Committee for Economic Collaboration, have repeatedly forecast large-scale US sales in Cuba once the embargo is lifted.[54] But in return, as Fernández made clear in his October talk with 85 US businessmen at the East-West Trade Council, Cuba insists that the US market must first be opened to Cuban goods on the basis of most-favored-nation and other major trade and tariff privileges.[55] Congressional and other elements in the United States may well insist that Cuba cease much of its internationalist activities in the Third World in exchange for such trade concessions.

It is precisely over this last issue that progress in Cuban-US relations may stall in the future. US

* On November 13, 1977 (as this article went to press), Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and also ordered all Soviet advisers in Somalia to leave the country within seven days. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1977, p. 1.—Eds.

[53] The reduced growth figure was cited by a *Los Angeles Times* correspondent based on an interview with Foreign Trade Minister Fernández and Hector Rodríguez, head of the State Committee for Economic Collaboration. See "Havana's View: Rich Potential Seen for U.S., Cuba Trade," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 1977, pp. 1, 14.

[54] See ibid.

[55] *The New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1977, p. 10.

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Cuban President Fidel Castro waves his hat to the crowd as Jamaican Prime Minister Michael-Manley applauds during a National Heroes Day rally at Jamaica's Montego Bay on October 17, 1977.

—Wide World.

demands for major political concessions from Cuba would conflict with the primary policy and organizational interests of the two dominant elite groupings within the Cuban leadership, the *fidelistas* and the *raulistas.* As has been argued, both are committed to Cuba's Third World interests and paladin role. Thus, Fidel would probably favor improved relations with Washington so long as they involved primarily economic or peripheral political concessions on the part of Havana. He is hardly likely to accept conditions that would have Cuba forego those very global activities which have now provided his regime with heightened international leverage in the Third World and, most of all, with the Soviet Union.[56] By the same token, Raúl and his FAR/MINFAR followers would likely accept such relations only if the quid pro quos with the United States do not restrict Cuba's military activities abroad. Moreover, it should be noted that increased Soviet economic and military support for Cuba since Angola has enhanced Cuba's international status and leverage to a greater extent than future relations with the United States are likely to do.

Hence, the logic of Cuba's situation tends to impel it in the direction of a more activist global policy. Such a policy would most probably be played out in Africa (where Cuba already has momentum, enjoys Soviet backing, and can operate with some degree of legitimacy in African eyes) and in the Caribbean (where Cuba has established a regional power position.)

Cuba's ability to reconcile its divergent pragmatic and activist policy orientations will thus depend in large measure on the types of conditions that Washington seeks to place on further normalization of relations with Havana. If these are confined to economic matters and do not involve concessions that touch on the very leverage capabilities of the

[56] For example, on March 21, 1977, at the conclusion of his visit to Tanzania, Fidel insisted that Cuba's solidarity with revolutionary movements in Africa was non-negotiable. He declared, "We will not make any concessions on matters of principles in order to improve relations with the United States." *Granma,* March 27, 1977, p. 1.

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Castro regime, then Cuba can continue on a dual-track policy of pragmatism and global activism.[57] At the same time, one should not lose sight of certain other factors—both objective and subjective—that could limit Cuba's ability to sustain its paladin role over the long term. First, there are intrinsic manpower and economic constraints, and perhaps also internal political considerations, which would argue against unrestrained global activism, particularly if the military situation overseas continues to place a heavy drain on Cuban resources. And, second, Cuba's future leverage may well depend ultimately on the global intentions of the Soviet Union. If the USSR increasingly becomes a reactive rather than activist world power, dedicated more to preserving the status quo than to expansion of its influence, Cuba's value as a paladin in the service of proletarian internationalism would decline.[58] In such an eventuality, one might expect some lessening of strength of the revolutionary and military mission tendencies and some increased stress on the pragmatic tendency in Cuban foreign behavior.

These are basically hypothetical considerations, however. For the present, Fidel appears intent upon playing out each of the three tendencies in Cuban foreign policy. Thus, on September 29, he reaffirmed that if the United States ends its "acts of aggression" and "economic blockade" against Cuba, there can be "an improvement in state relations" between the two countries, but added that no one should get the "wrong idea" about any kind of "flirtation" between the two systems. Meanwhile, he said, "Cuba's international policy of principles and her increasingly close and solid relations with the Soviet Union will remain unchanged." [59] His six-day visit to Jamaica three weeks later, during which he pledged renewed solidarity with and material support for the Manley government, underscored Cuba's efforts to assert leadership in the Caribbean.[60] This, along with the large presence of Cuban military, technical, and medical personnel in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa, attests to Fidel's continued commitment to global activism.

[57] It should be pointed out that such a scenario, in Fidel's perspective, does not entail rapid reestablishment of *full* diplomatic relations with Washington. In an interview with Barbara Walters ("Fidel Castro Speaks"), broadcast over ABC television on June 9, 1977, the Cuban leader answered a question on when such relations might be achieved, in the following manner: "I don't even think they could be reestablished during Carter's term. Maybe [they could be reestablished] in Carter's second term, between 1980 and 1984."

[58] I am indebted to Professor Richard W. Cottam, University of Pittsburgh, for this observation. For recent analyses of Soviet interests and problems in Africa, see Vanneman and James, loc. cit., and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Somalia and Moscow's Problems on the Horn of Africa," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 158/7, July 5, 1977, pp. 1-12.

[59] *Granma*, Oct. 9, 1977, p. 5.

[60] For an assessment of the impact of Castro's visit to Jamaica, see Michael Leapman, "President Castro comes to the aid of Mr. Manley's party," *The Times* (London), Oct. 24, 1977, p. 5. Detailed coverage of Castro's Jamaican trip appears in *Granma*, Oct. 30, 1977, pp. 1-6.

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Social Change and Stability In Eastern Europe

By Walter D. Connor

The Eastern Europe of the hardy travelers and diarists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, that continental "backwater" at which so many statesmen scoffed, has been gone for many years. Its successor, defined so evocatively in Churchill's "iron curtain" speech, has been with us now for three decades—time which has shown that the curtain, if still in place, is rather permeable, and that behind it much has taken and is taking place.

Observers have frequently wrapped postwar Eastern Europe in large terminological blankets. On some points complementary, on other points contradictory, such characterizations have differed widely, depicting at one extreme precariously dammed reservoirs of simmering discontent, or stressing at the other the masses' political apathy and materialistic privatism. Not surprisingly, events and trends of the past 30 years have lent, and continue to lend, support to both images.

Thus, the riots and other public disorders of the mid-1950's, which alternated with periods of apparent quiescence under conditions of repression and retrenchment, yielded a mix of indications on which one might reasonably have predicted an unstable and uncertain future for the Soviet-dominated regimes and the Soviet-model socialism imposed throughout Eastern Europe save in Yugoslavia. On the same evidence—but with less optimism—one might also have discerned in the regimes' quick resort to forcible suppression and arrest an effective determination to maintain these systems, whatever their human costs and lack of legitimacy.

Today, however, our analyses tend to be proportioned to less "grand" issues than those addressed earlier, for the socialist regimes now seem durable parts of Europe's political topography. Most of these regimes have outlived the personalities first connected with them, yet with some adjustments, the social and political orders which those early leaders spawned and consolidated endure. Against the backdrop of the postwar world, marked by a proliferation of new states, growing territorial disparities of wealth and power, political instability in many areas, and a seemingly ever less predictable global situation, Eastern Europe has been and continues to be a relatively stable area, although with some inevitable qualifications. Why, then, have the East European regimes—imposed from without, dominated by the USSR, and indeed often acting on behalf of it—survived? So clearly defective in initial political legitimacy, how have they, nonetheless, maintained themselves through years of strife, tension, and uneasy accommodation with popular discontent?

An easy but oversimple answer would be *coercion,* its actual use and no less effective threat. Both internal coercion—that which the regimes mounted against their subject populations—and external coercion—Soviet power inside and outside Eastern Europe, setting limits to what the USSR's client states in the area might do—played a clear role, certainly, in imposing and maintaining a status quo, in spite of the wishes and aspirations of Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and other peoples. But to accept coercion alone as the answer is to narrow one's view of East European sociopolitical dynamics to an unwarranted degree, and to risk missing other factors

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important for explaining the past and for identifying possible lines of future development.[1]

This article offers a retrospective and prospective examination of some of the sources of stability and, perhaps, latent future instability in the East European states. Our focus is directed, not at *all* those "other important factors" which a preoccupation with coercion might obscure, but rather at one, broad enough in itself: the social consequences of economic growth and development in the new socialist states and the mass *social mobility* that resulted. We thereby attempt to link major social forces to the stability and "staying power" of what are for the most part political "importations," for our underlying premise is that the "high politics" of the East European leaderships are connected inextricably with the broader problems of everyday life and the responses—real or imagined—of the East European masses.

Looked at from one angle, then, the history of the socialist regimes is the history of the mass movement of populations from old to new contexts of work and life. The impact of that history on the minds of the socialist masses has been critical, we shall argue, for the stability these regimes have achieved in the past 30 years. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the history of mass mobility is indeed now history, irretrievably in the past, and that a new era with respect to social mobility is upon Eastern Europe, suggesting in turn that a period of instability may be dawning. Whether this potential instability will in fact materialize and with what implications for the use of "stabilizing" coercion and the effects thereof are matters for speculation.

The Promise of Revolution

Whether imposed from without or a product of domestic revolution as in Yugoslavia, the new socialist order promised something profoundly new to those who lived under it—social equality. In the Eastern Europe that emerged from World War II, nothing perhaps could have represented a greater break with the past than the promise that the mighty would be laid low, that those "who had been nothing, would be all." Even in economically developed and democratic Czechoslovakia, this presaged a thrust toward greater egalitarianism; in Hungary and Poland, given their traditional elitist social orders and yawning gaps between gentry and mass, it meant no less than transformation of the very bases and premises of society. Although the Balkan "peasant states" for the most part lacked indigenous aristocracies, there, too, the promise of equality in the material sphere, under a regime devoted to the interests of "toiling" workers and peasants, found strong resonance.

Revolutionary promises rarely achieve fulfillment once they leave banners and posters for the real world. Such at least was the case with the promise of equality. To be sure, the former elites disappeared, new criteria of social value favored proletarians in the allocation of ration cards, etc. But socialism came to Eastern Europe in the context of war's destruction, economic backwardness, and scarcity—with respect to material goods there was precious little to distribute. As did the Soviet regime in the 1920's, the new East European socialist regimes in the early postwar years faced the need for and attendant problems of rapid and large-scale economic development in order to create the modern industrial economies which were the presumed social base for socialism. And, following the path of their Soviet predecessor, the East European regimes rapidly abandoned "revolutionary" egalitarian policies for ones offering markedly differentiated rewards, for managers, engineers, and highly skilled workers in critical industries were in short supply. These personnel now would be rewarded "according to their work," and as scarce commodities they commanded relatively high rewards. Equality gave way to a clearly "functionalist" pattern of differentiated income.[2] For many rank-and-file workers and peasants, their relative place in the material hierarchy remained much as before.

[1] In general, coercion in its most extreme forms—like *mass* terror of the Stalinist 1930's in the USSR—was less pronounced in Eastern Europe. The reasons for this involve situational, temporal, cultural, and accidental factors beyond the scope of our discussion here. It will not do to *minimize* the amount of violence visited on East European populations in the later Stalin years, but, given the factors discussed below, it would be a mistake to see coercion as the sole "cement" holding these societies together during the early years of socialism.

[2] "Functionalism" here is meant in the sense in which the American sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore used it in their elaboration and explanation of the persistence of inequalities in rewards and esteem. In essence, "jobs" are seen as having differential importance for society in the contribution they make. Those jobs both critical in importance and demanding talent and lengthy training are well rewarded, in order to motivate the talented to compete for them and discharge the responsibilities of the job effectively. See Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review* (Washington, DC), April 1945, pp. 242-49, and since reprinted in numerous readers and collections.

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A commitment to rapid industrial growth, in the context of poverty and scarcity, meant stressing investment over consumption, future economic capacity over current demand. Thus, the new socialist societies, lacking in any case the prerequisites of affluence, were pushed by their planned economies into still relatively greater scarcity. The gray and grim years of shoddy goods and shortages of necessities, of overcrowding in aged and deteriorating housing, of grand promises for the future and deficient diets in the present, descended upon Eastern Europe.

A balance sheet drawn in the early 1950's would have looked bleak indeed. Parliamentary democracy had not flourished in the region except in Czechoslovakia, yet subordination to the communist regimes left *less* personal or institutional freedom than even the authoritarian interwar governments had afforded. Political terror and purge trials, while not on the scale of the 1930's in the USSR, nonetheless prevailed. Living standards were low; goods, scarce. For broad strata of the population, real incomes had fallen to levels below those enjoyed, or endured, at the close of the prewar period, with restoration of the war's material ravages proceeding slowly.

The potential for latent social unrest under such conditions is, of course, immense, and it was manifested in riots and popular disturbances in East Berlin and elsewhere in the wake of Stalin's death. It may sharpen our appreciation of the situation if we consider the following "representatives" of whole East European social strata. A member of the Warsaw *inteligencja,* for example, lived worse in 1951 than he had in 1938. His salary bought less food, commanded a smaller range of choice and quality in clothing, and gave him less living space. It mattered little whether he was a member of the "old" or new "socialist" professional strata; a position in this social category no longer commanded the same rewards as before—in Poland, or elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, for a Budapest worker in 1951, a week's work at his plant bought him a smaller market basket than those same hours had in 1939 under a regime of capitalists closely allied to Nazi Germany. This worker's diet had worsened in quality and quantity, while the general scope of his material life had narrowed, rather than broadened, under the socialist regime.[3]

The peasant's position during these same years is less easily characterized. In Poland and Hungary, long overdue reforms distributed land hitherto locked within the boundaries of the large estates, thereby improving the peasant's lot. Thus, for a time, socialism could claim the credit for a fundamental reform which previous regimes had avoided. In much of the rest of Eastern Europe, presocialist landholding patterns, while uneconomical and problematic, at least provided the base for an independent peasantry. Here collectivization came more quickly—accompanied by resistance, deprivation, unsown fields, and a declining quality of life.

In general, then, after nearly a decade of socialism, the circumstances of most social groups evidenced only the barest improvement.[4] Grim statistics charted the much greater number of hours it took an East European worker to "earn" a kilo of meat, a pair of shoes, or other items, in comparison with his American (or West European) counterpart. From this perspective, the social stability of the East European states is all the more impressive. The remarkable thing is not that riots occurred, or that they were suppressed, but that so few took place. Coercion and the penetration of society by the secret police explain a lot, but not the whole, of this puzzle. There were also more "positive" factors, socialist policies which perhaps tapped and effectively responded to mass desires. But to explore these relationships we need to change our angle of vision.

The Impact of Economic Growth

Socialism might not deliver equality; however, through the economic development it fostered it did create (in addition to straitened circumstances for

[3] Of course, workers were assured of more *steady* employment in a socialist economy. Unemployment, which had threatened much, but not all, of the prerevolutionary working class, no longer presented a major problem. For some, this new benefit weighed heavily in the new regime's favor; for others, whose skills had kept them steadily employed in the late 1930's, it was necessarily less relevant.

[4] In some of the more war-ravaged states, socialism's early and generally shortlived "reconstruction" phase resulted in some improvements in living standards above the "low" of 1944-45. But the *pace* of improvement did not continue, and there is evidence that the public perception of rapid gains quickly diminished as early as 1947-48—before anything approaching prewar standards could have been reached, and as construction of the "foundations of a socialist economy" was just beginning. See, e.g., the interesting Budapest data reported by Robert Blumstock in Walter D. Connor and Zvi Y. Gitelman, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems,* New York, NY, Praeger, forthcoming in 1977, Ch. 5. For a review of some changes in the Czechoslovak living standard between 1937 and 1957 (by which time life in many aspects had improved since the early 1950's), see Edward Taborsky, *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 425-43.

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Demonstrating workers trample a sign identifying the "Beginning of the Democratic [i.e., Soviet-controlled] Sector of Greater Berlin," during the June 1953 riots against communist rule.

—Keystone.

the population) *opportunity*—opportunity to change one's work and one's life on a hitherto undreamed-of scale. In other words, economic development demanded and created socio-occupational mobility.

It would be hard to overestimate the impact of this development. Europe as a whole, in comparison with the United States, offered less fertile soil for the Horatio Alger myth and ideology.[5] West Europeans and Americans *both* believed that social mobility—the chance for a blue-collar worker's or peasant's son to cross the border into nonmanual work, to go "beyond" the world of his father—was greater in the United States than in Europe (although actual differences in mobility rates were not very great[6]). The notion that peasants might change their lives, that workers might become managers, that children of the humble might in large numbers occupy desks in university lecture halls, was even more alien in Eastern Europe, which was economically and socially backward compared to the Western part of the continent. There, one's social location at birth seemed that which one would keep for the rest of one's life. Great and apparently unbridgeable gaps yawned between urbanite and rustic, between the person who worked with his hands and one who worked with his head. The Great Depression, which closed with such a tight grip on Eastern Europe in the "twilight" 1930's,[7] widened these gaps still further, reducing especially the opportunities for even the most ambitious and adventuresome of the peasantry to make it to a job in Warsaw or Budapest.[8]

The economic development that followed the imposition of socialism changed these circumstances profoundly. The rates of both intergenerational (father-to-son) and intragenerational (career) mobility increased dramatically over those of the interwar period.[9] For the first time, industry grew at such a pace, creating such a demand for manpower, that peasants and their sons found ready employment at the new factories and construction sites—and accompanying relief from the burden of rural overpopulation and agricultural underemployment. At the same time, the ranks of the new "socialist" intelligentsia and managerial/administrative cadres grew as the new regimes assumed a range of activities much broader than those of their predecessors. Into these nonmanual "spaces" came the sons of urban workers and even peasants, for offspring of the presocialist white-collar stratum were not themselves numerous enough to "inherit" all of the new positions that socialism created. Eastern Europe remained poor, and life was still grim in many ways.

[5] See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1963, pp. 267-69; also Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1963, pp. 76-83.

[6] Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., pp. 11-75, have documented strong gross similarities in total manual-to-nonmanual mobility in the US and West European countries, while also noting some differences in particular aspects, such as the predominant social origin of *elite* members.

[7] See the interesting and informative work by two major Hungarian economic historians, Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1974, esp. pp. 242-64 and 315-18.

[8] An effective and evocative treatment of a young peasant's efforts to make his way in Budapest is provided in Laszlo Nemeth's novel *Guilt*, London, Peter Owen, 1966.

[9] Interwar mobility data are indeed hard to come by, and for the most part, we are confined to making judgments on the basis of the slow rates of economic change that necessarily would have restricted such mobility. Yet some Hungarian data, collected at different times using different methods, do indicate lower rates in the interwar period than those derived from socialist period data. For these data and a detailed discussion, see Walter D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics, and Equality*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, forthcoming in 1978, Ch. 4, Tables 4-16 and 4-18.

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But for the first time people were conscious of being "on the move."

The investigations of East European sociologists in the 1960's and 1970's have confirmed this break with the past, while supplying more precise quantitative indicators of the magnitude of the transformation. Research on social mobility in the socialist states has been diverse in format and rich, if sometimes unsystematic, in results.

The most useful are studies based on *national* samples of a country's population, and, except in the case of Romania, national samples yield the data reported in Table 1. Such studies are far from the only sources of information about social mobility in Eastern Europe—a wide range of data derived from subnational studies, based largely on urban samples, also exists. Yet, while subnational data are useful for many purposes, national surveys would seem to be more appropriate for inquiring into the magnitude of *national* social transformation.[10]

In addition, looking cross-nationally at such data raises problems of comparability, although, for our purposes, these appear relatively minor. Where necessary, data have been aggregated into three broad categories—nonmanual, manual (nonfarm), and peasant. (Some of the studies provided *only* this trichotomous classification.) Nonmanual includes both "intelligentsia" and white-collar employees. Nonfarm manual ("worker" in Table 1) encompasses manual workers employed outside agriculture—i.e., industrial and other workers, as well as both cooperative and independent artisans. "Peasant" covers all manual workers in agriculture, whether collectivized or (as in Poland and Yugo-

Table 1. Intergenerational Social Mobility
(in percent*)

	Manual to Nonmanual	Worker to Nonmanual	Peasant to Nonmanual	Peasant to Worker
Bulgaria	13.5	22.6	10.1	49.8
Czechoslovakia	29.0	35.9	20.6	50.3
Hungary	17.2	27.5	10.7	48.8
Poland	16.9	27.6	10.3	33.7
Romania (estimate)	20.0	37.4	14.3	41.1
Yugoslavia	14.5	27.9	10.7	25.5

* Figures in table represent the percentages of respondents born into a particular socio-occupational stratum who themselves have moved into a different stratum.

SOURCES: Bulgaria—Atanas Atanasov and Aron Mashiakh, *Promeni v sotsialnata prinadlezhnost na zaetite litsa v Bulgariya* (Changes in the Social Composition of Employed Persons in Bulgaria), Sofia, 1971. These data date from 1967 and derive from a 3 percent sample of the employed males and females in that country.

Czechoslovakia—"Intergenerational Mobility in the Occupational Sphere," in Ceskoslovensky Vyzkumny Ustav Prace, *Socialni a profesionalni mobilita pracujicino obyvatelstva CSSR* (Social and Occupational Mobility of the Working Population of the CSSR), Bratislava, 1972. These figures, also from 1967, reflect a sample of males (probably), a subset of a larger sample drawn for the 1967 comprehensive investigation of the Czechoslovak social structure. For the main publication of this larger study, see Pavel Machonin et al., *Ceskoslovenska spolecnost: sociologicka analyza socialni stratifikace* (Czechoslovakian Society: A Sociological Analysis of Social Stratification), Bratislava, Epocha, 1969. The Czechoslovak data used here, however, were not published in the earlier book but are taken from the 1972 source cited, a two-volume collection of essays, printed "for internal use only" in an edition of 600 copies.

Hungary—Rudolf Andorka, "Tendencies of Social Mobility in Hungary: Comparisons of Historical Periods and Cohorts," Conference of the Research Committee on Social Stratification, International Sociolcgical Association, Geneva, 1975, mimeo. The data come from a 1973 survey of males only and cover 0.5 percent of the population (N=16,403). This study is a replication of one conducted in 1962-64, also by Dr. Andorka and his collaborators at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. See *A tarsadalmi atretegzodes es demografiai hatasai, II. Magyarorszagon* (Social Mobility and Its Demographic Effects, II. Hungary), Budapest, Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, 1970. More accessible data from this project are provided in Andorka, "Social Mobility and Economic Development in Hungary," *Acta Oeconomica* (Budapest), No. 7, 1971, pp. 25-45, and Andorka, "Social Mobility, Economic Development, and Socio-Occupational Transformations of the Working Population in Hungary, A General View (1930-1970)," *Revue française de sociologie* (Paris), Vol. 13, Supplement, 1972, pp. 607-29. Some results of the 1973 replication are now available in Andorka's "Social Mobility and Education in Hungary: An Analysis Applying Raymond Boudon's Models," *Social Science Information* (Paris), Vol. 15, No. 1, 1976, pp. 47-70.

Poland—Krzysztof Zagorski, "Changes of Socio-Occupational Mobility in Poland: Methodological Issues and Preliminary Findings," Warsaw, 1975, mimeo. These data are a result of a 1972 study conducted by Poland's Main Statistical Administration and directed by Dr. Zagorski which surveyed a sample of economically active males and females, aged 15-69, and involved more than 72,000 respondents.

Romania—Honorina Cazacu, *Mobilitate sociala* (Social Mobility), Bucharest, 1974. The Romanian data are *not* national in scope but are based on separate studies conducted in 1970, in Bucharest and in the rural commune of Calugareni, with a total of 1,116 respondents. Figures from each of these studies have been weighted, respectively, in accordance with the urban and rural shares of the 1970 Romanian population and combined in order to provide the estimates of mobility dynamics reported above.

Yugoslavia—Vojin Milic, "General Trends in Social Mobility in Yugoslavia," *Acta Sociologica* (Copenhagen), Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2, 1965. These data are the oldest in Table 1 and come from a 1960 pilot census, a sample comprised of 8,707 males and females.

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slavia) independent. In sum, and at this level of *gross* distinctions, the categories are as similar as we are likely to be able to make them in any investigation of cross-national data.[11]

The data in Table 1 reveal the magnitude of the mobility between broad socio-occupational categories. These figures indicate "outflow," i.e. the percentage of sons (or sons and daughters, in the case of mixed-sex studies) of fathers in a given category who themselves move to a different category. The first column gives the percentage of offspring of manual fathers (workers or peasants) who have attained nonmanual jobs themselves. Variation in the figures is wide, from nearly 30 percent for relatively developed Czechoslovakia to less than 15 percent for backward Bulgaria. The second and third columns decompose the data of the first into two component parts, showing separate outflow figures for worker and peasant offspring. It is evident that, in socialist countries as elsewhere, workers' children, generally raised in an urban and more modern, complex environment, have an advantage over peasant children in the competition for the desk job and a white collar.

It is the fourth column, however, which tells the real story of Eastern Europe's social transformation: intergenerational mobility within the manual category, the movement of peasant offspring from farm and village to factory and city. Initially constituting the majority of the total population in all countries but Czechoslovakia, the peasantry yielded up nearly half its offspring, on the average, to form the new working class, to create the social drama of a new life, a new world. As the Polish poet Adam Wazyk wrote of the process in 1955, "from villages and little towns, they come in carts/to build a foundry and dream out a city. . . ." [12]

There occurred, then, a critical break with the past, the shattering of many old, local, primordial ties. A new *fluidity* came to characterize East European social structures. Mobility expanded the range and volume of opportunities for social advance. It did not make "equal" opportunities, nor did it provide equality of condition or result—to which, in a broader sense, socialism was commited. But mobility did make for the *appearance* of greater equality, and for the reality of a more promising structure of opportunities in expanding economies.

Perhaps it is worth emphasizing that, at least by the "gross" measure of *manual-to-nonmanual* mobility, the socialist states are not particularly dynamic in comparison to Western industrial and semi-industrial states (where data tend to be the most readily available). Thus, the average manual-to-nonmanual rate for the six countries treated here is 18.5 percent; a similar average for 11 "Western" countries, using studies between 1949 and the mid-1960's, equals 23.8 percent.[13] Ranges within the

[10] Interesting Polish studies at the subnational level include: a study of the occupational destinations of peasant sons, Michal Pohoski, *Migracje ze wsi do miast* (Migration from Village to City), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1963, and idem, "Interrelations Between Social Mobility of Individuals and Groups in the Process of Economic Growth in Poland," *Polish Sociological Bulletin* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1964, pp. 17-33; an early (1959) urban study in Lodz, Jozef Kadzielski, "Intergenerational Social Mobility of Lodz Residents," *Przeglad socjologiczny* (Warsaw), Vol. 17, No. 2, 1963, pp. 114-28; and a 1961 study of urban males from all over Poland, Stefan Nowak, "Psychological Aspects of Changes in Social Structure and Social Mobility," *Studia socjologiczne* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1966, pp. 75-105. Finally, research during 1964-67 in Lodz, Szczecin, and Koszalin resulted in two reports on the mobility of male respondents: Antonina Pilonow-Ostrowska, "Occupational Mobility and its Consequences," in Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Ed., *Zroznicowanie spoleczne* (Social Differentiation), Wroclaw-Warsaw-Crakow, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1970, pp. 339-73; and Krystyna Janicka, "Intergenerational Mobility," in K. M. Slomczynski and W. Wesolowski, Eds., *Struktura i ruchliwosc spoleczna* (Social Structure and Mobility), Wroclaw-Warsaw-Crakow, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii, Nauk 1973, pp. 61-101.

Yugoslav researchers also have undertaken quite complex and sophisticated analyses of mobility, although they lean less toward nationally representative samples and more toward those which try to capture the complexity of differential economic development by focusing on the extremes—usually "Westernized" and modern Slovenia, on the one hand, and the quintessentially "Balkan" Macedonia, on the other. For example, see Stane Saksida et al., "Social Stratification and Mobility in Yugoslav Society," in *Some Yugoslav Papers Presented to the 8th World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, 1974*, Ljubljana, 1974, pp. 213-74.

[11] Table 1 reflects some adjustments in the original data, e.g., the elimination of "other" and "no answer" responses to both origin and destination questions. The data also suffer some other problems of specificity and comparability. For example, the effects of economic development would be clearer if we had age-cohort data—our sources, like most mobility studies, include a "mix" of respondents of many ages. Moreover, some national samples consist of males only, while others include men and women, thus complicating cross-national comparisons. Given the generality of the arguments advanced here, however, these data problems are not so serious as they might be were our focus different. For more detailed discussion of the data problems, see the author's *Socialism, Politics, and Equality*, Ch. 4.

[12] Adam Wazyk, "A Poem for Adults," *Kultura* (Warsaw), Aug. 21, 1955, translated in Edmund Stillman, Ed., *Bitter Harvest: The Intellectual Revolt Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1959, pp. 121-32.

[13] The countries are Australia, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the US, and West Germany. Figures are adapted from S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility," *Current Sociology* (The Hague), Vol. 9, No. 1, 1960; Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, "Occupational Inheritance: A Cross-National Analysis," in J. Lopreato and L. L. Lewis, Eds., *Readings in Social Stratification*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1974, pp. 469-73; and several other sources. See the author's *Socialism, Politics, and Equality*, Ch. 4.

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

Two apprentices of the Leipzig-Halle Electrical Power Engineering Works learn to mount a switching panel.

—Eastfoto.

Western data are also wide (from 17.1 percent for Italy in 1963-64 to 30.8 percent for a sample of US males in 1962), but, in general, the Western states "outperform" their socialist counterparts on this measure. The reason is clear. The greater degree of economic development in the Western states created a more "modern" starting point—that is, the fathers' occupational distribution includes a much smaller share of peasants/farmers on the average in the "Western" than in the socialist states. A relatively large peasant-origin stratum thus restricts short-term manual to nonmanual mobility, since the next "move" of children of peasants is typically (and given the nature of economic development, almost necessarily) into *manual* work *outside* agriculture.

But this, too, is "upward" mobility—indeed, it is the primary social transformation wrought in the backward East European states, as we noted above. Its magnitude may best be understood by attention to the fact that, on average, 27.1 percent of all respondents in the six socialist states—of the total populations of the original samples—are "workers" born into the peasant stratum. Data for seven, generally better-developed Western states show, on average, only 13.7 percent of total respondents in this "farm-to-factory" category.[14]

The Social Consequences

Viewed against the background of historically low aspirations, frustration, and backwardness, the recent transformation of East European societies through mass social mobility, even if at a rate lower, *en gros,* than that of some Western states, takes on its full meaning. One side of the picture drawn by socialism showed initial declines in living standards and many other aspects of the "quality of life." Yet socialism also delivered the opportunity "to make something of oneself"—which contrasted sharply with the eternally "peasant" character of the pre-socialist Balkans and the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the gentry/upper class and the common worker and peasant in Hungary and Poland.[15] Socialism, as a "principle" of system-organization, claimed and received credit for the transformation. If not yet "legitimate," the East European regimes could nonetheless point to their "effectiveness"—a base from which legitimacy can accrue.[16]

In a strict sense, however, socialism *as a principle* had almost nothing to do with producing a new, more dynamically "equal" society, a factor which has made the interpretation of social mobility under a revolutionary socialist regime a matter of some political sensitivity. The point is that economic development of the sort important here can be promoted by regimes of quite different political-economic colorations. Mass mobility is a product of the "demand" generated by economic development, not of the new "openness" of a revolutionary so-

[14] The countries include Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the US and West Germany. Data are derived and adapted as reported in fn. 13. Since the data for several of the East European countries are based on mixed-sex samples, these figures may understate the real differences between Eastern Europe and the West, concerning farm-to-factory mobility. Women, in both East and West, have traditionally been less inclined than men to leave their rural origins. However, the mobility studies from which our Western figures have been derived are based—as usual—on all-male samples. Were all the East European data derived from male samples, the calculated average mobility rates for the East European socialist countries probably would be greater.

[15] Historical data on mobility are sparse indeed. The magnitude of the changes we are talking about, however, may be at least partially illuminated by Hungarian census data. Thus, in 1930 only 3.8 percent of the sons of workers and peasants had moved into nonmanual occupations, while in 1949 (just as the consequences of revolution began to be felt), 7.0 percent had done so. See fn. 9 above. But compare these figures with the 1973 figure for manual-to-nonmanual mobility as presented in Table 1.

[16] On the relevance to legitimacy of effectiveness, in the economic sphere and elsewhere, see Lipset's *Political Man,* p. 64, and his *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective,* Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1967, p. 68.

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Table 2. Intergenerational Social Mobility: Hypothetical Rates Assuming No Change in Occupational Structure

(in percent*)

	Manual to Nonmanual	Worker to Nonmanual	Peasant to Nonmanual	Peasant to Worker
Bulgaria	4.6	11.1	2.0	14.9
Czechoslovakia	6.5	14.1	4.1	27.1
Hungary	4.3	8.3	1.8	23.8
Poland	5.3	10.7	1.9	16.1
Romania (estimate)	4.2	12.7	1.4	10.7
Yugoslavia	5.3	14.2	2.8	11.3

* Figures in table represent hypothetical percentages of respondents, born into a particular socio-occupational stratum, who *might* have moved into different strata in the absence of economic growth and development. On methodology, see footnote 19 in text.

SOURCES: See source note in Table 1.

cialist regime. To be sure, the ascent of activist ex-peasants and workers to the few positions of real political power *is* connected with the "revolutionary" element, but the very scarcity of such positions ensures that only a small portion of the population is so benefited. Thus, in a 1957 address to an international audience, the late Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski asserted that

. . . one of the immediate aims of the leaders of the socialist states was to reach the level of more advanced capitalist countries in industrialization, urbanization, development of communications, and mass education. All these processes imply an increase in social mobility in socialist countries as well as elsewhere, *and since they were induced by social revolutions we can therefore postulate a plain causal relation between social revolution and—this increase of social mobility.* But it is the "social-economic expansion" and not the revolutionary introduction of a socialist order which can be considered a necessary condition of this increase. Increased mobility of this type could have been accomplished also if the capitalist system had persisted: it would have been done, e.g., with the help of schemes like the Marshall plan.[17]

Clearly, Ossowski took a quite nonideological view of the linkage between socialism and the increase in general social mobility. But such clarity of vision is ideologically inconvenient, and the credit due a socialist regime for benefits and opportunities bestowed on the population is a sensitive matter. Thus, when the posthumous multivolume edition of his complete works was published subsequently in Poland, the last sentence of the passage quoted above was replaced by the more innocuous, "The introduction of the socialist order through revolution and the accompanying 'social-economic expansion' is a necessary condition of this growth." [18]

This sensitivity is understandable when one considers what the outcome might have been had socialism been less successful in promoting economic growth and therefore social mobility. Table 2 clarifies this by use of a technique whereby the intergenerational mobility attributable to economic growth (i.e., to changes in the structure of employment) is "eliminated" from the net data in Table 1. The figures in Table 2 represent that mobility which would have occurred solely as a result of the *random* movement of persons in the occupational structure. These rates, reported in the same manner as in Table 1, thus reflect what "might have been." [19]

[17] Stanislaw Ossowski, "Social Mobility Brought About by Social Revolution," working paper (in English), Fourth Working Conference on Social Stratification and Social Mobility, International Sociological Association, Geneva, 1957, as quoted in Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, op. cit., p. 282. Emphasis in original.

[18] Stanislaw Ossowski, *Z zagadnien struktury spolecznej* (On Problems of Social Structure), Vol. 5 of *Dziela* (Works), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1968, p. 282.

[19] The statistical technique used in the construction of Table 2 is discussed in W. Edward Deming, *Statistical Adjustment of Data*, New York, NY, Wiley, 1943, pp. 96-127. Under "random" movement, we mean to subsume all mobility that is *not* induced by structural change. Of course, nonrandom factors—among them the implementation of implicit or explicit social policies—*do* affect social mobility. Even a "no-growth" socialist economy, through "politicized" educational and promotional practices, doubtless would have encouraged at the margins more of certain kinds of mobility than a stagnant economy and presocialist regime did. In the larger context of broad national change, however, it is clear that economic development, and the changes it effects in the occupational structure, are far and away the most important factors at work. In this sense, comparisons between Tables 1 and 2 are by no means unfair to the socialist regimes.

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The figures are sobering. Had socialism not promoted development, or only moderate development, manual-to-nonmanual mobility would have been miniscule—birth in a toiling family would indeed have been a sentence for one's lifetime. Similarly, peasant-to-worker mobility would have been but a pale reflection of that which actually took place, leaving the vast majority of peasants locked in the cycle of hard work, underemployment, and poverty. If these random figures, rather than those of Table 1, had been the "reality," would the postrevolutionary socialist regimes, after promising so much, have enjoyed the relative stability they did? Indeed, one would have to doubt it. Mass mobility "upward," from peasant to worker, from manual to nonmanual, generated credits which the regimes badly needed.

It was, finally, by *mobility* that the overall decline in living standards, occasioned by forced-draft, high-reinvestment industrialization, was masked and deprived of some of its explosive potential. Our earlier description of "worsening situations" is accurate, but must be understood in the context which mass mobility imparted to it.

The "Warsaw intellectual" was indeed poorer in the early 1950's than in 1938—but "he" was not the same person. By the early 1950's, the social stratum for which we let him stand was heavily populated by *novi homines,* sons of workers and peasants, recruited to form the beginnings of the new socialist intelligentsia. "Hereditary" intellectuals were on the decline as a proportion of the total stratum. The new arrivals brought with them *old* frames of reference. Prewar, presocialist living standards and the shortfalls from these were irrelevant, for the life, perquisites, and prestige they now enjoyed were incomparably more exalted than what their worker and peasant backgrounds would have led them to aspire to.[20]

The Budapest worker, by the early to mid-1950's, was also disadvantaged in material things compared to 1938—but neither was "he" the same person. Increasingly, he was not a holdover or child of the smaller, "core" urban proletariat of the presocialist years, but an ex-peasant. In Hungary, as elsewhere, the old small working class was "swamped" by peasant recruits into a rapidly expanding socialist blue-collar stratum. As Zygmunt Bauman has put it in regard to Poland:

A relatively meagre group of pre-war industrial workers, who remained workers in spite of all mobility opportunities opened by the revolution, suffered an almost continuous deterioration of their living standard. . . . But [they were] dissolved in a vast mass of peasant migrants, to whom the living conditions they met meant a genuine improvement in the standards they had known.[21]

Life was grim in the factories, workers' dormitories, and overcrowded housing of the new cities, but through *peasant* eyes it was the *city,* it was the life many had unsuccessfully sought in the 1930's, only to return to harsh labor or enforced idleness in the countryside. And peasant eyes were the eyes of a growing proportion of the working class. Like the new intelligentsia, the new workers were conscious of being "upwardly mobile." [22]

Finally, what about the peasantry itself? Here, our focus changes, for people are not "upwardly mobile" into the peasantry, the bottom stratum of East European society. The peasants probably had the least to be "grateful" for, the smallest debt to the new regimes. Of course, isolation, ignorance, and tradition all make for quiescence, moderating a peasantry's potential for generating serious instability. Yet, more fundamental, while nonmanual and industrial worker strata were growing in numbers and as proportions of the total population—and growing by adding upward-mobiles with a stake in the new social order—the peasantry's absolute and relative size declined. And, it declined through the outflow of the young, the male, the adventurous, ambitious, and talented, not through the exit of industrial recruits "representative" of the entire peasant stratum. To oversimplify somewhat, the "natural leaders" of any peasant mobilization

[20] The dimensions of change may be more clearly understood when we examine the mobility "inflow" figures—the percentage of nonmanuals recorded in the national surveys of Table 1 who were *children* of manuals (workers or peasants). The percentages are: Bulgaria, 77.8; Czechoslovakia, 76.3; Hungary, 77.4; Poland, 76.8; Romania (estimate), 63.1; Yugoslavia, 70.0. Since many of these studies were conducted in the late 1960's or early 1970's, such a renewal of the East European intelligentsia would not have had such quantitative impact by the mid- to late 1950's. But the process would have been under way, with the effects mentioned.

[21] Zygmunt Bauman, "Social Dissent in the East European Political System," *European Journal of Sociology* (Paris), Vol. 12, No. 1, 1971, p. 38.

[22] Here, following the procedure in fn. 20, we give the percentages at the time of the study of *workers* who were of peasant origin: Bulgaria, 61.5; Czechoslovakia, 37.5 (a testimony to its *earlier* development of a large working class and its relatively small peasant "recruiting pool"); Hungary, 54.0; Poland, 43.6; Romania, 65.4; and Yugoslavia, 57.3. The data thus show a heavy "peasantization" of the industrial work force.

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were coopted by economic change and left the stratum of their birth to be upwardly mobile. It mattered far less whether those who remained were disgruntled or not, or even whether agriculture eventually was collectivized or left private, as in Poland and Yugoslavia. The "dynamic" left the countryside in either case—as they continue to do.

Thus, the impact of the deprivation socialism brought, measured in average indicators, was absorbed by a process of mass social mobility which, emphasizing "upward" flow for individuals, changed the size, importance, and "inhabitants" of social strata. The decline in living standards[23] and mass social mobility were the contrasting sides of the same picture, each a result of the industrialization process which socialist regimes set in motion.

Such is the "retrospect"—the history of processes and changes now accomplished, or at least beyond certain critical stages of development. If the factors and processes discussed here indeed contributed in past years to a rather remarkable political stability in socialist Eastern Europe, their consequences and the form they are now taking suggest some rather different implications for the future.

The Deferred Costs of Success

Both socialist publicists and Western analysts have recognized the "maturing" of East European socialist societies—their passage, hard to date precisely but evident in result, from the revolutionary and post-revolutionary phases of system-building to the tasks of system maintenance. From this maturity observers also have inferred an increased *stability*. This judgment may well be warranted, for, certainly, the years of great decisions, grand alternatives, and heroic transformation of old societies into new are past. But there is, perhaps, another meaning of socialist maturity.

Ironically, the very success that socialism achieved in fostering social mobility has now given rise to possibly serious, if unanticipated, costs. This mobility produced a one-time social transformation, spread over several years, but at a pace which cannot be duplicated. Most East European socialist countries are now entering a critical period of transition: to slower economic growth, with the resulting implications for manpower "demand" and social mobility; and to a gradual, yet seemingly inevitable shift in the social and demographic composition of all three major social strata.

First, the better-developed economies of Eastern Europe no longer grow so rapidly as to demand mass reallocations of labor across manual-nonmanual and agriculture-industry lines, although less-developed Bulgaria and Romania may still have some "room" in this regard. The various white-collar bureaucracies have grown, multiplied, and stabilized somewhat in size. While the industrial blue-collar work force in some countries is experiencing a manpower shortage, no longer does the peasantry, now a much smaller stratum, provide a pool of underemployed manpower upon which industry can easily draw. Eastern Europe has a larger nonmanual and industrial worker population and a smaller peasantry than ever before. These facts testify to the social transformation which has taken place; they also suggest less "slack" in the demographic structure than existed in, let us say, 1949-50. That is, given the socio-occupational structure that now exists, and the persistent difficulties which the East European economies have suffered with respect to automation and computerization, prospects are dim for a manpower demand of the sort which could generate another rapid expansion in the size of the nonmanual sector and the working class, thereby providing the "space" for future substantial upward mobility. These economies are no longer as dynamic, and though today able to afford more "material stimuli" to their consumers, they are deficient in the spur they can provide to social mobility.[24]

This deficiency extends, moreover, to the second aspect of transition. The "frames of reference" with

[23] Economists, no doubt, will find this characterization of "living standards" oversimple, ignoring various types of transfer payments, welfare allocations, etc. But many social benefits, although available *in principle*, were difficult to distribute in practice in the early socialist period, because of poverty and commitment to heavy investment. Housing, a critical "welfare" item, remained low in cost, but was overcrowded and was in many cases deteriorating rapidly in these years—thus "compensating" people for the low rents paid. Free education was, indeed, a benefit—but one whose payoffs were prospective and, therefore, part of the mobility process and *its* ultimate gains.

[24] While it is true that, in general, the socialist states now exhibit a somewhat more "modern" profile in their occupational structures, this does not mean that they have reached a "take-off" point for increased mobility across the manual-nonmanual line. The pronounced growth of the "service sector," so characteristic of the postwar economies of many Western nations and projective of future economies in which nonmanuals constitute an absolute majority of all those employed, has not been matched in the socialist countries. And it can be argued that the "logic" and predominant tendencies of the socialist economies make such an outcome unlikely, at least in the near-to-medium term. See Gur Ofer, *The Service Sector in Soviet Economic Growth: A Comparative Study*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1973, passim.

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Graduates of the Bolyai Janos Secondary School in Salgotarjan, Hungary, in May 1971.

—Eastfoto.

which members of the major social strata assess their experience and structure their aspirations have undergone a gradual and continuing process of change which parallels that taking place in the composition of those social strata.

The East European intelligentsia, for example, still include a heavy proportion of those whose first referent was a worker or peasant family. But another, different component seems to be on the increase: "second-generation" socialist intelligentsia who have, thanks to education and familial preparation, "inherited" their status from their parents. The ranks of the first-generation socialist intelligentsia grew by external recruitment (upward mobility)—for both demographic and political reasons. Today, however, the number of intelligentsia is not increasing rapidly, and the supply of children in current intelligentsia households is more nearly adequate to "fill" the available positions. This stratum, therefore, is approaching the point where it can "replace" itself intergenerationally through *internal* recruitment.

What does this imply? First, it would seem that the present socialist intelligentsia possess frames of reference no longer so favorable to stability as it is defined by their regimes. The status, material rewards, etc., of these individuals are not ones they can contrast to those of earlier worker or peasant milieux and feel lucky and grateful for having "made it"—for they have grown up in intelligentsia families themselves. Their frame of reference is that of the intelligentsia. Their judgments regarding the adequacy of their pay, perquisites, direct occupational satisfaction, and the whole quality of their lives are made from an intelligentsia perspective. They are doubtless less easily satisfied.

The intelligentsia cannot be "bought off" with the promise of mobility, for they already are the most advantaged category of society. Their expectations *as* intelligentsia are important and there is no guarantee that their regimes can continue to meet these expectations as successfully as in the past. This is, first, a question of material expectations. That they do and *should* live better than workers and peasants is something the intelligentsia take for granted.[25] More critical, increased access to the West with its higher material standards affords the socialist intelligentsia a completely different point of reference, against which their standard of living is still quite low. This, certainly, disturbs some, who see their lower rewards as the result not only of the relatively poorer economies of their countries, but also of government policies which are failing to generate the growth necessary to raise those standards. Thus, the intelligentsia can frequently be found favoring some kind of market-related economic reform and increased income differentiation, as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68[26] and as is still true in Yugoslavia

[25] Indeed, apropos of the argument here, research in two Polish cities in the mid-1960's depicted "hereditary" intelligentsia (those whose parents had been part of this stratum) as less satisfied with their income levels and general material situation than upwardly-mobile, first-generation intelligentsia—even though the former enjoyed higher actual income than the latter. See Antonina Pillnow-Ostrowska, loc. cit., pp. 367-69.

[26] See, e.g., comments by the economist Ota Sik and the sociologist Pavel Machonin, as cited in Walter D. Connor, "Socialism, Work, and Equality," in Irving Louis Horowitz, Ed., *Equity, Income, and Policy: Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1977, pp. 167-68. As one observer has noted, these "white-collar specialists" would most likely gain from policies stressing greater reward differentiation. See Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1971, p. 177.

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among those whom Svetozar Stojanovic calls "anarcho-liberals." [27]

But material concerns are not the only ones regarding which the present intelligentsia's aspirations may go beyond regime capability, or willingness, to deliver. It would be going too far by a great deal to say that the intelligentsia are disaffected or politically "oppositional"—most, it seems clear, still perceive that they have a stake in the status quo and, therefore, support it. Yet some—among them a good number of the second-generation—*are* disaffected politically. Whatever limits on political perception and conventional belief they have transcended to arrive at an oppositional stance, those limits have not been the consequence of birth and early socialization in the working class or peasantry. The students who contributed to unrest in Poland and Yugoslavia in 1968, and also to the Czech reform movement, included many "cadet" members of the second-generation socialist intelligentsia; the same is true of the Hungarian "new left," the groups of dissenters developing in Poland since 1976, and Charter 77 supporters in Czechoslovakia. The angles from which they criticize their regimes are diverse, ranging from "liberal," civil-rights-oriented stances to quasi-Maoist condemnations of the new "materialism," economic inequality, and general "slackness" of socialist consumerism. Such dissensions do not yet present East European politicians with a major problem. But as the older, first-generation socialist intelligentsia are replaced —to a large degree, *literally*, by their children—it seems likely that there will be a proliferation of more critical orientations, a multiplication of "points of view" from which contemporary East European socialism appears morally deficient.

These are children of a certain "affluence," possessed of a rather secure status and many advantages which their parents' success afforded. Like such children in the US and Western Europe in the 1960's, many are critical and rejecting in their attitudes toward the system they live in.[28] For many, this is but a phenomenon of "youth," while for others, something more fundamental. Western countries generally have proven resilient and adaptive in dealing with the strange mix of generational discontents and real politics which the "student revolt" presented. Whether the less resilient East European states can do the same with their younger intelligentsia remains to be seen.

The dissatisfactions of the second-generation socialist intelligentsia thus present a complex picture. Concerns with material status and a "place" in the social hierarchy, which are essentially "selfish" concerns, mix with aspirations for a greater role in structuring social priorities in a more egalitarian direction, *or* (and these are far from the same) for a more libertarian political order. The intelligentsia are, and are likely to remain, divided as to the *desiderata* of politics. As for the sources of these differences, there is little of precision which may be said. One expects, and finds, more dissidence in general in the humanist and social science sectors, where roles are more "marginal" to current regime objectives, than among the technical intelligentsia, although this is true of many Western states as well.

Our judgments must be tentative. At present, the intelligentsia do not represent, on the whole, an authentically destabilizing force, but the social trends sketched above scarcely point to a more stabilizing role for this stratum in the future. While the intelligentsia are not, surely, the gravediggers of socialism, they are unlikely to be its chief comforters in its middle age.

Workers' Prospects

The socialist working class presents potentially even more disquieting prospects. Working-class "consciousness" and combativeness, a proletarian awareness of a commonality of interests, is not something usually expected of workers most of whom are "just off the farm." Bauman's comments, quoted earlier, provide a persuasive rationale for the relative quiescence and lack of effective organization among the workers of the 1950's in Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere. But today's working class is also increasingly hereditary in composition. The sons of ex-peasants, who themselves have known only industrial-urban life, are now coming to replace their fathers behind the benches and machines.

This is potentially important in two ways. First,

[27] Svetozar Stojanovic, *Between Ideals and Reality: A Critique of Socialism and its Future*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 220.

[28] This is not to say that *most* are critical—or that most need be in order to cause some problems for the East European regimes. Passive disaffection, cynicism, a retreat into "private" life, and a concern with material gains at the expense of political principle probably characterize *most* East European youth today, although this is not necessarily limited to Eastern Europe. See Paul Neuberg, *The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation in Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, William Morrow, 1973.

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many such sons do not want to follow their fathers. The sons' aspirations, nurtured by the earlier movement of mobiles into a rapidly-growing intelligentsia, are to "higher things." These children are almost as likely as intelligentsia offspring themselves to desire a university education.[29] Yet their working-class backgrounds leave them less prepared for the competition for university places.[30] Their opportunities to "succeed" are fewer because places in universities have not grown at the same rate as has the output of secondary schools, and for those places which are available, working-class children now compete with those of first-generation socialist intelligentsia eager to see their own offspring succeed them. Nor does the intelligentsia stratum itself grow fast enough to generate "empty space." If yesterday's recruits to the working class were peasants ready and eager to leave the monotony of the village and happy with their destination, today's are more often people who have grown up in the working class and who are disgruntled at their failure to rise above it.

Second—and related to this—there exists in Eastern Europe now more than ever before the "social base" for working-class consciousness. Increasingly, the frame of reference for members of this large class which socialism itself created is that of "worker" rather than of peasant. The regimes can claim no particular credit from most new recruits to blue-collar life, for the latter have not been upwardly mobile from the peasantry. Today's industrial recruits undoubtedly view working-class rewards and life more critically.

To demonstrate conclusively that the chances of working-class offspring for upward mobility are *declining* requires data of a precision we do not now possess—indeed, such data are likely to become available only after the fact. But recent data do show class-related patterns of access to higher education, with worker and peasant offspring being markedly underrepresented. Perhaps the best data come from Poland,[31] but more fragmentary findings from other socialist states also illustrate the problem. One Yugoslav writer explains the situation succinctly, observing that "a manual worker's child today has on the average at least nine to ten times less chance to become a professional than a child of a university trained person or manager." [32] Higher education is, of course, the path to becoming a professional. Whether, in fact, this path is becoming increasingly closed to working-class sons and daughters or is merely stabilizing at a certain level, is less important, perhaps, than the fact that many workers appear to *believe* that the former is the case.

Thus, there may be emerging in Eastern Europe a critical element of "class politics"—that few believe their lot can be improved by individual effort and mobility upward, while many believe that they can only improve their lot collectively. Something of this presently exists in Yugoslavia, which has thus far accommodated it fairly effectively. A similar development may be perceptible even in "quiet" Hungary. There, some of the differentiated material stimuli of the New Economic Mechanism, which has been in effect since 1968, have been reduced in response to working-class resentments, and factory managers occasionally have been exposed to varieties of militancy over bread-and-butter issues (which any convinced Leninist would have to denounce as "trade-unionism"). Poland, of course, is the most obvious site of "class" sentiments and action. In neither 1970 nor 1976 did Polish intellectuals assume their "traditional" role as the initial leaders of oppositional politics. Polish workers, *for their own reasons* and not those of the intelligentsia, have taken to the streets (and taken up the rails) in militant outbreaks which appear qualitatively different from those of the 1950's. In general, East European workers are not as easily satisfied as ex-peasants might be, and they are organizationally more astute. Moreover, in Poland they have linkages with dissident

[29] Various studies indicate high educational and career aspirations of working-class youth and parental desires to see offspring advance as well. For relevant data, see Vasile Morea, "Preparation of the Labor Force and the Occupational Orientation of Youth," *Lupta de clasa* (Bucharest), December 1970, p. 49; Mihailo Popovic, "Social Conditions and the Possibilities of Education of the Young People in Yugoslavia," in English edition of *Sociologija* (Belgrade), 1970, p. 251; and Hungarian Central Statistical Office, *Social Stratification in Hungary*, Budapest, 1967, p. 89.

[30] Thus arises the well-known proportional "underrepresentation" of worker and peasant offspring in universities. Many working-class families lack specific attitudes and practices which are "useful" to their children. Unskilled workers, in their "way of thinking," are still, according to two Polish authors, reminiscent of "the prewar proletariat." See Dariusz Fikus and Jerzy Urban, *Spoleczenstwo w podrozy* (Society in Transition), Lodz, Wydawnictwo Lodzkie, 1968, p. 29. For a Hungarian article, rich in material on these working-class problems, see Julia Juhasz, "Secondary Education of Working Class Children," *New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), Autumn 1970, esp. pp. 132-34.

[31] See, e.g., Wieslaw Wisniewski, "The Academic Progress of Students of Different Social Origin," *Polish Sociological Bulletin* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1970, p. 136; and M. Boyarskaya, "Problems of Occupational Choice of Rural Youth," in G. V. Osipov and J. Szczepanski, Eds., *Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva* (The Social Problems of Work and Production), Moscow, Mysl', 1969.

[32] Srdan Vrcan, "Some Comments on Social Inequality," *Praxis* (Zagreb—International Edition), No. 2-3, 1973, p. 237.

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A sit-in strike at the "Warski" Shipyard in Szczecin in January 1971. The sign over the building proclaims, "The strike is on economic, not political grounds."

—A private photo by a Polish citizen now in the West.

intelligentsia, linkages of the sort that seemed to be missing, until too late, in the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968.

The East European regimes thus have reason to be seriously concerned about workers—the largest single "class," the product and presumably foundation of socialism. Official rhetoric still makes them the "leading class." Yet, in taking to the streets in violent protest, Polish workers at least have demonstrated a clear belief to the contrary. To be sure, such action is not yet common, and to look at the working classes of the socialist states is not to see a mass of blue-collar *enragés*. Certain kinds of material demands can still be met fairly readily by regimes anxious to maintain stability. Others may be articulated, however, which are much harder to accommodate, touching as they do on the routine and subordinated quality of activity at the workplace itself.

In sum, the combination of the growing complexity of the blue-collar work force and demographic trends which point to fewer peasant recruits entering that stratum poses problems for regimes and workers alike. Reforms to increase economic efficiency may be in the offing, but while these may moderate some of the problems of the more skilled, productive, and energetic workers through enhanced economic incentives, they also may increase the dissatisfactions of those with lower skills, as reform serves to decrease the stockpiling of surplus labor in many factories. Though workers, on the whole, are not yet notably "politicized," some economic measures may push them in this direction. And regimes must, in a sense, deal with the workers they have. They no longer can seek large inputs of new and relatively docile recruits from the peasantry.

What, then, of the peasantry? Here some rather different observations are warranted. After years of a depressed material life, the peasants of Eastern Europe have benefited recently from economic policies which have increased their rewards, upgraded their social welfare, and, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, raised their average total earnings to nearly those of the average industrial worker. The peasant is still at the bottom of the social structure, but the bottom is not so low as once it was. The gap

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between it and the industrial "middle" of society is less wide.[33]

At the same time, this stratum remains one into which an individual is *born*—people do not aspire to "join" the peasantry. Whatever the improving economic conditions, the young and ambitious still aspire to leave the countryside. Many do, and the peasantry continues to be relatively "old," feminized, and less "dynamic," in comparison with other strata. It is also, given the past and ongoing processes of out-mobility, proportionately *smaller* than ever before.

Those who remain in the peasantry may have reason to credit the state with considerable improvement in their lives as peasants. Yet the paradox in the general situation is evident. On the one hand, the intelligentsia and worker strata have grown in size and social significance just as their changing composition has made them potentially less quiescent. On the other hand, the peasants, despite their eternal grumblings, are probably less likely than ever to furnish the material for a *jacquerie,* yet are fewer in number than ever before, thus minimizing their supportive influence on general sociopolitical stability. The intelligentsia and workers, derived initially from the peasantry, will determine the degree of that stability, while the peasants, once the social bedrock of the presocialist regimes and—despite the fact that they were isolated and difficult to mobilize—a source of stability in the early years of socialism, have now been bypassed.

[33] In Czechoslovakia, workers in *state* agriculture, whose total "take" is frequently less than that of cooperative farmers, earned 85.5 percent of the average industrial worker's wage in 1965, and 98.1 percent in 1973. See *Statistica rocenka CSSR 1974,* (Statistical Yearbook of the CSSR 1974), Prague, State Statistical Administration, 1975, pp. 135, 253. In Hungary, state agricultural manual workers earned 88.1 percent of the worker's wage in 1965, equaled that level in 1970, and then "fell back" to 94.1 percent in 1973. *Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 1973,* Budapest, Central Statistical Office, 1974, pp. 151, 242-43.

Toward the Future

Ideally, one would like to conclude with a package of specific, if somewhat hedged and qualified, predictions. This can hardly be the case here, for we already have speculated a good deal on seeming trends which, by their very nature, cannot yet be demonstrated sufficiently by empirical data (al-



Family residences built on the prize-winning "Rakoczi" Farmers Cooperative of Hungary's Pest County in May 1966.

—Eastfoto.

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though the data at hand certainly do not indicate countertrends).

Perhaps it is enough to state that we have identified certain *tendencies,* inherent in the demographic process of industrialization and consequent social mobility in "medium-backward" countries—tendencies which are especially acute in most societies in Eastern Europe, where the political-institutional framework and mode of economic organization have been "borrowed," semiartificially, and hence suffer the burden of still-questionable legitimacy. These social trends contain a serious problematic potential. While they do not, in themselves, presage upheaval, they do complicate the problems of social management with which the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, now well beyond any "heroic" phase, must cope. One can predict these complications—one cannot predict the downfall of systems.

The problems focused on here are consequences of economic development and, not surprisingly, seem most pressing in the better-developed socialist states, which to date have had varying success in dealing with them. Thus, under the New Economic Mechanism, Hungary has sought, fairly effectively it seems, to enlarge the "pie" for intelligentsia, workers, and peasants alike. Its bread-and-butter politics, so far not subjected to any stern reining-in from Moscow, are redolent of Chicago's—"nobody gets everything, everybody gets something, nobody gets nothing." Similarly, Czechoslovakia's "normalizers" have considerably sweetened the pill of 1968 with a consumerism supported by Soviet economic transfusions—a fact which perhaps explains why the echoes of Charter 77 have been soft indeed, especially among workers. Poland, failing once again in 1976 to rationalize its price structure after listening to both the economists' "efficiency" case and public opinion researchers' warnings about mass reactions (and attending more to the former),[34] also needs and benefits from Soviet economic aid in order to maintain social peace. Nevertheless, the Gierek regime may well have encouraged public militancy with its gingerly treatment of those dissidents in the civil rights movement and on the Workers' Defense Committee, and by the recently declared amnesty of so many of the participants in the 1976 disturbances. Yet, perhaps the government could do little else, considering how seriously the regime's legitimacy is challenged already.

The Romanian and Bulgarian situations, in contrast, present generally less threatening prospects to the Ceausescu and Zhivkov regimes respectively. The socioeconomic processes with which we have been most concerned here have not yet run their full course in the relatively less developed Balkan countries. Ceausescu's personalistic style, combined with nationalist rhetoric and policy, evidently is quite palatable to a Romanian population which is still largely peasant in origin. Manifestations of dissent, such as that by the writer Paul Goma and a few others, are relatively infrequent and are focused on issues unlikely to evoke broadly based sympathetic concern or understanding. Bulgaria, for its part, remains the seeming archetype of socialist stability, mixing growth in a few industrial sectors with the profitable pursuit of certain types of specialized agriculture. While it is probable that these states, too, will confront some of the problems of their more developed neighbors, they will do so later (and by then, perhaps, will face these problems in altered form).

Yugoslavia, as in so many other spheres, constitutes a rather special case, for its political development has resulted in a certain flexibility in dealing with the consequences of mobility in a recently quite backward nation. Yugoslav economic policies, and a measure of political innovation, have provided an escape valve for those peasant mobility aspirations which exceed the domestic economy's capacity for satisfaction: the export of industrial workers, as *Gastarbeiter,* to capitalist nations in Northern and Central Europe. There is militancy among Yugoslav workers, but thus far the system seems to have accommodated it reasonably well—as it has the aspirations of many of the intelligentsia. That Yugoslav intellectuals are often vocal in their criticism of the regime should not divert one's attention from the fact that "permissible" dissent there runs wider and deeper than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The threats to Yugoslav stability for the most part are

[34] As a well-placed Pole told the author, the prelude to the attempted 1976 price increases was very different from Gomulka's debacle of 1970, when little if any prior exploration of public reaction was undertaken. In 1976, however, government-sponsored opinion polling (its product, for the most part, "for internal use only") indicated the likelihood of quite adverse public reactions. On the other hand, economists' calculations stressed, as they have for some time, the pressing need for price reform. Gierek and his colleagues found themselves in the position of many officials in both East and West: forced to make a choice, anxious to base it on accurate data and perceptions of the situation, but faced with strong empirical arguments for entirely different choices. While the readiness to gather and use more information in decision-making may be another hallmark of "mature" or "developed" socialism, this does not mean that those decisions will be any easier to make or more certain to produce favorable outcomes.

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Romanian urban workers head to their jobs from a housing sector in Bucharest.

—Robert Lebeck/Pontis Photo.

rooted outside the set of problems considered here.

Over the long term, and in the light of the trends we have outlined, more destabilizing tensions may be anticipated in Eastern Europe. Of course, we have directed no attention to other problems which these societies face—energy dependence, growing indebtedness to Western states, etc. But these and other factors may well reduce the capacity of these regimes to deal effectively with the tensions we have discussed. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the USSR, increasingly feeling the pinch of a sluggish economy and constrained by the spectre of slowdown and retrenchment, will provide the material wherewithal for the East European regimes to moderate the tensions. Although such has been the policy of Leonid Brezhnev, one should be wary of assuming that his successor(s) will continue along the same path.

This does not mean that the USSR would not readily move to restore order by use of force, should an East European state experience a destabilizing crisis as a result of these or other tensions. At present, Poland appears in the most precarious position. The Polish regime seems to lack a legitimacy it can develop only by proving itself effective, while such effectiveness requires that the public endure some strong economic medicine. Yet, the Polish masses evidently would accept such a prescription only if they accorded the regime a basic confidence and/or legitimacy based on qualities *other* than material effectiveness. This is a legitimacy that the Poles do not now widely appear to concede.

It nevertheless seems clear that Soviet intervention is the *last* thing Brezhnev, Gierek, or Cardinal Wyszynski would want, whatever their differing perspectives. The dilemmas which these leaders face today may well confront future East European leaders and their Soviet counterparts, for while Poland may be "unique," not all of its problems are.

Thus, the sociopolitical fabric of Eastern Europe has absorbed a great deal of strain in the postwar period. Whether it can absorb much more strain without tearing—and with or without the remedy of Soviet intervention—will become clear in the next decade or two, and will be closely studied in the East European capitals, as well as in Moscow and Washington.

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Albania in the 1970's

By Nicholas C. Pano

On July 7, 1977, the publication of a 7,500-word editorial entitled "The Theory and Practice of Revolution" in *Zeri i popullit,* the newspaper of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL), underscored the fact that Chinese-Albanian relations had entered a new crisis phase. The Albanians did not criticize the Chinese directly, but they left no doubt as to the target of their polemic. They had already characterized Mao's "three world" theory—based on distinctions among superpowers, developed countries, and developing nations—as an "anti-Leninist" and "pseudoimperialist" concept. By inference they had also accused the Chinese of abandoning the struggle against imperialism by cultivating the friendship of the United States; splitting the Maoist Marxist-Leninist movement by creating pro-Chinese "anti-Marxist groups" to fight the pro-Albanian "true Marxist-Leninist parties"; and undermining the communist revolutionary movement in Third World countries by supporting bourgeois nationalist rulers there.[1]

The Albanians and Chinese had openly disagreed over foreign policy issues since the early 1970's. But relations between Tirana and Peking deteriorated markedly after the death of Mao Tse-tung in September 1976. The Albanians initiated the post-Mao phase of their anti-Chinese campaign in November 1976 at the 7th Congress of the APL, when Albanian party leader Enver Hoxha criticized Mao's "three world" theory, failed to endorse Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's purge of the "gang of four," and invited all "true Marxist-Leninists" to join the APL in its crusade to defend ideological orthodoxy—as defined by Tirana—within the world communist movement.[2]

Despite the ideological sparring and organizational maneuvering that have taken place since the congress, much has remained unclear about current Sino-Albanian tensions. Why are the Albanians so publicly critical of the Chinese? What are the major issues which have come between the People's Republic of Albania (PRA) and its great, distant, longtime, and only ally, the People's Republic of China (PRC)? Are foreign policy disagreements primarily responsible for the rift, as the lastest polemics indicate? Or are matters of internal politics involved as well? And is the crisis likely to be long-term or ephemeral: will it lead to prolonged bitter polemics and a diplomatic and economic rupture, or will it subside? The present essay is an attempt to provide some answers to these questions.

Background to the Crisis

The situation which exists between Albania and China today calls to mind the Soviet-Albanian confrontation of the early 1960's, when Tirana severed party, state, and economic ties with Moscow after a year-long war of words. Ironically, it was common hostility toward the Soviet Union that brought the Chinese and Albanians together during the late 1950's and early 1960's.[3]

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[1] Nexhmije Hoxha, "Some Basic Questioning Regarding the Revolutionary Policies of the APL on the Development of Class Warfare," *Rruga e partise* (Tirana), June 1977, pp. 34-44.

[2] *Zeri i popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1976. For extensive documentation on the 7th Congress of the APL, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Supplement 47 of Dec. 7, 1976, Supplement 49 of Dec. 29, 1976, and Supplement 51 of Dec. 30, 1976.

[3] For a discussion of this development, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," *China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1962, pp. 123-43.

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The works and speeches of Enver Hoxha are promoted in a poster seen on a wall in Gjirokaster in 1969, during Albania's Cultural Revolution.

—Paolo Koch/Photoresearchers.

Sino-Albanian collaboration reached its zenith between 1966 and 1969, when both countries were in the throes of their respective cultural revolutions.[4] The Albanian connection was especially valuable to China at this time because the PRC's prestige had reached a low ebb following the failure of the communist coup attempt in Indonesia in 1965 and the defection of Asian communist parties from Peking's sphere of influence as a result of the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution itself. High-ranking Albanian leaders were periodically brought to China to campaign for the Maoists in the political battles of the Cultural Revolution. Albania served as the PRC's spokesman at the United Nations and as a center for Chinese propaganda activities abroad. The Albanians for their part received the ideological and diplomatic backing of a major communist party-state and much needed economic and military assistance.

In addition to a high degree of unity on domestic policy, there was also consensus between Tirana and Peking during this period regarding international issues. Both endorsed the "dual adversary doctrine," which asserted that "US imperialism" and "Soviet modern revisionism" posed equal threats to Marxism-Leninism" and had to be opposed with equal vigor. Both also enthusiastically backed the pro-Mao Marxist-Leninist splinter parties formed during the 1960's as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split, and agreed to support only communist or pro-communist organizations in Third World national liberation wars.

It was clear that the special relationship that developed between China and Albania during the 1966-69 period had resulted from the specific situation in which each country found itself at the time. Apparently the Albanians never fully appreciated this fact, however, and they consequently were surprised and annoyed when their importance to Peking declined.

The Onset of Tensions

Tirana's initial disillusionment with Peking in fact dates back to 1969, when the PRC phased out its cultural revolution, lost interest in the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement, sought to expand diplomatic and commercial relations with the West and nonaligned countries, and began to pursue a more pragmatic line at home.[5] Furthermore, it seemed to the Albanians that as the Chinese strove to cultivate a new image of respectability, they were seeking to keep their militant Balkan ally in the background as much as possible.[6] During the 1960's Hoxha's domestic and foreign policies had been endowed with added legitimacy and prestige within Albania by the public support they received from the Chinese. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the early

[4] For analyses of Sino-Albanian relations during this period, see Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Recent Sino-Albanian Relations," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1975, pp. 124-27; Peter R. Prifti, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Autumn 1973, pp. 243-54; and the author's "Albania in the Era of Kosygin and Brezhnev," in George W. Simmonds, Ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, Detroit, MI, The University of Detroit Press, 1977, pp. 481-82.

[5] See the author's "When Friends Fall Out," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 26, 1977, p. 34.

[6] Fontana, loc. cit., p. 139, fn. 50.

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1970's, as Hoxha and his associates became concerned that the new Chinese line would be used to justify the arguments of those Albanians urging the regime to institute more relaxed policies at home and to seek a wider range of contacts abroad,[7] their alarm over the course being charted by the Chinese leadership increased. The impact of China's post-1969 policies on the Albanian domestic scene has been a significant factor in the cooling of Albanian-Chinese friendship.

Hoxha's decision to wind down the Albanian Cultural Revolution in late 1969 was influenced in part by the Chinese example, but also by his recognition that the Albanian people were emotionally and physically exhausted after four years of extreme regimentation.[8] At the same time, the Albanian leadership was moved to reappraise its foreign policy. Here it was reacting to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to what it subsequently perceived as a Soviet military threat to the Balkans, both coupled with Albanian uncertainty as to the Chinese response to a possible Soviet move against the PRA.[9]

It is clear that Hoxha himself did not regard Albania's gestures of 1969-72 aimed at improving ties with Western Europe and normalizing relations with Yugoslavia and Greece as representing a fundamental change in his party's ideological stance vis-à-vis the "capitalist" and "revisionist" worlds. However, he was sensitive to the fact that many of his countrymen did not understand or share his view. For this reason, he felt constrained in September 1970 to spell out his position in the following terms:

When the bourgeoisie and the modern revisionists recognized that their [hard-line] methods did not have any effect on socialist Albania, they changed their tactics but not their aims. They began to smile at us, to say they wanted diplomatic relations and more extensive foreign trade with our country. They vowed they did not wish us any harm. For some time now they have been alleging that the winds of liberalism are blowing through Albania, and they represent each of our diplomatic moves as a reversal of our previous policies. They interpret their changes of tactics toward us as our changes toward them. We have made no changes in our policy.[10]

Hoxha's protestations notwithstanding, Albania did experience a period of relaxation during the early 1970's. As in the case of China, the PRA opened the door a crack to tourism and expanded cultural and commercial ties with the noncommunist world. In addition, the regime loosened its controls somewhat over the nation's youth and intellectuals and gave the bureaucrats a bit more freedom in the management of the economy.[11]



Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, at the APL's Seventh Congress, held in Tirana in November 1976.

—Eastfoto.

[7] Prifti, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," p. 262; and *The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1973.

[8] See the author's "The Albanian Cultural Revolution," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1974, p. 55.

[9] Peter R. Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1972, pp. 34-39.

[10] Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e fjalime, 1970-1971* (Reports and Speeches, 1970-1971), Tirana, Libri Politik, 1972, pp. 34-35.

[11] See, inter alia, *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Sept. 7, 1970; *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Aug. 4, 1971; *Time* (New York, NY), Sept. 6, 1971.

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By the close of 1972, however, Hoxha had become convinced of the dangers involved in permitting a moderate domestic line to continue. The Albanian leader was deeply concerned about the growing power of the bureaucracy and the difficulties which continued to plague the country's economy. He expressed alarm over the breakdown of discipline among the nation's youth and intellectuals and the penetration of "alien and harmful" influences from abroad.[12] He and his followers apparently decided that, if not checked immediately, these trends could weaken the party's influence in key sectors of Albanian life or, at the very least, oblige it to alter its policies significantly.[13] The wholesale purges of the Albanian youth and cultural elites that Hoxha ordered during the summer of 1973 attest to the seriousness with which he viewed the ideological deviations that had developed in the country.[14]

Clearly, Albania's flirtation with liberalism in the early 1970's had confirmed Hoxha in his conviction that any substantial modification of hard-line policies he had pursued since the 1940's could only endanger his regime and the building of socialism in Albania. It was in the context of the experiences of this period that the first major crisis in the Sino-Albanian relationship emerged.

Crisis, Rapprochement, Purge: 1971-75

The decision of the People's Republic of China in 1971 to seek an accommodation with the United States in order to strengthen Peking's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union caused much consternation in Tirana, where China's move was viewed as a repudiation of the dual adversary doctrine. This led Hoxha, in November 1971, to publicly chastise the Chinese—though not by name—for seeking "to rely on one imperialism to oppose the other."[15] The Albanian leader left no doubt as to where he stood regarding rapprochement with the United States when he declared that "the stand toward imperialism, above all American imperialism, constitutes the demarcation line which separates revolutionaries from reactionaries and traitors."[16]

Hoxha's words had no discernible impact on the Chinese, who received President Nixon in Peking during February 1972 and subsequently adopted the position—highly objectionable from Albania's perspective—that NATO and the Common Market could serve as useful counterweights to Soviet power in Europe. Tirana's malaise was reportedly heightened further by Chinese suggestions that Albania also seek sources of support in the West.[17]

Thus by mid-1973, when the Albanian leadership launched its cultural crackdown at home, serious tensions had already developed between Tirana and Peking. The Albanians had been careful to provide ideological justification for their differences with the Chinese; nevertheless it was clear that the problems developing between the two allies stemmed not from fundamental differences in the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist dogma, but from real conflicts of national interests and aspirations and from somewhat divergent views on domestic policy directions.

Despite these differences, Sino-Albanian relations took a turn for the better following the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1973.[18] The Congress did not reverse the Chinese stand on the foreign policy and domestic ideological issues over which Tirana and Peking differed. It did, however, reaffirm the "necessity and correctness" of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and pledged that additional cultural revolutions would be instituted when required. Subsequent to the Congress the Chinese inaugurated the "anti-Confucius, anti-Lin" campaign, which the Albanians enthusiastically endorsed and which they interpreted as a new phase of the Cultural Revolution.[19]

There can be little doubt that Hoxha and his associates welcomed the new trend in China as a vindication of their hard-line domestic policies. They were also gratified by the resurgence of the "radicals" within the Chinese leadership and seem to have expected this development to resolidify ties between the two countries.[20] Emboldened by his

[12] Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e fjalime, 1972-1973,* Tirana, 8 Nentori, 1974, pp. 189-211, 260-96.

[13] Ibid., pp. 391-425.

[14] The purges resulted in the removal of the entire top level leadership of the League of Albanian Writers and Artists and in the ouster of approximately half of the editorial board members of the League's newspaper and journal. There were also a considerable number of key leadership changes in the Union of Albanian Labor Youth at both national and district levels. See *Zeri i popullit,* July 24 and 26, 1973.

[15] Ibid., Nov. 2, 1971.

[16] Ibid.

[17] *Christian Science Monitor,* July 13, 1972.

[18] There was extensive coverage of the 10th CCP Congress in the Albanian press (e.g., *Zeri i popullit,* Aug. 31-Sept. 5, 1973). Numerous meetings were also held to celebrate the successes of the Congress (ibid., Sept. 8-9, 1973), and Hoxha sent Mao a warm congratulatory note on the occasion (ibid., Sept. 2, 1973).

[19] See, e.g., ibid., Feb. 12 and 16-28, 1974.

[20] See, e.g., ibid., Nov. 28, 29, and 30, 1975.

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renewed favorable assessment of the Chinese domestic situation and by his success in squelching the intellectual and cultural dissidents in Albania, Hoxha chose this moment to move to eliminate what he had come to consider a potentially serious threat to his regime from the echelons of the Albanian military.

On the basis of the fragmentary evidence currently available, it appears that in the early 1970's differences had arisen between the Albanian party leader and the military establishment over both domestic and foreign policy issues.[21] The APL leadership apparently was distressed by demands of the military elite, headed by Defense Minister Beqir Balluku, that many of the innovations introduced in the military sector during the Cultural Revolution be abolished. Among other things, the Defense Ministry sought to limit the authority of political commissars assigned to military units and to reduce the amount of time devoted to ideological indoctrination and other nonmilitary activities. Party officials, on the other hand, viewed with dismay the breakdown of discipline in some units, the inefficacy of the ideological training program, and the efforts of an increasing number of officers, especially those in staff positions, to weaken the role of the party in military planning and operations.[22]

Demonstrative of this last point was the disagreement between party and military over the concept of "people's war," which Hoxha had proclaimed as the nation's official defense doctrine. By the early 1970's the military professionals had concluded that this concept, which called for arming all working-age Albanians and relying on guerrilla tactics to oppose foreign aggression, was outmoded. They argued for the creation of a well-trained professional army equipped with modern sophisticated weapons. Hoxha and his associates opposed this position, however. They feared that a professional army would tend to "degenerate" into a politically active "barracks army" which it would prove difficult for the party to control.[23]

Hoxha had also come to regard Balluku, reputedly the fourth-ranking member of the ruling hierarchy, as a potentially serious personal political rival. The Albanian party leader seems to have convinced himself that if he did not move quickly against the popular Balluku and the defense establishment, they might attempt to overthrow his regime "by means of an armed putsch."[24]

In the area of foreign policy, Balluku and his followers differed with Hoxha as well. The military appears to have had doubts about the extent to which the PRA could rely on the Chinese in the event of a threat to Albanian national security. They wanted Albania to become economically and diplomatically less dependent on China, to mute polemics with the Soviet Union and the United States in order to cultivate a less militant image abroad, and to further improve relations with Balkan neighbors and Western Europe.[25]

The party leadership obviously resented the questioning of its external policies, but domestic factors, especially Hoxha's fear of a Balluku coup, were of primary importance in bringing the crisis between the APL leadership and the military elite to a head.[26] Hoxha launched his purge of the Albanian defense establishment at the APL Central Committee plenum of July 1974, and completed the operation by the end of the year. The chief victims of the purge were Balluku; Petrit Dume, Armed Forces Chief of Staff; and Hito Cako, head of the Defense Ministry's Political Directorate. Balluku and Dume were the first members of the Politburo since 1960 to be dropped from that body for opposing the leadership.

Following the ouster of the Balluku group, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the second-ranking member of the ruling hierarchy and Hoxha's closest collaborator, assumed the Defense portfolio.[27] The remainder of the top leadership posts in the ministry were filled mainly by middle-level cadres who owed their positions to Hoxha and who could presumably be counted on to be loyal to him and to the party.[28]

It is interesting to note that while his purge of the military was in progress, Hoxha drew closer to the Chinese, whose support he obviously welcomed in this difficult period. The Albanian leader

[21] The Albanians have not yet published a comprehensive account of this development. For an excellent analysis based on currently available evidence, see Peter R. Prifti, "The Dismissal of [General] Beqir Balluku, Albania's Minister of Defense: An Analysis," in Simmonds, op. cit., pp. 495-502.

[22] See, inter alia, *Zeri i popullit*, Dec. 19, 1974, and July 9 and 10, 1975; and Tahir Minxhozi, "The Growth of the Leading Role of the Party in the Army and the Further Revolutionization of the Army Are Realized in a Concrete Struggle Against Bureaucratism," *Rruga e partise*, July 1975, pp. 13-22.

[23] *Zeri i popullit*, July 10, 1974; and *Bashkimi* (Tirana), March 11, 1977.

[24] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1976; and Ndreci Plasari, "The Strength and Invincibility of Our Army Lie in Its Popular and Revolutionary Character," *Rruga e partise*, February 1975, pp. 40-41.

[25] *Zeri i popullit*, Sept. 28, Oct. 4, and Nov. 29, 1974.

[26] Prifti, "The Dismissal of [General] Beqir Balluku . . .," pp. 498, 501.

[27] *Zeri i popullit*, Oct. 30, 1974.

[28] See ibid., July 30 and Dec. 19, 1974, and May 7, 1975.

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Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu addresses the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in November 1976.

—Eastfoto.

demonstrated the importance he attached to his ties to Peking by attending the reception of the Chinese embassy in Tirana marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.[29] Albanian commentaries during the latter part of 1974 were lavish in their praise of the Chinese leadership and effusive in their thanks for China's economic and moral support.[30] In the atmosphere of cordiality thus created, the Albanian leadership affirmed that it would never be moved from its pro-Peking line by "counterrevolutionary tempests from whatever quarter they might come, be it from within as a consequence of the class struggle, or from abroad as a consequence of the pressures, blackmail, and intrigues of imperialists, revisionists, and other reactionaries." [31]

The Chinese in response seem to have made an effort to assure the Albanians of their sympathy and support. In November 1974, Peking sent a delegation headed by Politburo member Yao Wen-yüan and Politburo candidate Wu Kuei-hsien to participate in ceremonies marking the 30th anniversary of Albania's liberation.[32] This was the first Chinese Politburo-level delegation to visit Albania since 1971. In addition, in its congratulatory messages to the Albanians, the Chinese leadership expressed its confidence in Hoxha and reaffirmed the "deep revolutionary friendship" and "militant unity of the Albanian and Chinese parties, nations, and peoples." [33]

The Economic Factor

As 1974 drew to a close, Sino-Albanian relations were more cordial than at any other time during the 1970's. Largely responsible for this seems to have been the general consensus reestablished between Peking and Tirana on domestic policies. This consensus broke down, however, during 1975, with the gradual deemphasis of the "anti-Confucius, anti-Lin" campaign in China and the appointment in January of that year of the "pragmatist" Teng Hsiao-p'ing as First Deputy Prime Minister of the PRC and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Both of these events signaled a new move to the right in China, at a time when Hoxha, in response to an economic slowdown, was instituting a purge of the Albanian economic and technocratic elites, whose growing influence he regarded as challenging the leading role of the APL as well as his own personal authority. It is now clear that Peking's decision to reduce its aid to the PRA for the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan period—a decision which the Chinese had apparently communicated to Tirana as early as 1972 and which had contributed to earlier tensions in the Sino-Albanian relationship—by this juncture had brought about conflict within the ranks of the Albanian ruling elite.

The Albanian leadership had become increasingly preoccupied with economic problems throughout 1974, as industrial production began to fall short of projected goals for the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan.[34]

[29] Ibid., Oct. 1, 1974.

[30] See, e.g., ibid., Nov. 5, 1974. In what might be interpreted as a modest concession to the Chinese, Hoxha declared in an address delivered on Oct. 3, 1974, that while Albania would "never" normalize relations with the Soviet Union, it might be willing to do so with the United States "at some time in the future." Ibid., Oct. 4, 1974.

[31] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1974.

[32] The selection of Yao, one of the leaders of the "Shanghai radicals," was obviously designed to please the Albanians, who were sympathetic to the views of this faction of the Chinese leadership.

[33] *Zeri i popullit,* Nov. 30, 1974.

[34] According to the plan, industrial output was to increase at an average annual rate of 10.3 percent. This target was realized only in 1971; in 1974 industrial output rose by 7.3 percent, and the projected increase for 1975 was only 4.4 percent. Ibid., Dec. 23, 1971, and Jan. 28, 1975.

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In addition to the usual problem of worker apathy, poor management and poor planning had contributed significantly to the failure to meet planned targets. In an attempt to correct some of the more obvious administrative weaknesses in the economy, Hoxha in October 1974 ordered changes of leadership in the Ministries of Finance and Communications. At the same time, though, he apparently accepted the recommendation of the State Planning Commission, headed by Abdyl Kellezi, to reduce industrial output targets for 1975, allegedly in order to upgrade the quality of production.[35] This latter decision ensured that Albania would fail to achieve the goals set in the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan.

As a consequence of the economic difficulties Albania was encountering, Hoxha by 1975 had lost confidence in several of his leading economic advisers and had come to view their policies with suspicion. Party leaders were distressed by the State Planning Commission's efforts to decentralize the planning process to some extent and to encourage administrative innovations at the plant, farm, and local levels. These actions had created a considerable amount of confusion and interagency rivalry not only in the day-to-day operations of the economy but also in the preliminary planning for the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan.[36]

Relations between the party hierarchy and the economic establishment were further exacerbated by differences which had arisen between them over several important policy issues. One specific area of party concern was the petrochemical industry, where Kellezi and Minister of Heavy Industry and Mining Koco Theodosi were accused of having used "sophisticated techniques" to discourage the exploration and development of new sources of oil and natural gas and "barbarous methods" to exploit

[35] *Puna* (Tirana), May 16, 1975.

[36] *Zeri i popullit*, June 5, 1975, and Nov. 2 and 5, 1976; and Besim Bardhosi, "Democratic Centralism: A Basic Principle in the Planned Direction of the Socialist Economy," *Probleme ekonomike* (Tirana), July-September 1975, pp. 15-21.

Yao Wen-yüan (third from right), then a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, attends celebrations in Tirana on November 29, 1974, marking the 30th anniversary of Albania's liberation. To Yao's right are Albanian Party of Labor First Secretary Enver Hoxha (with hat raised) and Haxhi Lleshi, President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of Albania; to Yao's left are Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu and Hysni Kapo, member of the APL Politburo and Secretariat.

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existing sources of these products.[37] A second and perhaps more crucial area of contention was foreign economic policy. China's intention to cut back its aid programs in Albania after 1975 seems to have prompted Minister of Trade Kico Ngjela and others to recommend that the regime permit an expansion of trade with the West. This recommendation, most likely made prior to the reimposition of hard-line domestic policies in 1973, was approved, and the PRA's trade volume with nonsocialist countries (including Yugoslavia) rose from US$37 million in 1970 to US$157 million in 1975.[38]

The conflict between the APL leadership and the nation's economic establishment over this trade began later, apparently triggered by the economists' recommendations that Albanian trade with nonsocialist countries be further expanded during the 1976-80 plan period and that Tirana follow the Chinese example by seeking credits from the West to cover anticipated trade deficits with capitalist trading partners. Since this proposal conflicted with his position that Albania not accept loans from either "capitalists" or "revisionists," [39] Hoxha rejected it. During the latter half of 1975 the Albanian leadership decided to reduce Tirana's commerce with nonsocialist countries and to eliminate its trade deficit with them.[40] In its final form the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan emphasizes the doctrine of economic self-reliance and aims at achieving virtual economic self-sufficiency by 1980.[41] Although China has pledged to continue to provide the PRA with economic and technical assistance through 1980, the scanty and restrained Albanian commentaries which have appeared concerning this matter suggest that Tirana is not entirely happy with the help it is currently receiving from Peking.[42]

While the debate over Western trade was still going on, Hoxha launched his counteroffensive against the economic establishment. In April 1975 he opened a campaign to reduce the size of the bureaucracy and to "proletarianize" it by recruiting new bureaucrats primarily from the ranks of citizens actually engaged in production or having working-class backgrounds.[43] By these means the party leadership succeeded in removing from office or intimidating many backers of Kellezi and his associates. Hoxha moved directly against Kellezi and Theodosi at the May 1975 APL Central Committee plenum; both were ousted from the Politburo and from their government posts. In July Minister of Trade Ngjela was removed from office and from the party Central Committee. By mid-November it appeared that nearly 25 percent of the bureaucracy—a remarkable figure for a six-month period—had been replaced.[44]

Impact of the Purges

The persistence and vigor with which Hoxha has conducted his purges of the party, state, and mass organization leaderships underscores the gravity with which he regarded the opposition and indifference to his policies that had arisen within the ruling elite. The challenges to his authority were the most serious he had faced since the 1950's. Hoxha appreciated that his political survival and that of his regime were at stake, and his response to his domestic rivals reflected this belief. A recent Albanian commentary on the early 1970's indicates that the most prominent opponents of the party line—Balluku, Dume, Kellezi, and others—were deprived of party membership after their fall from power and tried for treason. "Several" of them were executed.[45]

The impact of Hoxha's purges on the leadership did not become fully evident until the 7th APL Congress in November 1976, when the compositions of the current Politburo and Central Committee were announced. In addition to the three deposed Polit-

[37] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1976, and May 4, 1977. The discovery of an "important new oil deposit" in October 1977 was interpreted as attesting to the "correctness" of the Hoxha line on this issue. Ibid., Oct. 4 and 7, 1977.

[38] See Michael Kaser, "Trade and Aid in the Albanian Economy," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 1328-31, 1337. Between 1971 and 1975, the nonsocialist countries accounted for about 20 percent of Albania's imports and 27 percent of her exports; the Comecon countries, for 27 percent of her imports and 49 percent of her exports; and China, for 53 percent of her imports and 23 percent of her exports. Ibid., pp. 1328-32, 1338. Kaser estimates the value of Chinese assistance to Albania between 1971 and 1975 at US$485 million (at current prices). Ibid., p. 1339.

[39] See, inter alia, *Zeri i popullit*, Oct. 4, 1974. A provision against such loans was incorporated into the 1976 Albanian Constitution.

[40] See Kaser, loc. cit., pp. 1329-31.

[41] In 1976, the PRA achieved self-sufficiency in the production of bread grains and produced about 66 percent of its spare parts and about 80 percent of its consumer goods requirements. By 1980, the country was expected to furnish from its own output virtually all its food needs, 95 percent of its spare parts, and 90 percent of its consumer goods. See *Zeri i popullit*, Jan. 7 and 11, 1977.

[42] Ibid., July 5, 1975, and Nov. 2-8, 1976.

[43] Ibid., April 3 and Sept. 12, 1975.

[44] Ibid., Nov. 14, 1975; *The Times* (London), Oct. 31, 1975.

[45] *Zeri i popullit*, Feb. 20, 1977; *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1977.

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Hysni Kapo, member of the Politburo and a secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, cuts the ribbon on a 25-kilometer section of the Fier-Ballsh railroad on March 9, 1975.

—Eastfoto.

buro members, three of the four Politburo candidate members elected in 1971 lost their posts. Moreover, of the 71 Central Committee members elected in 1971, 28 were dropped from that body, and 7 were demoted to candidate status.[46] Virtually all those dismissed from leading party organs or demoted had held responsible positions in the cultural, military, or economic sectors. There were also extensive changes in the leadership of the district party organizations. Between November 1971 and November 1976, Hoxha replaced 24 of the 26 district party first secretaries. Half of the 1971 incumbents removed were demoted, while the remainder were moved laterally or promoted.[47]

Beginning in the latter part of 1975, with personnel matters largely resolved, Hoxha moved to solidify his regime in other ways. First, he fashioned a new leadership comprised of such veteran Politburo colleagues as Mehmet Shehu, Hysni Kapo, Ramiz Alia, and Manush Myftiu as well as of such newcomers as Hekuran Isaj, Pali Miska, and Llambi Gegprifti.[48] Apparently, Hoxha hopes that this combination will serve to bring about an orderly political transition after his death.

Second, Hoxha in October 1975 set the machinery in motion to draft a new constitution for the PRA. The final document, ratified in December 1976, is in effect Hoxha's political testament, designed to guarantee that Albania will always follow "the correct Marxist-Leninist path" to the achievement of communism.[49] It represents an attempt on Hoxha's part to make his policies binding on his eventual successors and the nation. Among other things, the constitution sanctions the political monopoly of the APL (Art. 3); declares that the development of the country's socialist economy is to be based mainly on the principle of "self-reliance" (Art. 14) and prohibits the solicitation of credits from bourgeois or capitalist states or companies (Art. 28); designates the APL First Secretary as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Art. 89); and forbids the establishment of foreign military bases or the stationing of foreign troops in Albania (Art 91).

PRA versus PRC

As he reasserted firm control over party and state during the latter half of 1975 and early 1976, Hoxha appears to have followed developments in

[46] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 8, 1976. Between 1956 and 1971 only one Politburo member and five Central Committee members had been expelled from their posts for political reasons.

[47] This analysis is based on data obtained from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Albanian Officials*, Washington, DC, 1970; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of Albania*, Washington, DC, 1974; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania*, Washington, DC, 1977; and Albanian press accounts. In addition to changes in APL leadership personnel, there were 15 changes in the composition of the Albanian cabinet between October 1972 and October 1977, and numerous personnel shifts in the top echelons of the Ministries of Education and Defense and of the economics ministries.

[48] Shehu, second-ranking member of the Albanian leadership, is Premier and has been a Politburo member since 1948; Kapo is a secretary of the Central Committee of the APL and has been a Politburo member since 1946; Alia is a secretary of the Central Committee and has been a Politburo member since 1960; Myftiu is a deputy premier and has been a Politburo member since 1956; Isaj, formerly First Secretary of the Diber District APL organization, has been a secretary of the Central Committee and a Politburo member since 1975; Miska, formerly First Secretary of the Puke District APL organization, is a deputy premier and has been a Politburo member since 1975; Gegprifti is Deputy Defense Minister and has been a candidate member of the Politburo since 1974.

[49] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1976.

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Albanian party chief Enver Hoxha holds a May 1976 reception for Chinese and Albanian workers responsible for completion of the first pig-iron production line of the Elbasan Metallurgical Combine two months earlier. The People's Republic of China provided technical assistance in the construction of the plant.

—Eastfoto.

Peking carefully. He seemed cautious toward China following the death of Chou En-lai in January 1976. But with the second fall from power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April of that year, Hoxha reversed his stand, enthusiastically endorsed the anti-Teng campaign, and made a bid to improve Tirana's relations with Peking. On April 29, in the presence of a group of Chinese technicians working in Albania, the APL leader publicly thanked Peking for the generous economic support it had given Albania and sought to lay to rest rumors of a Sino-Albanian rift by reaffirming the primary importance of Albania's ties with China. Referring to the recent purges in Albania, he announced that he had crushed a plot by domestic "enemies" and "revisionists" to disrupt Sino-Albanian friendship, and hinted that the Chinese might find it useful to make Teng their scapegoat for the difficulties which had arisen between the two countries.[50]

Peking, however, apparently never responded to Hoxha's overture. Sino-Albanian relations took a turn for the worse when Hua Kuo-feng aligned himself with the "pragmatists" after the death of Mao and launched his drive against the "radicals" led by the "gang of four." Hoxha saw this development as having the potential to create new domestic difficulties in the PRA. He could not overlook the possibility that it might inspire demands for the rehabilitation of the victims of recent purges and for a new period of liberalization. For this reason, Hoxha, in his report to the 7th Congress of the APL, renewed his condemnation of the "traitorous antiparty groups" for their "hostile activities" against his regime and blamed them for the failures of the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan.[51]

Hoxha sought to take advantage of the presence of the 29 "Marxist-Leninist" delegations at the congress to detail his grievances against the Chinese and garner support for the Albanian position. On the whole he was successful, and by December 1976 Tirana had enlisted the pro-Albanian "Marxist-Leninists" as surrogates to initiate public polemics against the Chinese.[52]

The Albanian leaders seem to have had two prime objectives in their polemics. First, they hoped to justify their hard-line policies to their own people and to demonstrate that they were not isolated in the communist movement, as their critics claimed. The backing they enjoyed from the pro-Tirana "Marxist-Leninist" groups was especially important in this regard. The Albanian press has given extensive publicity to the activities of the pro-Tirana Marxist-Leninists, but it is unclear whether the Albanian masses have been favorably impressed by the support the APL enjoys within world communism. A prominent party ideologist sought to allay the concerns that have arisen on this score by asserting:

The future belongs to these new revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties no matter how small or weak they may appear today. The revisionist parties will, however, regardless of their present size and power, end up in the manner of the social democratic and revisionist parties of the Second International.[53]

Second, Hoxha seems to have hoped that his challenge to Peking might encourage the "radicals"

[50] Ibid., April 30, 1976.
[51] Ibid., Nov. 2, 1976.
[52] Ibid., Dec. 9, 1976.
[53] Nexhmije Hoxha, loc. cit., p. 44.

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to persevere in their struggle against the Hua regime in the PRC, or at least cause the Chinese leadership to modify its position on some of the issues that had produced the most recent crisis in Sino-Albanian relations.[54] Neither desire has been realized, however. The Chinese have not been deterred in the least by Tirana's actions.

By the summer of 1977, Hua Kuo-feng and the "pragmatists" seemed firmly entrenched in power. They had routed the radicals and secured the restoration of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.[55] The Chinese invitation to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to visit Peking in August 1977 demonstrated that China would continue to pursue her policy of détente with the United States; and the invitation extended to President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia indicated the importance which the Chinese attached to strengthening ties with Hoxha's neighbor and long-time ideological adversary. Chinese statements on the occasion of Italian Foreign Minister Arnaldo Forlani's visit to Peking in June 1977 underscored the value Peking continued to place on NATO and the Common Market as counterweights to Soviet power in Europe.[56] And continuing pilgrimages of Third World leaders to Peking suggested that the Chinese were persisting in their support of the nationalist rulers in developing countries, rather than working to overthrow them in favor of communists, as Tirana counseled.[57] Finally, China succeeded in thwarting Albanian efforts to gain control of the "Marxist-Leninist" movement.[58]

It was in response to this long chain of affronts that the APL leadership authorized the publication of the July 7 editorial in *Zeri i popullit*. While the Albanians have given some indications that they intend to press on to an ideological break with the Chinese,[59] they seem less eager, at least for the moment, to precipitate an economic or diplomatic rupture. Tirana is apparently unwilling to jeopardize the economic aid it is currently receiving from China. Adverse weather conditions during the summer of 1977 had a negative impact on agricultural output and graphically demonstrated to the Albanians their vulnerability to natural forces beyond their control.[60] The Albanians also recognize that the only real possibilities open to them for expanding trade lie in Eastern and Western Europe. In light of their experience and rhetoric over the last two decades, the PRA's leaders are understandably reluctant to become heavily dependent on either of these regions. Finally, despite the bravado of some Albanian spokesmen, Hoxha himself does not appear to want to sever all ties with China. Such a move could accentuate Albania's isolation in the world and in the communist movement and undermine the morale of her people.

However, Hoxha's domestic and foreign policy decisions in the immediate future are likely to continue to be determined by his image of the Albania which he has tried for 30 years to create and which he would like to leave in his wake. This being the case, how far he moves toward a complete break with the People's Republic of China will depend as much on how the Chinese react to his challenge in the name of orthodoxy as on the day-to-day necessities of running his country and maintaining personal power.

[54] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1976.

[55] E.g., *The New York Times*, June 25, 1977; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), July 22, 1977.

[56] *Peking Review*, June 24, 1977.

[57] E.g., ibid., Dec. 17 and 24, 1976, and Jan. 7, 1977.

[58] See the author's "When Friends Fall Out," p. 39.

[59] See *Zeri i popullit*, Aug. 15 and Sept. 2, 1977; and *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 17, 1977.

[60] *Zeri i popullit*, July 23, 1977.

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The USSR, China, and South Asia

By William J. Barnds

The most striking feature of Soviet and Chinese policies toward South Asia in the 1970's has been their basic continuity. Moscow has continued to attach top priority to good relations with India. Peking's support for Pakistan and suspicion of India has remained essentially unaltered, though with some subtle signs of modification after 1976. Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have occasionally undertaken new initiatives in an effort to deepen existing links or to broaden their relationships within the area. Thus far, however, such moves have not resulted in any major alterations in Soviet or Chinese policies or positions.

This element of continuity—which extends back into the 1960's—is remarkable in view of the many turbulent changes that have occurred in the domestic political lives as well as the interrelations of the major South Asian countries.[1] Domestically, each of the countries has experienced both democracy and authoritarianism, and such shifts have brought groups with different outlooks into power. Regionally, the Pakistani failure to establish a viable political system for its two disparate wings led to a brutal civil war and the bifurcation of the country into a truncated Pakistan and the new state of Bangladesh in 1971. Despite the bitterness caused by India's military role in this upheaval, between 1972 and 1976 India and Pakistan made substantial progress in mitigating their traditional hostility, which had created the opportunity for outside powers to gain a foothold in the subcontinent—at the same time that it had prevented any external power from enjoying good relations with both nations simultaneously.

The basic consistency of the communist powers' South Asian policies is the more remarkable given the dramatic changes in the general pattern of Chinese foreign policy in the 1970's, as well as the significant shifts that have occurred in Soviet foreign relations. In the same period, the United States has greatly reduced its role in South Asia, providing new opportunities for Moscow and potential problems for Peking. Yet Moscow has been unable—or unwilling—to take advantage of these opportunities to any substantial extent, and its position in South Asia has not changed significantly since it emerged as the "victorious" external power by virtue of its support for India during the 1971 upheaval.

The continuity in Soviet and Chinese relations with South Asia suggests that certain deep-seated interests and attitudes have governed the actions of Moscow and Peking. It also suggests that the great power competition of the cold war years has had some lasting effects on the pattern of relationships in the subcontinent. Yet the perspectives of the communist powers are not necessarily immutable. Whether or not—or to what extent—their views will change in the future may depend on a number of recent trends and developments, including the

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[1] This article focuses on Soviet and Chinese policies toward India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in view of their size and importance in South Asia. Soviet and Chinese policies toward Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal are considered chiefly as they affect relations with the major South Asian countries.

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USSR's failure thus far to work out a better relationship with post-Mao China; India's experiment with authoritarianism and the ensuing removal of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from power; and Pakistan's state of turmoil since the 1977 elections that has now culminated in a military takeover of that country. It is possible that such developments could lead Soviet and Chinese leaders to reappraise their policies, and even if no major departures resulted, shifts in emphasis could have significant consequences over time.

The present paper will seek to explain the complex of factors that have shaped the respective courses of Moscow and Peking and then to assess the prospects for future continuity and change in their South Asian policies.

The Legacy of Great Power Competition

The struggle of the major powers for influence in South Asia from the end of World War II until the early 1970's has been covered in a number of recent studies and need not be dealt with in detail here.[2] Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union was basically successful in countering, first, the American effort to bring Pakistan into the US security system without alienating India, and later, Chinese moves to intimidate India. Moscow's gains were based upon its ability to build a durable and broadly based relationship with India as the most important South Asian power. Soviet backing of India was not entirely consistent, nor was it always easy. The USSR's links to China were a problem when Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in the late 1950's, as were Soviet efforts to cultivate Pakistan in the middle and late 1960's. Yet in each case Moscow eventually sided with India when forced to choose, thus preserving its ties with New Delhi. Peking, on the other hand, felt forced by its disputes with India over Tibet and over the location of the Sino-Indian border to adopt an essentially defensive posture toward the subcontinent, a stance expressed principally through support of Pakistan because of the latter's hostility toward India. Neither Soviet support for India nor Chinese support for Pakistan was unlimited, but given the uncertain and shifting course of US policy, both India and Pakistan came to place considerable value on their links with the two major communist powers.

Nearly 20 years of great power involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent had, by the early 1970's, led the USSR and China as well as the key South Asian countries to certain general conclusions.

Soviet leaders were convinced that their policy of giving primacy to their links with India was correct, even if it did not give them as much influence in New Delhi as they had hoped for—or perhaps expected. At the same time, they recognized that they had to establish a better position in Pakistan if they were further to reduce the Chinese and American roles in South Asia. Peking probably believed that it had little option but to continue an essentially defensive policy, though in a less favorable environment in the short term in view of India's enhanced position. Peking's only consolation was that its new relationship with the United States—and the latter's estrangement from New Delhi—eliminated the danger of Soviet-American collusion with India against China, a prospect that had deeply concerned the Chinese in the 1960's.

Indians, for their part, were exuberant over their enhanced position within South Asia. They credited their success more to their own efforts than to Soviet support, but there was a widespread awareness of the importance of their links with Moscow. There was also a general belief that Soviet support—while not unconditional—was as reliable as one could expect amidst the uncertainties of world politics. This belief was combined with an underlying awareness that Soviet leaders would someday like to bring about improved Sino-Soviet relations which could result in a decline of India's importance to the USSR, but such a development seemed unlikely to occur for many years. Thus, Indian leaders felt themselves under no pressure to seek better relations with China or the United States—which appeared to them to have formed an informal Sino-American-Pakistani alignment.

Pakistani leaders, while bitter over their humiliations and defeats, were gradually becoming aware that they had to shift from a policy of confrontation to one of at least partial accommodation toward India. At the same time, they saw that if they were to have any hope of influencing the terms of such an accommodation, they not only would have to re-

[2] See William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972, pp. 12-31; S. P. Seth, "Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives," ibid., March-April 1974, pp. 14-26; and William J. Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity," *The China Quarterly* (London), September 1975, pp. 463-89.

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build their armed forces but also would need to retain Chinese and American support as well as to establish a relationship with Moscow that would lead it to modify its firm support of India.

Communist Global Perspectives

In considering Soviet and Chinese aims in South Asia, it is essential to bear in mind at the outset that, in global terms, the subcontinent has never constituted an area of top priority for either communist power. Relations with each other, the United States, and Japan have been more central to the concerns of both the USSR and China. Europe and the Middle East have loomed more important than South Asia to Moscow, and Southeast Asia probably has been at least as important to Peking as the subcontinent. On the other hand, South Asia has seemed more significant to the Soviet Union than Southeast Asia, Africa, or Latin America, and has appeared to rank higher in Chinese priorities than the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. No South Asian country has possessed the indigenous power to threaten the Soviet Union, although the possibility that certain countries (either out of fear of the USSR or of their neighbors) might ally themselves with a major power hostile to Moscow has created periodic apprehension among Soviet leaders. Peking's disputed borders with India (as well as its border with Nepal) and its problems in maintaining control of distant Tibet probably have made the subcontinent of somewhat more direct importance to China than to the Soviet Union.[3] These relative priorities have not in themselves determined Soviet and Chinese policies vis-à-vis South Asia, but they have set the framework in which the two powers' perceptions of their interests have taken shape.

When the USSR launched its initial thrust into South Asia in the mid-1950's, its aims were primarily defensive in nature—to counter the American and Chinese positions in the area. As it succeeded in expanding its role, however, positive goals assumed more importance. These included gaining endorsement by as many South Asian countries as possible of Soviet foreign policies and expanding Soviet influence with the governments and ultimately the peoples of the subcontinent by portraying the USSR as supportive of their aspirations for international status, national power, economic development, and social and economic reforms.

Yet Soviet leaders soon learned that there were distinct limits to the gains that they could make by any feasible amount of support for such a large and poor area. Open approbation of Soviet foreign policies was gratifying, but how much benefit did Moscow derive from such declarations in dealing with its major foreign policy problems? The USSR expressed periodic concern over trends in India when the country was in internal disarray (as in the late 1960's and again in 1974-75) or when it saw conservative forces gaining strength; it also spoke of its gratification when "progressive" forces were in ascendancy and adopting leftist policies.[4] Such behavior yielded some worthwhile returns. Indeed, members of India's political and bureaucratic elite found Moscow's support of their "socialist" (but nonegalitarian) policies quite appealing in contrast to the US's support of private enterprise or China's backing—at least rhetorically—of radical and revolutionary forces. (Moscow's links with the Communist Party of India [CPI], which sometimes annoyed the Indian government, were increasingly attributable more to considerations involving the politics of international communism than to any likelihood that the CPI would develop into a key force in Indian politics.[5]) The USSR likewise profited from

[3] The Soviet-Afghan border has not presented Moscow with comparable problems since there has been no dispute about its location and since Afghanistan—which is as much a part of the Middle East as of South Asia—is in no position to cause Moscow trouble in Soviet Central Asia. In fact, the USSR has been the source of nearly all Afghanistan's arms—as well as much of its economic assistance—since the mid 1950's, as none of the other major powers ever evidenced much interest in supplying military aid to Kabul.

[4] There is little point in any extended appraisal of the perennial question of the relationship between national interest and ideology in Soviet—or Chinese—foreign policy. Most scholars believe that considerations of national interest take precedence when there is a conflict, but such a judgment is too simplistic. A country's national interest is not a discernible, objective reality apparent to its leaders and people. If it were, there would be far fewer domestic disagreements over foreign policy issues. Concepts of "ideology" and "national interest" are not located in separate compartments of men's minds, for men's concepts of the national interest are molded in varying degrees by their ideology and values as well as their interpretations of history.

[5] The Soviet Union had helped to establish the Communist Party of India after World War I and continued to maintain close links with the pro-Soviet CPI after splits in the Indian communist movement during the 1960's produced the more radical Communist Party of India (Marxist)—CPI(M)—and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)—CPI(ML). China's record in this regard has been quite different. Despite Peking's long-standing disdain for India's political and economic system and prospects, it has apparently made few attempts to forge links with or provide guidance and support to any significant part of India's divided communist movement.

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widespread Indian admiration of its success in becoming a great power. However, in practical terms, Soviet writings on development had a rather limited impact on Indian thinking and policies.[6] Finally, the Soviet Union was hampered by the lack of personal rapport between many Soviet officials posted to the subcontinent and the local people they dealt with—and conversely by the negative reactions of many South Asians to their experiences during training tours in the USSR. Soviets and Indians tended to express disdain for each other, and Soviet officials were at times openly scornful of India's performance in certain areas.[7] This did not undermine the two countries' political relationship but certainly weakened its psychological underpinnings.

Not only did the passing years witness a reduction in the gains that Moscow expected to register in South Asia, but they also brought changes in the importance that the USSR attached to stability within the individual countries and in their relations with one another. The Soviet Union initially established a position in the area by backing Afghanistan and India in their quarrels with Pakistan, but the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, which Soviet leaders feared might draw in other major powers and force painful choices on the USSR, convinced Moscow that it had acquired a stake in South Asian stability. Improved relations among the countries were necessary to prevent such dangers, and only if regional animosities were reduced could the USSR hope to develop and maintain strong ties throughout the entire area.

Two other motivations behind Soviet policy also warrant mention. The first relates to the Asian balance of power. Given a hostile China, a wary Japan, and a Southeast Asia that—except for North Vietnam—was suspicious or indifferent, the Soviet Union's ability to play any significant role in the Asian balance of power virtually demanded a strong Moscow-New Delhi link. Secondly and more broadly, the Soviet quest for status as a global power made it indispensable for the USSR to play a major role in the lands to the south stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Indian subcontinent.

In contrast to Soviet interests and goals in South Asia, those of China in the area remained essentially negative. Their nature stemmed not only from the long-standing Sino-Indian dispute, but also from the fact that China's domestic economic challenges and the more pressing international issues it faced in East Asia provided it with less scope to pursue an ambitious South Asian policy.

Peking had two related concerns about threats to its security emanating from the subcontinent. The first was the danger posed by any Indian government that—in Chinese eyes—did not fully accept Chinese control of Tibet. The second involved the broader threat to its general security posed by an India supported by one—or both—superpowers. The extent of China's preoccupation with the possible implications of Indo-Soviet collaboration is illustrated by some remarks of China's UN representative Huang Hua before the Security Council in the wake of the Indian intervention in the Pakistani civil war of 1971. On December 4, he said:

The Indian Government asserts that the purpose of its sending troops to invade East Pakistan is to help the refugees of East Pakistan to return to their homeland. This is utterly untenable. At present, there are in India large numbers of so-called "refugees" from Tibet, China; the Indian Government is also grooming Dalai Lama, the chieftain of the Tibetan counterrevolutionary rebellion. According to the Indian Government's assertion, are you going to use this also as a basis for aggression against China? [8]

That Chinese apprehension over possible Indian moves against Tibet was part of a larger fear of Indo-Soviet collusion was underscored by Huang Hua in a second speech, on December 6. Referring to a TASS statement that explained Soviet concern over the war on the ground that fighting was "occurring in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR and, hence, involved its security interests," he expostulated:

The "secure boundaries" of the Soviet Union have all of a sudden been extended to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. The aim of the Soviet leaders is to gain control over the subcontinent, encircle China, and strengthen its position in contending with the other superpower for world hegemony. What the Soviet leaders of today are frantically seeking is the establishment of a great

[6] See Stephen Clarkson, "The Law Impact of Soviet Writing and Aid on Indian Thinking and Policy," *Survey* (London), Winter 1974, pp. 1-23.

[7] For a graphic example of Soviet criticism of India's economic management, see *The Overseas Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), May 16, 1974.

[8] *Peking Review* (Peking), Dec. 10, 1971, p. 7.

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empire which the old tsars craved after but were unable to realize, a great empire controlling the whole Eurasian nation.[9]

Peking could have attempted to weaken New Delhi's ties to Moscow by actively working for a rapprochement with India. Indeed, many observers of Asian politics thought such a shift would be a logical part of Peking's more flexible post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy. Yet Peking was slow to alter its South Asian policies, and the very modest easing of Sino-Indian tensions that took place in the late 1960's was reversed by the 1971 upheaval. In any case, China's leaders probably believed that New Delhi's need for Soviet support, combined with the imperatives of Indian domestic politics, would prevent the Indian government from making the painful choices necessary to meet Peking's terms for a settlement of such a thorny issue as the border dispute. With respect to the latter, New Delhi's stake in the Indo-Soviet tie was underscored by one later move made by Moscow. Despite the Sino-Soviet schism, Moscow had issued maps in the 1960's supporting Chinese border claims along the Himalayas; but in 1972 it hinted that it might be shifting its position by allowing publication of an article openly backing India's claims.[10]

Moscow Opts for Consolidation

These various factors bore directly on Soviet and Chinese policies after 1971. To consider the USSR first, Soviet leaders were confronted with a basic policy choice in the post-1971 period. Should Moscow commit Soviet energies and resources to an attempt greatly to expand its influence in the area, or should it do only what was necessary to maintain its gains against any attempts by the US or China to rebuild their positions? The much debated meaning of the ambiguous Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971—whether it merely formalized existing Indo-Soviet links or presaged a substantial increase in India's dependence upon Moscow and the latter's influence with New Delhi—conceivably hinged on this decision.

The more ambitious course probably had its attractions for a Soviet leadership eager to demonstrate that the USSR was a superpower with a steadily increasing status in world affairs. Soviet leaders may have felt that the necessary effort would be worthwhile if certain tangible as well as intangible gains could be realized, such as regular use of naval facilities in India and Bangladesh and support by these two countries for Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposal.[11] Indeed, Moscow seemed eager in 1971-72 to portray the Indo-Soviet treaty as a first step toward realization of the Brezhnev proposal, which argued for an active Soviet policy.

At the same time, there were powerful arguments against, and obstacles to, such a course. The primary goals of Soviet leaders were to cultivate détente with the West, to isolate and contain China, and to secure Western technology and credits to modernize their economy. While Moscow was willing to deemphasize détente when dramatic gains in the Third World appeared possible, too active a South Asian policy might complicate Soviet-American relations without yielding much in the way of benefits for the USSR, since India could probably be expected to resist any substantial expansion of Soviet influence.[12] India's enhanced position in South Asia, although in part the result of past backing from Moscow, reduced New Delhi's need for further Soviet support within the subcontinent. India was grateful to Moscow, but—as Mrs. Gandhi put it to *The New York Times* correspondent C. L. Sulzberger—"we are unable to display gratitude in any tangible sense for anything."[13] Mrs. Gandhi also underscored New

[9] Ibid., Dec. 17, 1971, p. 16. The TASS statement can be found in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), Jan. 4, 1972, pp. 1-2.

[10] G. V. Matveyev, "Peking's Political Machinations on the Hindustan Peninsula," *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* (Moscow), Nov. 4, 1972, pp. 39-45, excerpted in *CDSP*, April 11, 1973, p. 4. The Indian government had endorsed the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet border dispute (see Reuters dispatch from New Delhi, April 8, 1969). This move not only angered Peking but probably strengthened its view of India as a Soviet accomplice.

[11] Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposal was first put forth in 1969, but its lack of specificity and its implicit anti-Chinese bias has led Asian governments to ignore or reject it. For respective Western and Soviet appraisals, see Ian Clark, "Collective Security in Asia: Towards a Framework for Soviet Diplomacy," *The Round Table* (London), October 1973, pp. 473-81; and V. Pavdovskiy, "Collective Security: The Way to Peace in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1972, pp. 23-27.

[12] The term influence, while used frequently by students of politics, is notoriously difficult to appraise with any precision. Most Indians have denied that Moscow exercises *any* significant influence in India. This probably understates the Soviet role but not by any great extent—much to the frustration of Soviet officials. For an analysis of this matter, see William J. Barnds, "Soviet Influence in India: A Search for the Spoils That Go with Victory," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1975; and Ian Clark, "Autonomy and Dependence in Recent Indo-Soviet Relations," *Australian Outlook* (Canberra), April 1977, pp. 147-62.

[13] *The New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1972.

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Delhi's insistence that India and Pakistan handle their problems in a bilateral context and that no outside mediators be involved—which ruled out a repeat of the Soviet Union's achievement at Tashkent.[14] At the same time, India was careful not to antagonize Moscow because of its worry that a Sino-American-Pakistani alignment might be in the offing. If such a trend were to emerge—and if the gradually expanding US presence in the Indian Ocean were to pose a significant threat to India—the advantage of India's improved position within the subcontinent would be offset or endangered. Furthermore, the Indian air force and navy—though not the army—remained significantly dependent upon Soviet equipment and spare parts (although after 1971 they managed to diversify their sources somewhat by purchasing some British and French equipment).

The changing nature of the Indian economy, which had now developed a substantial heavy industrial base, likewise lessened India's need for major projects financed by Soviet aid. By the end of 1976 Soviet project loan commitments amounting to some US$200 million remained unutilized, and India had been drawing less than US$20 million annually during the previous several years.[15] Nor was New Delhi as enthusiastic as it had once been about importing Soviet technology when Moscow was looking to Japan and to the West to overcome its own technology gap. To the extent that India needed support, it was in the form of raw materials and, on occasion, foodstuffs; but Moscow only proved willing to provide such goods on credit in emergencies, as when it agreed to provide a two-million-ton wheat loan in 1973. The Soviet Union's own need to im-

[14] After their 1965 war, India and Pakistan proved unable to move beyond a ceasefire either through bilateral negotiations or under United Nations or Western auspices. They then accepted a Soviet proposal to meet in Tashkent in January 1966 to negotiate on troop withdrawals and other issues in contention. While they did not reach a basic settlement of their differences, they were able, with Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's help, to return to the status quo ante.

[15] *The Times of India* (New Delhi), June 5, 1977.



A poster in New Delhi at the time of Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973.

—Camera Press.

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port food grains periodically and its ability to sell its excess raw materials for hard currencies left it with no desire to underwrite the Indian economy as it was doing at such high cost in Cuba.

Nor was Moscow willing to commit large sums for either the rehabilitation or the economic development of war-ravaged Bangladesh. The USSR did move quickly to establish ties with the government of the new Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who visited Moscow in March 1972, bestowed lavish praise on the Soviet Union, and agreed to hold regular political consultations with the USSR.[16] Moscow also gave Bangladesh some aircraft for domestic flights, as well as a squadron of MIG fighter planes, and agreed to clear the sunken ships from two key Bangladesh ports—Chittagong and Cox's Bazar—free of charge. However, it kept its economic development commitments carefully limited to relatively inexpensive programs amounting to about US$40 million in 1972 and US$46 million in 1975, plus US$35 million worth of wheat in 1973. Basically, the Soviet Union was content to let first India and later the United States and other nations assume the responsibility for keeping the new nation afloat.[17] Nonetheless, Soviet-Bangladesh trade expanded rather rapidly, reaching the equivalent of US$111 million in 1974 (though even this was less than what trade agreements called for).

While the Soviet Union did not undertake dramatic new programs in South Asia, it by no means ignored the area. For example, in 1975 Moscow extended new economic credits amounting to US$437 million to Afghanistan for use in its Fifth Plan and US$57 million to Sri Lanka—the first aid Moscow had granted the latter country since 1958.[18] Soviet and Indian political leaders continually journeyed to each other's capitals. The most dramatic of these visits was Brezhnev's trip to India in November 1973, and there was considerable speculation at the time that Moscow might announce a major program of assistance to India if the latter endorsed Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposal. Whether Soviet leaders offered such a quid pro quo has never been made clear, although they did urge New Delhi to comment favorably on the Soviet security proposal. Yet Indian leaders resisted, and the joint communiqué issued at the close of the visit was a distinct anticlimax.[19]

Trade expanded, and the USSR became India's second largest trading partner. But India's trade remained overwhelmingly oriented toward the West, and its economic aid flowed largely from noncommunist countries and international institutions. In addition, as North-South issues increased in importance relative to East-West disputes—at least from the viewpoint of the developing nations—Moscow's claims that it had no responsibiliy for the establishment of a new international economic order despite its status as an industrialized nation became less acceptable. Moreover, such matters as India's persistent surplus on current accounts as it repaid past Soviet loans, the Indian suspicion that the USSR was reexporting some Indian products for hard currencies, and Moscow's pressure to alter the ruble-rupee rate in its favor because of the fall in the value of the rupee in international money markets, led many Indians to be more skeptical of the value of Soviet trade than they had been earlier.[20] Yet numerous economic and scientific agreements were signed which committed the two countries to increased cooperation, and Moscow provided India with heavy water for its nuclear energy program in 1976.

Moscow commented favorably on the trend of political events and economic policy under Mrs. Gandhi during 1972 and 1973, and each government not only praised as many of the foreign policy actions of the other as it could but also was careful to keep silent about actions of the other that troubled it. For example, despite the general Soviet opposition to nuclear proliferation, Moscow refrained from any adverse public comment on India's nuclear explosion of May 1974. Indeed, a major Soviet article on the test-ban issue less than a year later did not even mention the Indian explosion.[21] And India, despite its oft-proclaimed opposition to the presence

[16] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), March 26, 1972, in *CDSP*, April 19, 1972, p. 18.

[17] For an analysis of Soviet-Bangladesh relations, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Moscow and Bangladesh," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1975, pp. 56-68.

[18] US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975*, ER76-10372U, Washington, DC, July 1976.

[19] The communiqué expressed each government's broad praise of the other's foreign policy but, in the parts dealing with South Asian affairs, went little beyond such generalities as extolling Indo-Soviet cooperation and calling for the peaceful settlement of differences by the states in the subcontinent. *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1973, in *CDSP*, Jan. 2, 1974, pp. 11-13.

[20] Soviet economic aid extensions to India amounted to US$1.943 billion between 1954 and 1974, and Soviet military aid commitments amounted to US$1.4 billion during the same period. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, Report No. 298, Washington, DC, Jan. 27, 1976.

[21] V. Shestov, "For a Total End to Nuclear Weapons Tests," *International Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 33-40.

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Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin greets Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto upon his arrival in Moscow on October 24, 1974.

—Sovfoto.

of naval forces of any nonlittoral state in the Indian Ocean, concentrated attacks on the US buildup at the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagas Archipelago, while virtually ignoring (publicly) the expanding Soviet naval presence in the area.

Tied in with the USSR's apparent reluctance to expand its efforts dramatically in India was the desire of the Soviet leaders to try again to develop better relations with Pakistan.[22] (Indeed, geopolitical considerations such as location make Pakistan more important than Bangladesh in Soviet strategy toward the subcontinent, despite Moscow's role in the birth of Bangladesh.) Improved Soviet-Pakistan relations, if handled skillfully, might provide some modest leverage to Soviet leaders in dealing with New Delhi by demonstrating that Moscow was not totally dependent on India in South Asia. The dangers that might grow out of further wars in the subcontinent also led Soviet leaders to conclude that the USSR had a stake in the stability of South Asia even if the settlement of the long-standing disputes between the parties were to reduce Moscow's ability to play off one party against the other.

Soviet efforts thus were directed along two lines. The first was toward the expansion of Soviet-Pakistani relations, but in a manner that would not disrupt Moscow's ties with New Delhi. The second was the promotion of a resolution of the conflicts between the South Asian countries, preferably under Soviet auspices.

A possible way for Moscow to improve Soviet-Pakistan relations without alienating India was to make a moderate economic commitment to Pakistan while continuing to refrain from supplying the country with any arms. This seemed a reasonable price to Soviet leaders, and they renewed their offer to finance a one-million-ton steel mill (for which they eventually provided the equivalent of US$435 million in credits) as well as certain other small projects, and to expand trade with Pakistan.[23] Pakistani leaders, who had feared that the Soviet Union might use its close ties with Afghanistan to urge the latter to encourage separatism within what was left of Pakistan, hoped that a favorable response not only would benefit their country's economy but also would induce Moscow to moderate its previous support for India and Afghanistan in their quarrels with Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972 and again in October 1974 and tried to convince Soviet leaders that Pakistan was eager for a new and better relationship. He indicated that Pakistan could not abandon its link with China to improve relations with Moscow, but he stressed that these links were not directed against the USSR.

The Soviets also saw considerable progress made toward the realization of their second goal of stability in the subcontinent with the signing of a series of agreements, beginning in July 1972, which settled many of the outstanding disputes among the South Asian antagonists (though not the issue of Kashmir).[24] While the Soviets probably were disappointed that they were not permitted to take an active role in these negotiations, they nonetheless welcomed the results and urged the parties to continue the process of rapprochement.[25] The com-

[22] Some support for Pakistan would also help Moscow demonstrate to the Muslim Middle Eastern and North African states, which had been strongly critical of Soviet support for India's dismemberment of Pakistan, that the USSR regarded that action as a special case and was not pursuing either an anti-Pakistan policy as such or a policy of supporting dissident groups seeking to undermine the national unity of African or Asian countries.

[23] Soviet-Pakistan trade rose from the equivalent of US$38 million in 1972 to US$73 million in 1975. International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Direction of Trade Annual: 1969-75*, Washington, DC, 1976.

[24] For a description of these negotiations, see Mohammed Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Détente," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), October 1976, pp. 149-69.

[25] See P. Kutsobin and V. Shurygin, "South Asia: Tendencies Toward Stability," *International Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 43-48.

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muniqué issued at the end of Bhutto's October 1974 visit to Moscow not only supported the moves toward normalization of Pakistan's relations with India and Bangladesh but also included a statement that the Soviet Union and Pakistan hoped that the Afghan-Pakistani disagreement over the Pushtoonistan issue (which involved the status of the inhabitants of the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan) could be settled by peaceful means.[26] More recently, the communiqué issued at the end of Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Daud's April 1977 visit to Moscow expressed the same hope.[27] (The Pakistanis had feared that Daud, who had overthrown the Afghan king in a coup in July 1973, would revive the relatively dormant Pushtoonistan issue and thus exacerbate Afghan-Pakistani relations, but these apprehensions proved essentially groundless. Daud's moderate course was probably influenced as much by Afghan desires for aid from the Shah of Iran, who wanted his two neighbors to reach an accommodation, as it was by Soviet policy.)

At the same time, Moscow's ongoing concern over the trend of events within and between the countries contributed to its reluctance to assume a heavier burden in South Asia—especially in India and Bangladesh. This concern clearly increased after 1974. While Pakistan's improved relations with India and Bangladesh were welcomed by Moscow, a new worry was posed by anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh resulting from popular frustration over the dismal conditions in the new nation (in view of Dacca's dependence on and close links with New Delhi, such conditions were increasingly blamed on India). Not surprisingly, Moscow favored Sheikh Mujib's move from a democratic to an authoritarian political system early in 1975. The Soviets' concern turned into visible consternation after Mujib was overthrown by a coup led by more conservative forces in August 1975; subsequently, the country fell into even greater political turmoil, until General Ziaur Rahman seized control of the government at the end of 1975 and gradually restored a measure of order. Moscow recognized that increased rightist—and pro-Islamic—strength, as well as the government's arrest of leftist forces, would create even greater strains between India and Bangladesh, thus endangering stability in the eastern part of the subcontinent and complicating the Soviet position in South Asia. In addition, such a situation might offer

[26] *Pravda*, Oct. 27, 1974, in *CDSP*, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 15.
[27] *Pravda*, April 16, 1977, in *CDSP*, May 11, 1977, pp. 17-18.

New leaders in South Asia (from the left): General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan; Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India; and Major General Ziaur Rahman, President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

—Photos by Camera Press, Magnum, and Keystone.

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new opportunities to the United States or to China, if Bangladesh attempted to reduce its dependence on India. General Zia's attempts to distance himself from New Delhi probably tended to confirm Soviet fears. While Zia at first moved cautiously, leading Moscow to describe his role favorably a year after the coup,[28] his subsequent efforts to expand relations with China must have been disquieting.

More recently, Soviet leaders apparently were surprised and worried over the turmoil that occurred in Pakistan after the national elections of March 1977. Although the Soviets had not found Prime Minister Bhutto entirely to their liking, they had been pleased with his moves toward accommodation with India and had commented favorably on the economic and social reforms he had carried out.[29] The heterogeneous but basically pro-Islamic and anti-Indian opposition bloc which challenged Bhutto in the national elections and which, upon losing, took its case to the streets (resulting in an eventual military coup, to be discussed below) appeared likely to be a factor for instability within Pakistan and in South Asia.

More serious than events in Bangladesh and Pakistan, however, were trends in India. In the middle and late 1960's, Soviet officials and observers had been perturbed about what they took to be a resurgence of rightist strength in post-Nehru India,[30] but after 1969 Moscow had been heartened by Mrs. Gandhi's resurgence and her declared intention to move to the left. Yet by 1974 India was again in turmoil as the result of a combination of ill-conceived policies, poor management of government affairs, and bad monsoons. Moscow strongly and repeatedly supported Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of an emergency in June 1975 as a necessary step against the forces of reaction—noting that the Communist Party of India offered the same support.[31] The rising power of Mrs. Gandhi's outspokenly anticommunist son Sanjay in time led to open disputes between the government and the CPI, but the Soviet press was still depicting the struggle between Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party and the newly-formed Janata party as a battle between progressive and reactionary forces before the national elections of March 1977. In the past, Moscow had openly attacked Morarji Desai (soon to be the new prime minister) for his conservative and pro-Western leanings, and on March 13, 1977, *Izvestiya* went so far as to assert that "everything India has achieved during its 30 years of independence has been directly connected with the Indian National Congress. . . ." [32] Soviet dismay over the dramatic upset that spelled the end of three decades of Congress party rule was increased when the pro-Moscow CPI lost over two thirds of its seats in the Lok Sabha (the Indian parliament), while the independent Communist Party of India (Marxist)—the CPI(M)—maintained its previous strength. Brezhnev had painted an optimistic picture of trends in the Third World to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976, but a year later the USSR was faced with the need for a reappraisal of its position and policies in South Asia—at a time when Sino-Indian relations seemed to be improving and the new Carter administration in Washington appeared to be moving toward a more sympathetic stance vis-à-vis India.

China: Constraints and Opportunities

The outcome of the 1971 upheaval in the subcontinent—and Chinese policy during that episode—significantly curtailed Peking's short-term options and opportunities in South Asia. China's continued shipment of arms to Pakistan during the civil war and its diplomatic backing of that country during the fighting with India effectively halted the tentative Chinese and Indian attempt of 1969-70 to move toward better relations. China was left with no prospective role in Bangladesh—at least so long as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League was in power and the Bengali memory of China's position in 1971 remained vivid. While Peking was able to maintain its links with Islamabad, the West Pakistanis were clearly disappointed that the Chinese had not offered more all-out support—a disappointment only partially offset by their recognition that they could hardly afford to offend the country which had done the most for them during the crisis. From Peking's viewpoint, while a truncated Pakistan was less attractive as a counterweight to India, Chinese interests had long been centered in West rather than East Pakistan, since it was the western wing of the country that harbored the strongest anti-Indian feelings and contained the bulk of Pakistan's military strength. Peking evidently concluded that Pakistan

[28] *Izvestiya*, Aug. 26, 1976, in *CDSP*, Sept. 22, 1976, pp. 11 and 23.
[29] *Pravda*, March 11, 1977, in *CDSP*, April 6, 1977, p. 20.
[30] See, for example, M. Savelyev, "Monopoly Drive in India," *International Affairs*, April 1967, pp. 35-40.
[31] See *Pravda*, July 2, 1975, in *CDSP*, July 23, 1975, p. 12; *Izvestiya*, July 4, 1975, in *CDSP*, July 30, 1975, p. 17; and *Pravda* July 13, 1975, in *CDSP*, Aug. 6, 1975, pp. 17-18.
[32] *Izvestiya*, March 13, 1977, in *CDSP*, April 13, 1977, pp. 15-16.

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Premier Hua Kuo-feng of the People's Republic of China welcomes Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Peking airport on May 26, 1976.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 8, 1976, p. 2.

continued to offer the only possible leverage against India.

If China's short-term opportunities in South Asia were sharply circumscribed, the new situation in the subcontinent provided some possibilities for improving its position over the long term. The limited capacity of Sheikh Mujib's government to deal with Bangladesh's monumental tasks rendered its durability uncertain. As the high hopes of the newly-independent Bengalis for a better life were undermined by continued food shortages, unemployment, inflation, and the failure to establish law and order, Dacca's dependence on New Delhi made the latter an obvious scapegoat in place of the departed West Pakistanis. Most important, however, was the fact that India's predominance within South Asia reduced its need for Soviet backing, thereby opening up the possibility that a less hostile Chinese policy might weaken Indo-Soviet ties. Yet Chinese leaders, preoccupied with domestic political and economic disputes and intensely suspicious of the Soviet Union, were slow to realize and act upon this possibility.

Hence, the initial thrust of Chinese policy was to continue backing Pakistan, not only to counter India but also to help prevent West Pakistan's disintegration as a result of linguistic and regional disputes—although, according to Prime Minister Bhutto, China refused his 1972 request for a defense pact.[33] When Bhutto visited Peking in February 1972, Peking converted four past loans amounting to US$110 million into grants and deferred the repayment period of a 1970 loan of US$200 million for 20 years.[34] Chinese support improved Pakistan's bargaining position vis-à-vis India and Bangladesh—and Peking's 1972 veto of Bangladesh's application for UN membership (apparently at Pakistan's request) demonstrated to Dacca and New Delhi one cost of poor relations with China.

Thus, Pakistan, although forced to recognize India's enhanced position within South Asia, was not so weak as to be obliged to accept whatever New

[33] *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1972.
[34] *Peking Review*, Feb. 4, 1972, p. 8.

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Delhi proposed. Bhutto skillfully utilized his limited assets to reach a series of agreements with India and Bangladesh between 1972 and 1976, thus settling many of the outstanding issues created by the 1965 as well as the 1971 wars in the subcontinent. While India and Pakistan remained deadlocked on Kashmir, there was a tacit understanding that the issue would remain essentially dormant.

Peking, while probably of two minds about these agreements, spoke out in favor of the emerging détente. During a second visit of Bhutto to Peking in May 1974, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing said:

We are glad to see that agreements have been reached . . . which have led to the implementation of the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and thus created favorable conditions for the normalization of relations among the countries of the subcontinent. . . . It is our hope that the countries of the subcontinent will live in friendship, in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty. . . . The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the peoples of South Asia in their struggle against hegemonism and expansionism.[35]

As a result of the intraregional agreements, Peking reversed its initial veto to support Bangladesh's 1974 application for UN membership. In August 1975, after the overthrow of Sheikh Mujib, China also extended diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh, and the two countries moved toward normal relations.[36] Goodwill delegations began to exchange visits in 1976, and a Sino-Bangladesh trade agreement was signed in December of that year. Mujib's successor, General Ziaur Rahman, received an extremely warm welcome when he visited China in January 1977, and economic and technical cooperation as well as trade and payments agreements were signed.[37] Zia's denunciation of "expansionism and hegemonism" while in China probably was especially satisfying to Peking—and worrisome to Moscow.[38] Subsequently there were reports that China was offering MIG-21 planes to Bangladesh, although Peking's own needs and Bangladesh's limited capacity to fly and service such aircraft suggest that any transfers will be quite limited.[39]

The mid-1970's also saw some slow movement toward a less hostile Sino-Indian relationship. Nonetheless, a number of specific events prompted periodic Chinese attacks on India, particularly in 1974. Peking's earlier public statements downplaying the dangers of nuclear proliferation gave it little grounds for objecting to India's 1974 nuclear explosion, but it did try to reassure Pakistan by stressing its support for the latter's struggle to defend its independence against foreign aggression and interference, including specifically "nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail."[40] India's annexation of its Himalayan protectorate of Sikkim led to a series of much

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the start of the July 1972 negotiations in Simla, where the two countries began to resolve conflicts remaining in the aftermath of the 1971 war on the subcontinent.

—Pictorial Parade.

[35] Ibid., May 17, 1974, p. 7.

[36] For an analysis of trends in Bangladesh and its foreign relations, see M. Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), September 1977, pp. 793-808.

[37] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Trends in Communist Propaganda* (Washington, DC), Jan. 5, 1977, pp. 9-10.

[38] Radio Peking, New China News Agency (NCNA) in English, Jan. 4, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Jan. 5, 1977.

[39] Golam W. Choudhury, "Post-Mao Policy in Asia," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1977, p. 28.

[40] *Peking Review*, July 15, 1974, p. 14.

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harsher Chinese reactions throughout the latter half of 1974. Typical was an official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 11 denouncing New Delhi's action:

The Indian government's shameless act of annexing Sikkim has been strongly condemned by all countries and people that uphold justice. The Soviet Union alone, however, has blatantly cheered India and expressed support for Indira Gandhi's government. This is another proof that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is the boss behind the scenes as well as the abettor of Indian expansionism.[41]

The Chinese belief that New Delhi was not only firmly linked to Moscow but was a willing tool of the Soviet Union remained the major obstacle to substantial improvement in Sino-Indian relations. If Peking was unwilling to move toward an accommodation until New Delhi proved its own master, Indian government leaders were equally adamant that it was not their task to prove that they made their own decisions.

China's adverse commentary on India declined in 1975 and early 1976, although Peking criticized the state of emergency declared by Mrs. Gandhi's government in June 1975 and also attacked New Delhi for its attempt to put pressure on Dacca to yield to Indian desires on issues in dispute.[42] At the same time, the Chinese began to point out approvingly that opposition was developing within India to Soviet economic "exploitation," and chose to play in a relatively low key a Sino-Indian border incident in October 1975 which resulted in the deaths of four Indians.

Hua Kuo-feng (right), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Premier of the People's Republic of China, welcomes Major General Ziaur Rahman, then Chief Martial Law Administrator (and now President) of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, to Peking on January 4, 1977.

—UPI.

Early in 1976 the Indian government took a number of modest initiatives toward normalizing relations. An agreement was reached to install a general telex link with China on a reciprocal basis, and China was invited to participate in UNESCO conferences in India. Mrs. Gandhi went to the Chinese embassy to sign the book of condolences when Chou En-lai died, and this led to return gestures of protocol by Chinese officials. On April 15, Indian Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan told the Lok Sabha that India would send an ambassador to China and that Peking was expected to reciprocate, moves which restored full diplomatic relations for the first time since the two countries had withdrawn their ambassadors in the early 1960's. A visit by Mrs. Gandhi to the Soviet Union on June 8-13 probably reflected New Delhi's desire to make it clear that any improvement in India's relations with China would not weaken its ties with the USSR, but the absence of any Soviet commentary acknowledging the move toward Sino-Indian "normalization" suggests that Moscow was anything but enthusiastic about this development and its implications.

Two points should be kept in mind in evaluating the importance of the exchange of ambassadors. First, it was a significant symbolic step forward in ending the situation of neither country's having an ambassador in the other's capital, and assignment of ambassadors probably was a necessary step toward any sustained effort to improve relations. Second, it took the two governments eight years after the possibility of better relations was first seriously raised by Mrs. Gandhi in 1968 to achieve this first small step.

Major obstacles will confront any attempt by the two countries to effect a significant improvement in their relations. Their border dispute remains not only unsettled but undiscussed—although both

[41] Ibid., Sept. 20, 1974.
[42] Ibid., Feb. 20 and 27, 1976.

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governments appear willing to accept the de facto control arrangements which have been in force since the 1962 war. Indians remain convinced that China has provided training and material support to dissident tribal groups in northeastern India—and unconvinced that Peking can be trusted to refrain from such moves in the future. Both countries continue to compete for influence in the smaller countries of South Asia, and New Delhi will be very uneasy about any Chinese arms sent to Bangladesh. Finally, Peking remains suspicious about Indian policy toward Tibet—a suspicion intensified by the meeting Prime Minister Morarji Desai had with the Dalai Lama in July 1977, which prompted an official Chinese protest.[43]

Competition in a New Context

Any appraisal of the likely Soviet and Chinese courses of action vis-à-vis South Asia over the next several years must take into account several important changes since 1975 which have created increased complexity and uncertainty about the relations between the subcontinent and the major powers. It is by no means inevitable that these developments will lead to major policy shifts by Moscow and Peking. But some differences in emphasis seem very likely, and over time these could have a significant effect upon the subcontinent's international position.

Before setting forth the changes that have occurred, it is important to emphasize one possible development which has *not* taken place. Sino-Soviet relations have shown no significant signs of improvement since the death of Mao Tse-tung, despite Soviet efforts during the months after his death to probe the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet détente. Since Mao was the principal architect of China's anti-Soviet course, many observers—Soviet as well as Western—expected some lessening of hostility once he died. The new Chinese leaders have abandoned many of Mao's domestic policies, but their need to retain some part of his legacy to ensure their own legitimacy—combined with what appears to be a genuine fear of Soviet aims and power—have caused them to maintain a firm anti-Soviet stance. No one can be certain that a shift will not occur over the next few years, but if a change takes place it is likely to be a modest one in view of the bitter memories and deep fears of both parties. This suggests that Moscow and Peking will continue to be competitors in South Asia as elsewhere, although the importance of the interests and the intensity of their competition there are not likely to be of such magnitude as to prevent an easing of Sino-Soviet relations if more basic sources of tension are ameliorated.

Chen Chao-yüan (right), Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to India, presents his credentials to Indian President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed in New Delhi on September 20, 1976.

—Pictorial Parade.

Two of the changes that have taken place—the 1975 coup against Sheikh Mujib's government and its replacement by a regime less friendly to India, and the 1976 exchange of ambassadors between India and China—have already been discussed. The pace of change has been more rapid in 1977: events include the advent of the Carter administration in the United States; the overturn of the Congress party in India and the rise to power in New Delhi of men less suspicious of the US; and the prolonged political turmoil in Pakistan which resulted in the seizure of power by the military, on the ground that the March elections won by Bhutto were rigged and "fair" elections must be ensured in the future.

The assumption of office by the Carter administration brought to power men who were inclined to accord the Third World in general a somewhat more important place in world affairs and who were in

[43] Radio Peking, NCNA in English, Aug. 5, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1977.

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Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko with Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Atal Bihari at the New Delhi airport on April 25, 1977.

—UPI.

favor of assigning India a higher priority relative to Pakistan than had been the case during the Nixon and Ford presidencies.[44] This inclination of the new administration has been reinforced by the return of democracy in India and by New Delhi's more friendly attitude toward the US. The Carter administration has indicated its willingness to resume American economic aid to India, although nothing like the huge program—or great enthusiasm—of the Kennedy years is likely. India has welcomed President Carter's appeal to Moscow for a Soviet-American agreement to limit the naval activities of the two countries in the Indian Ocean, and New Delhi's statements on this issue are likely to be more balanced than in the past. The friendlier attitude of the two governments will not, of course, eliminate all sources of disagreement between them; there will continue to be downs as well as ups in Indo-American relations. In particular, the US's withholding of enriched uranium for the important Tarapore nuclear station in an effort to influence India's nuclear policies could lead to major difficulties. It is nevertheless clear that improved ties and an increased American involvement in India are desired by both countries.

The new American interest in India, combined with the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi—at a time when US-Soviet relations were under serious strain—posed significant problems for the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Desai, in one of his first major statements, said that his government would follow a policy of "genuine" nonalignment and would not allow the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty to stand in the way of Indian friendship with any other country.[45] Such a statement probably served to confirm Soviet fears about Desai and his associates. Yet the course Moscow should adopt must have been far from clear. If the USSR were to stop—or to cut back on—its support of India, this could lead New Delhi to seek better relations with China as well as with the United States. At the same time, Moscow could hardly have relished the idea of pressing its attention and favors on an India that was openly disdainful of the Soviet Union.

Fortunately for Moscow, India's new leaders soon adopted a more restrained tone in their remarks about New Delhi's relations with the USSR. Senior officials in India's Ministry of External Affairs pointed out to the country's new political leaders that Mrs. Gandhi's government had virtually eliminated its public attacks on the United States since early 1976 in an effort to improve relations—something the new leaders had not learned of in their jail cells. This move, combined with the exchange of ambassadors with China, had been designed to enhance India's position by improving relations with its major power adversaries rather than by weakening its links with its only great power supporter. Thus some reassurance that New Delhi still placed a high value on its ties to Moscow was in order, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko was invited to visit India.

Gromyko arrived in India late in April. His visit can probably best be described as businesslike rather than either friendly or hostile.[46] The language of the joint communiqué issued at the close of the visit was more restrained than had been typical of past high-level visits, and the Soviet offer of a loan for heavy industrial products equivalent to US$252 million was largely symbolic in view of unutilized past Soviet credits.

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[44] The Nixon and Ford administrations' support of Pakistan was limited largely to the field of economic aid in the years 1971-75, but in this respect the US was quite forthcoming, while providing little assistance for India. The official ending of the US arms embargo to South Asia in 1975 was not followed by any significant arms sales, but it was widely interpreted as a gesture friendly to Pakistan and thus assumed considerable symbolic importance in the subcontinent.

[45] *The New York Times*, March 25, 1977.

[46] See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), May 20, 1977.

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While the advent of new leaders in Washington and New Delhi posed problems for the Soviet Union, these developments—combined with the volatile situation in Pakistan—complicated China's tasks even more. Pakistan's political turmoil and economic disarray have further reduced that country's attractiveness to Peking, a tendency that is apt to be intensified if US-Pakistan relations continue to deteriorate. China has treated the prolonged political crisis and the ensuing military takeover in Pakistan in a relatively straightforward and noncommittal manner. It is likely to continue to mark time until the trend of events becomes clearer, without either abandoning Pakistan or extending any substantial support to the country.

If the more critical attitude of the new Indian leaders toward the Soviet Union is a hopeful sign to Peking, Chinese leaders have not forgotten that these same men were also among those most hostile to China during the 1960's, when Sino-Indian relations were at their worst. Apart from specific acts and suspicions, such as those growing out of Desai's meeting with the Dalai Lama and the problems in Sino-Indian relations mentioned earlier, there are several broad reasons to be skeptical about the chances for any major improvement in Sino-Indian relations. If Indo-American relations improve without any serious deterioration in Indo-Soviet relations, Peking may come to fear Soviet-American collusion with India against China—particularly if progress is made in the Soviet-American détente while Sino-American relations remain frozen over the Taiwan issue. On the other hand, Chinese leaders are well aware of the past fluctuations in Indo-American relations and may believe that if a future deterioration occurs it will once again cause New Delhi to draw closer to Moscow. Peking also seems to be convinced that New Delhi intends to play a hegemonic role within the subcontinent and will continue to oppose any significant Chinese presence in the smaller South Asian countries.

Beyond, or perhaps alongside, these obstacles there is the problem of discerning what would be the substance of—and thus the motivation for—a substantially improved Sino-Indian relationship. The two countries have little to offer each other in any *positive* sense, in view of the basic similarity of their economies and the great differences in their cultural and political systems. Their basic motivation for a rapprochement would thus be the essentially *negative* and long-range goal of reducing the potential harm that could result from hostile relations. The elimination of this threat would require short-term sacrifices in negotiating a border agreement as well as nebulous understandings (which would be open to conflicting interpretations) about the two countries' respective foreign policies and spheres of influence. Making short-term concessions for uncertain long-term gains is seldom an attractive proposition to political leaders unless the dangers of *not* doing so are great, a situation which hardly applies to India and China in view of the quiet conditions along their frontiers for more than a decade.

* * *

The foregoing review of Soviet and Chinese perceptions of and policies toward South Asia suggests two conclusions.

First, the essential consistency of Soviet and Chinese policies is likely to continue, though in somewhat modified form, at least for the next several years. The Soviet Union will continue to attach priority to its ties with India, while concomitantly trying to improve relations with Pakistan so as to broaden its role in the subcontinent. China probably will remain supportive of Pakistan. However, Peking will continue to accord the somewhat higher priority of the past year or so to efforts to expand its relations with the other South Asian states, in view of the uncertainties involved in Pakistan. Thus, the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in South Asia will continue as long as the mutual hostility of the two communist powers lasts.

Second, barring an unpredictable and unlikely crisis such as the complete internal disintegration of Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China are likely to pursue relatively cautious and essentially reactive policies toward the subcontinent. Fear of losing its present position rather than hope for any substantial gains appears to be the dominant motive behind Moscow's policy. Soviet leaders are engaged in a long-term effort to enhance their position in Asia, and recognize that temporary setbacks are likely—and also that the heterogeneous Janata party government in India may not be durable. Peking, which out of necessity is less actively seeking an expanded world role, will continue to have higher priorities at home as well as in other areas of the globe than in South Asia. Thus, while external powers will remain involved in the affairs of the subcontinent, it is unlikely to be as central an arena of competition as it has been over much of the past two decades.

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Books

Czechoslovakia: Views of the Bridge

By George Klein

JOSEF KORBEL. *Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.
EUGEN LOEBL. *My Mind on Trial.* New York, NY, and London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
PETER MILLARD. *Prager Winter: Männer und Mächte hinter der Charta 77* (The Prague Winter: Men and Forces Behind Charter 77). Wien-München, Verlag Herold, 1977.
H. GORDON SKILLING. *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976.
JAROSLAV TEPLY. *Economie nationale de la Tchécoslovaquie contemporaine* (The National Economy of Contemporary Czechoslovakia). Paris, La Pensée universelle, 1976.
OTTO ULC. *The Judge in a Communist State.* Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1972.
OTTO ULC. *Politics in Czechoslovakia.* San Francisco, CA, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1974.

THE LATE Jan Masaryk declared that Czechoslovakia would not serve as a bridge between East and West because bridges suffer indignities from both people and horses who cross them. Yet geography and history have conspired to place his country in precisely that role. Czechoslovakia is a multinational state with a dominant Slavic culture, where Catholicism, Protestantism, and a strong anticlerical strain have competed for men's souls. Politically, the country has experienced Western parliamentary democracy, Fascist occupation, and Soviet-style socialism.

The contradictions inherent in the imposition of the last-mentioned political form upon the Czechoslovak state have driven successive waves of Czechoslovak citizens to seek political asylum in the West. Indeed, four of the six authors reviewed here belong to various waves of post-World War II emigration. The late Josef Korbel is a representative of the generation of refugees that left the country in 1948, in the wake of the successful Communist coup. Otto Ulc, progressively disillusioned with the system that he served in the capacity of a judge, left in 1959. Eugen Loebl and Jarsolav Teply are both members of the "Class of 1968," those who departed in the wake of the Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring. In contrast, the other two authors—Peter Millard, a German journalist, and Gordon Skilling, a Canadian scholar—comment on recent political events in Czechoslovakia not as expatriates but as well-informed outsiders who have observed the country firsthand on numerous occasions.

The seven volumes approach contemporary Czechoslovakia from a variety of perspectives—historical, institutional, personal, and journalistic. The Korbel study looks to the past to explain the present. Loebl, Ulc, and Teply examine the institutional framework of contemporary Czechoslovakia. Loebl's work is also a memoir of his experiences as a star defendant in the Slansky trials of the early 1950's and of his later incarceration. Ulc's *The Judge in a Communist System* likewise provides an insider's view of communist Czechoslovakia's judicial system, although from the opposite side of the bench. Skilling presents a massive history of the origins and events of the Prague Spring of 1968, while Millard's book is an insightful journalistic account of the consequences of its suppression.

Despite their widely varying backgrounds and approaches, these authors reached a remarkable degree of consensus regarding the current situation of

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Czechoslovakia and the reasons for it. If their collective view is flawed, it is only because they for the most part try to examine the Czechoslovak system on its own terms without linking it in any systematic way to the fate of the rest of Eastern Europe and the world at large.

In particular, the Czechoslovak authors indulge in a national penchant for self-analysis and self-criticism. Korbel cites (p. 30) the thoughts of Thomas Masaryk, first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, upon his return to the newly independent country in 1918:

Are we able to govern ourselves: . . . Can we . . . maintain our independence, maintain it, permanently? Do we have enough ability, enough brains, enough perspicacity, enough will, enough resolution, enough perseverance?

While Masaryk's tentative answers were affirmative, as Korbel states, the doubts about the capacity of Czechoslovaks to rule themselves would recur in both the interwar and postwar periods. Korbel himself deals very harshly with the leadership of the late Eduard Benes, the last non-Communist President of Czechoslovakia, whom he accuses of compromising the country's independence by erroneous decisions. The author implies that the history of Czechoslovakia might have evolved differently under the direction of a more clearsighted leadership.

YET TO BLAME Czechoslovakia's fate on the weakness of its leaders is both inappropriate and simplistic. Such leaders as Benes, Emil Hacha, and Ludvik Svoboda manifested flashes of courage before bowing to forces which were amenable to neither reason nor control. The fact is that Czechoslovakia lacked and still lacks a credible capability for self-defense; its protectors in the West have proved both unwilling and unable to play an active role when threats to the nation's independence have developed. This was true in 1938, in 1948, and again in 1968.

In 1938, Czechoslovakia became the victim of the general instability of Europe and the continent's unwillingness to face the challenge posed by Hitler. Czechoslovakia—home of some two and a half million Germans—faced a variety of scavengers willing to benefit from its dismemberment. Denied assistance by the Western allies, Benes drew the logical conclusions, surrendered the Sudetenland, and withdrew to London in a state of profound disillusionment. He abandoned the country in a catastrophic situation to an enfeebled, nonpolitical caretaker president, Dr. Emil Hacha, who himself was later harshly judged for his "collaboration" in a role he had not sought.

Benes learned the lessons of Munich so well that when he returned with the Allied liberating armies he in effect greatly contributed to a second surrender of the state—this time into the arms of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (the only powerfully organized political force within the country) and lasting Soviet influence. Korbel marvels at Benes' naive faith that the Soviets would not demand an institutionalization of their system as the price for protection (p. 231). Yet, whether or not Benes trusted the Soviet Union was probably irrelevant in light of the havoc wrought by the postwar expulsion of the entire German minority, the chaotic state of property relationships, and the total discrediting of the West in the eyes of an entire generation of Czechoslovak citizens. Add to this the immediate proximity of Soviet power and Moscow's willingness to use it, and the success of the Communist coup of 1948 was all but guaranteed. Benes' Communist successor, Klement Gottwald, himself maintained plaintively to Eugen Loebl that as the first working

Reviewers in This Issue

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JAMES T. VINCENT—Pen name of a US Foreign Service Officer who has served at several East and West European posts and was assigned to Budapest in the final years of Cardinal Mindszenty's residence in the American Embassy there.

DENNIS REINHARTZ—Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of History and Russian, University of Texas (Arlington); contributor of articles on art and revolution to *Slavic Review*, *Virginia Social Science Journal*, and other periodicals; author of a forthcoming literary biography of Milovan Djilas.

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI—Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of California (Los Angeles); author of *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland, 1945-1960*, 1965, and other studies on the political economy of socialist Eastern Europe.

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class president of the Czechoslovak Republic he would not be a servant to the Soviets (Loebl, pp. 22-23). Yet, this is precisely the role that Gottwald and those who have followed him as president have been forced to play, although Antonin Novotny has been perhaps the only one to serve Soviet interests without inner reservations.[1]

IMPOSITION OF a Soviet-style one-party system on a technologically advanced Czechoslovakia, whose population traditionally placed great faith in the incorruptibility of its civil service and the integrity of its educational system, has had severe consequences. Ulc, Teply, and Loebl—all of whom worked within the new system before leaving in disillusionment—examine the state of contemporary institutions and the stagnation and degeneration associated with them. (Ulc's *Politics in Czechoslovakia* is of particular interest in that it is perhaps the first Western behavioral text to describe Czechoslovak institutions on the basis of aggregate data and functional analysis. He capably demonstrates that techniques applied to the studies of noncommunist areas can be utilized in the study of Eastern Europe as well.)

Traditional Czechoslovak public life was built on the foundations of the Hapsburg *Rechtsstaat,* in which all judicial and civil service procedures were regularized, and within which all institutions retained a substantial measure of autonomy. Education and merit played an important role in assignment to positions of responsibility. This tradition was democratized in interwar Czechoslovakia by what was the only successful parliamentary system in Central Europe.

It is the unanimous testimony of Ulc, Teply, and Leobl that the Communists destroyed these traditions by subordinating all autonomous institutions to the "will of the working class"—i.e., the party and state bureaucracies. In addition to this bureaucratization, there was even a gradual exclusion of those who had fought so tirelessly for communist principles during the interwar period and under the occupation, as Loebl himself had.

The authors bear witness to the subsequent moral atrophy of the system, which penetrated all spheres of human activity, ranging from the administration of justice to the arts and sciences and the economy. The ideological constraints were so thoughtlessly administered by the many incompetents raised to power that coercion became the modus operandi in the state's confrontation with its citizenry. Even the working-class membership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ), for whose benefit the regime supposedly existed, became disillusioned. This disillusionment did not necessarily extend to socialism per se but rather to the manner in which it was administered. In effect, the system alienated the very generation of Communists which it had nurtured.

At the root of this state of affairs lay the total politicization of all institutions, the subjecting of all appointments to the approval of the party monolith. Such staffing on the basis of party loyalty alone is abhorrent to all Czechoslovak traditions. The resulting mediocrity eventually deadened initiative and energy in all spheres and made conformity the highest value.

The Czechoslovaks could conform as long as the Communist management of the economy continued to provide a measure of physical comfort, but the stagnation which permeated the society affected not only its cultural institutions but also the economy. While the planned economy facilitated substantial achievements in production, as Teply points out, these were not translated into increased economic welfare. The problem was exacerbated because popular aspirations were measured not in terms of conditions prevalent in the Soviet bloc but in terms of conditions in the most advanced industrial states.

Ulc, Teply, and Korbel all provide ample data illustrating the institutional stagnation in the 1960's. They unanimously attribute the failings of the Czechoslovak system to the political structure as a whole, rather than to the defects in any single area of human activity. Responsibility for the system's failures is ascribed to the dogmatic application of Soviet methods and a general lack of participation, accompanied by a decline in the customary standards of human performance.

Loebl's *My Mind on Trial* and Ulc's *The Judge in a Communist State* make these views specific with respect to the Czechoslovak judicial system in the 1950's. These books are not works of social science; rather, they constitute personal documents based on participant observation. While Loebl and Ulc occupied different positions in the courtroom drama, their judgment of the system is remarkably similar—namely, that the subordination of the judicial system to achieve political ends

[1] Even Gustav Husak may have similar reservations. See, e.g., Millard, pp. 18-20.

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is corrupting and endangers the civil liberties of opponents and supporters of the regime alike. While Ulc ranges across the entire field of judicial administration in Czechoslovakia, Loebl deals exclusively with the Slansky trials, which were carried out under the tutelage of Soviet political advisers. Both prove the demoralizing effects on the entire administration of justice, even in non-political cases, of the fundamental violation of both the *Rechtsstaat* and the democratic traditions.

IT IS PRECISELY such conditions that were addressed by the reform movement, described in rich detail by Skilling. This movement, which culminated in the Spring of 1968, brought a remarkable, if brief, resurgence of traditional Czechoslovak values. The shocking maladministration of justice in the Novotny era—documented by Ulc and Loebl—provided strong impetus for this development. The Slansky trials offended Communists and non-Communists alike and tended to compromise those who had participated. These offenses to conscience combined with the poor overall performance of the economy to bring a resurgence of independent economic, scientific, and cultural institutions which sought to study the causes of the general malaise and eventually pressured the political system to oust Novotny in December of 1967.

Whether the reform movement is an "interrupted revolution," as Skilling argues, or another of the periodic upheavals which are not uncommon in communist states remains an open question. It should be recalled in this context that the Prague Spring was led in part by apparatchiks struggling to achieve personal and professional rehabilitation. In the vanguard were Slovaks, who, despite large-scale investments in their economy by the central government, chafed at the anti-Slovak biases of Czech politicians such as Novotny. Slovak Communists had been jailed (e.g., Gustav Husak) or executed (e.g., Vladimir Klementis) in the 1950's for nationalist tendencies. The Prague Spring catapulted the Slovak, Alexander Dubcek, into the leadership of the nation and seemed to provide the Slovaks with a chance for redress. At the same time, the cause of the apparatchiks found a response among the general populace, many of whose members had also suffered from the degradations of the previous era. The true test of the "revolutionary" quality of developments would have arrived only at the moment when the reformers had succeeded in consolidating their power and found themselves faced with a challenge from an opposition within the system. Judging from the lessons of Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, one should not have been too hopeful in this regard.

Nevertheless, during the heady Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia experienced its first movement of national consensus in decades. There were few intellectuals or institutions that did not participate enthusiastically in the events of 1968. Apart from members of the security organs and those who owed their positions purely to party allegiance, there was little opposition to the new line.

Skilling chronicles the dramatic rehabilitation of national institutions that occurred when Czechoslovakia's leaders permitted the country to fall back on its national traditions and norms as the guiding compass. During the brief era of the Spring all institutions seemed to have recovered an independent voice. The renaissance even encompassed the army, which was so affected that in the subsequent "normalization" some 11,000 officers had to be purged. At the same time, the country enjoyed a remarkable outpouring of creativity, which ranged from the stage and film to literature and technology.

YET THE REFORM leaders were guilty of a perspective as wishful as that which permeated the atmosphere in the years between 1945 and 1948. Like Benes before them, the reformers indulged in the fantasy that the Soviet Union would let them proceed unhampered. However, it was unrealistic to expect Moscow to permit them the luxury of institutionalizing a movement that promulgated values similar to those held by Soviet dissidents. Moreover, success of the Czechoslovak reforms would have validated dissident movements all through the Communist bloc. At Bratislava, on August 3, 1968, the Soviets served the Czechoslovak leadership notice that the course of the reforms must be reversed. Three weeks later, on August 22, 1968, Soviet forces occupied Prague to ensure this outcome.

Since then, Czechoslovakia has been in the throes of a "normalization," which has in effect meant the return to leadership of those who were the most "flexible." Their ranks include many of the erstwhile reformers, among them Husak, who now serves as CPCZ First Secretary as well as President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Conformity is again the

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paramount virtue — enshrining mediocrity as a national norm.

In imposing conformity, the present leadership has been far more subtle than its pre-1968 counterparts. (The Soviet occupiers, too, have manifested restraint in the face of local provocation and opposition.) While the most outspoken opponents of "normalization" have suffered imprisonment or exile, tens of thousands of others who failed to exhibit sufficient "flexibility" have been barred from their customary intellectual pursuits and must eke out an existence in menial occupations. In addition, they may find their children denied access to higher education—a sanction that is particularly offensive to Czechoslovak sensibilities. It would be an exaggeration to say that the atmosphere is permeated by fear; indifference is far more prevalent. Indeed, political apathy is widespread, as people have retreated into private concerns.

Yet, despite this dismal setting, many individuals have maintained a remarkable degree of courage. Dubcek himself challenged the regime in an open letter, which was also published abroad. The prominent student leader in 1968, Jiri Müller, was amnestied in October 1976, only to become a signatory of "Charter 77"—an open lament by those whom the regime had deprived of the rights granted them by provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which the Czechoslovak government had ratified.

The drafting and signing of "Charter 77" was the first major political act on the part of the reformers since the Soviet "entry." Millard provides a useful chronology of the sequence of events preceding and following its appearance at the outset of 1977, and he pinpoints the role of various individuals in presenting "Charter 77" to the authorities. As evidenced in his account, Millard is well acquainted with the Czechoslovak scene and was able to draw on information from both oppositional and governmental circles.

Both Millard and this reviewer marvel at the reluctance of the Soviets and the present Czechoslovak leadership to conciliate the former participants in the events of the Prague Spring. The continued exclusion from professional life of tens of thousands of highly trained individuals has caused Czechoslovak society incalculable losses, felt not only in the arts and sciences but in industrial production as well. The regime can ill afford to squander the skills of those whom it now forces to live on the fringes of society. It would seem to be in the interests of both the present government and the Soviets to bring these individuals back into the mainstream of national life. As Millard observes (p. 37), it was only three years after the Hungarian revolt of 1956 that Janos Kadar began to try to coopt the Hungarian insurgents back into the system.

"Charter 77" and the response of the Prague government to those individuals who sought to petition it peacefully is a sad commentary on Czechoslovak political realities. It is a mark of the weakness of the regime that the leaders feel they cannot afford to deal with these individuals other than by prosecution and internal or external exile. Only a massive movement toward national conciliation by the present holders of power can heal the wounds sustained by the Czechoslovak body politic in the last decade.

Recent Czechoslovak history has been well covered by a vast body of literature, of which the seven works reviewed here are but a random sampling. Skilling reports (p. 891) close to 600 books dealing with the Prague Spring published in the West alone and an additional 1,000 articles in the Czech and Slovak languages.

Events in Czechoslovakia will continue to absorb observers. The country's position between and astraddle diverse forces guarantees that nothing is as certain as change. The present piercing stillness can only be viewed as prelude to the next sweep of events.

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Mindszenty Remembered

By James T. Vincent

JOZSEF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. *Memoirs*. New York, NY, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

IT IS REGRETTABLE, if understandable in the context of international politics, that the personal and pastoral qualities of a controversial political and religious figure should recede from view in the effort to appraise his part in the evolving relationship between Church and State in Eastern Europe. The travail and ultimate exile of the late Primate of Hungary, Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, provide a case in point.

Born in 1892 of farmer stock in a village in Western Hungary, Mindszenty spent a quarter century in local parish work before being thrust suddenly into national prominence—and international controversy—in the aftermath of World War II. Mindszenty was elevated to the Hungarian Primacy in 1945, evidently on the basis of his strong anti-Nazi record, but was soon caught up in the escalating conflict between the Church and communist authorities. His stubborn opposition to the regime's growing encroachments on popular religious freedoms and prerogatives led, in February 1949, to a spectacular show trial, at which the Cardinal was charged with "treason," "espionage," and "foreign currency speculation." Originally sentenced to life imprisonment, a punishment later commuted to an indefinite "house arrest," he was finally released during the 1956 Hungarian revolution, but after less than a week at liberty, he sought refuge in the American Embassy in Budapest as Soviet forces re-entered the city.

For the next 15 years Cardinal Mindszenty remained in the embassy, refusing opportunities for safe passage to the West, presenting to many a symbol of courage and fortitude, while serving as a constant if diminishing source of conflict in Hungary's relations with the Vatican and the United States. Negotiations between the Vatican and the Hungarian government finally resulted in Cardinal Mindszenty's departure from Budapest in September 1971 for Rome and then Vienna, where he lived until his death in May 1975.

The difficulties which Cardinal Mindszenty posed for a Vatican intent on improving relations with the governments in Eastern Europe did not disappear with the Primate's arrival in the West—as seems evident from the tortured path the Cardinal's *Memoirs* traversed before publication. In a review of the German edition of the *Memoirs*,[1] Hansjakob Stehle draws attention to the radical editing of the original manuscript, which, he suggests, was reduced by "several thousand pages."[2] The final chapter, which describes the Cardinal's departure in 1971 from the American Embassy, apparently was cut from more than 200 to 19 pages.

Indeed, the first thing that struck this reviewer was the brevity of the *Memoirs*, made all the more evident by their staccato, disconnected chapters. While taste and publishing habits today clearly do not favor multivolume publications, the *Memoirs* nevertheless stand out as a prodigy of compression — especially when one considers the several bulky volumes of manuscript, much written in the Cardinal's minute handwriting, which had accumulated in the Embassy vault. This reviewer suspects a seesaw struggle occurred between Cardinal Mindszenty, on the one hand, and his editors and publishers (and probably the Vatican), on the other, in the interval between the Primate's September 1971 departure from Hungary and publication of the *Memoirs* three years later. In view of the importance which the Cardinal attached to early publication, the mass of written material already on hand when he left the Embassy, and the strength of his convictions whatever the

[1] *Erinnerungen*, Berlin, Propyläen-Verlag, 1974.

[2] *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Nov. 29, 1974.

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issue, the struggle was presumably severe.

If this conjecture is accurate, it would account for a desiccated quality in the writing. Much of the "juice" has been squeezed out, doubtless in the interest of moderation and credibility as well as of brevity. This is not to suggest that anything essential has been cut, yet this reviewer regrets that the editing was not a bit less prudent.

For the moderate tone of the *Memoirs* tends to conceal what this observer regarded as the Cardinal's most essential and endearing quality—his innocence, which included a large measure of indiscretion and a lack of worldly wisdom. This was at once his strength and a grave weakness. He was farthest removed from a "diplomat," in the stereotyped sense of that word—i.e., one who will not or cannot think, express oneself, or act directly. The Cardinal liked to project an image of political sophistication, and certainly his thought processes could be complicated enough. But they were usually too convoluted to be genuinely sophisticated. A provincial quality—a kind of *Kirchturmspolitik*—overlay the whole. His mask of shrewdness could not conceal the towering political innocence expressed, for example, in his almost otherworldly reply to the greetings from the Hungarian government on the occasion of his elevation to the Primacy in 1945:

Many thanks for the warm congratulations. The highest constitutional authority of the country stands ready to serve his native land. (*Memoirs*, p. 36)

Of course, observers less swayed by affection for the Cardinal might cite his reply instead as evidence of arrogance and political incorrigibility. And indeed it is not difficult to sense, even in the Cardinal's own account of the 1945-48 period in Hungary, the blank dismay and incomprehension of moderate political elements when confronted with the Primate's totally uncompromising refusal to come to terms with them in the interest of a united front against the ineluctable communist advance. Much respected Catholic opinion both in and outside of Hungary felt it was Mindszenty's duty—in the early postwar years and during his briefer interval of freedom in 1956—not only to make common cause with noncommunist forces, but even to try to find some modus vivendi with the communists and thus make it more difficult for the latter to accomplish their purposes. For the most important thing, in this view, was for the Church to survive as intact as possible. According to his critics, the Cardinal should have tacked and accommodated.

But this is a pointless debate, for the Cardinal was by nature incapable of such a course. He was a dogmatic romanticist, often childlike in his political concepts, really no fair game for Matyas Rakosi as the latter drew the net tight around the Primate during 1948.

At the same time, would a more flexible style on the Cardinal's part have achieved a better outcome? Would political sophistication have materially affected the course of events? This reviewer doubts it. A more politically skilled Cardinal might have strung out the process, but surely he could not have reversed it. The reviewer has never found persuasive the familiar comparison—which Stehle also makes to Mindszenty's disadvantage[3] — with Poland and Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, for the two Church leaders faced different social and political conditions. Still, this is a debate to which there is no completely satisfying answer.

IN THE CHAPTER dealing with his departure from the American Embassy, the Cardinal writes that he was motivated by the impression that "the United States Government, in view of the changed situation and in consideration of my age, regarded my leaving the Embassy as desirable" (p. 232). It is, of course, true that American officials, particularly those in Budapest who dealt with the Cardinal on a daily basis, were continually concerned over the practical problems that would likely arise if the Cardinal were taken seriously ill. As the Cardinal grew older, this concern increased and naturally was conveyed to the Vatican.

In fact, the Embassy staff took this question seriously enough to devise and rehearse in 1970 or 1971 a scenario (given the rather flippant title "Red Beanie I"—an allusion to the Cardinal's zucchetto) which began with a sudden, grave deterioration of the Cardinal's health. There were simulated inputs from various sources: the State Department, the White House, the Defense Department (regarding possible provision of a military aircraft to fly the Cardinal out of Hungary for medical treatment), the Vatican, the Hungarian government, and, most important, the Cardinal himself. Even dummy telegraphic traffic was drafted.

It was doubtless a rather

[3] Ibid.

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amateurish exercise as far as serious gaming goes, and the fact that the Cardinal occasionally walked past the table at which one team was playing gave the game a slightly surrealist air. While the Embassy never informed the State Department of the game, either before or after, one salient fact emerged from it. It was clear that in the case of real illness the ambassador or chargé would probably have to take decisions, most likely on personal responsibility, of considerable delicacy and political reach. The primary and ultimate consideration would be to save the Cardinal's life, and this might conceivably involve, for example, moving him out of the Embassy against his will to Hungarian medical facilities. This, of course, was not a pleasant prospect.

In the reviewer's opinion, however, the Cardinal is in error on a crucial point. The Cardinal recalls that when he wrote President Nixon, shortly after receiving the Vatican emissaries in the summer of 1971, and asked the President if he might remain in the Embassy, the latter instead

. . . recommended that I bow to my fate. Despite the courtesy of the tone I realized from the President's reply that from now on I would actually be an unwanted guest in the Embassy. I therefore had only the alternative of leaving the Embassy, and by that act surrendering to the political police, or leaving the country for the West, as the Pope desired." (pp. 234-35)

The Cardinal thus makes the President's reply the key factor in his decision to accede to the Vatican's urgings that he leave, and he implies that had the President invited him to stay on in the Embassy, he would have done so.

This account does not square with the reviewer's recollection of events on the spot. It is true, of course, that Washington preferred the Cardinal to go, but for the practical reasons given above rather than because, as the Cardinal states elsewhere (p. 235), US authorities thought "I stood in the way of the policy of détente" (an issue dealt with below). At the same time, it must have seemed elementary domestic political logic for the Nixon administration —and, indeed for any administration—to remain strictly neutral in the matter and to make an absolutely clear public record that the crucial decision remained entirely in the Cardinal's own hands.

The reviewer is somewhat at a loss to explain the Cardinal's version. One plausible explanation is that the Cardinal may have willed himself to imagine that the US was the real driving force in the effort to persuade him to leave Hungary. The Cardinal's attitude toward the United States was highly ambivalent. Although he was genuinely grateful for the hospitality he was accorded at the Embassy and for other support which he received from various American sources, he nevertheless had deep misgivings about US policy, a concern which grew out of what he saw as Woodrow Wilson's post-World War I "betrayal" of Hungary at Trianon, Franklin Roosevelt's "betrayal" of East and Central Europe at Yalta, and other postwar American "surrenders"—during the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Perhaps he instinctively expected yet another US "surrender" in his own case.

As for the Cardinal's supposed "standing in the way of détente," it is doubtless the case that his continued presence in the Embassy was an obstacle to improving US-Hungarian relations. The reviewer suspects that each US minister, ambassador, or chargé in Budapest during the years of the Cardinal's residence in the Embassy entertained hopes that he might be the one to achieve a breakthrough and bring about the Cardinal's departure.

Still, the point should not be exaggerated. The tenor of US-Hungarian relations was by no means determined solely by the Cardinal's presence in the Embassy. If in the period following the 1956 revolution it clearly was a major factor, its importance tended to diminish with the passing of years. By the time the Cardinal did leave, few on either the US or the Hungarian side imagined that his departure would effect a quantum leap in bilateral relations. Rather, the general approach, which the Embassy developed from the late 1960's on, stressed informally the discredit that would fall on the Hungarian regime if it failed to work out an orderly, dignified solution for the Cardinal's departure, thus compelling the prelate to remain in the Embassy and die there. It was pointed out that this would be an unseemly way for the Cardinal to end his days and an offense against Hungarian popular feelings, for despite the Cardinal's past role and the regime's view of him, his status as nominal head of the Hungarian Catholic Church could not be ignored.

It would no doubt be an exaggeration to claim that this line of

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argument was decisive with the Hungarian government. The mutual interest between the Vatican and Budapest in effecting a general improvement of relations, which the Cardinal's departure might significantly ease, was doubtless a more salient factor from the regime's perspective. Yet it seemed that the Embassy's line of argument did not fall on entirely unheeding listeners.

Finally, there is no doubt in the reviewer's mind that the Cardinal would have preferred to stay in the Embassy indefinitely, even until his death. In the last resort, only severe pressure from the Vatican was capable of moving him, and it was not easy even at that. But obedience to Rome was axiomatic with him. It was the one opening in an otherwise very tough defense, and, in retrospect, once Rome chose to press this vulnerability, the Cardinal was bound to comply. Still, it should be added that those watching the course of events close at hand remained uncertain about the outcome until a fairly late stage. The Cardinal gave the impression of different intentions at various points and sometimes appeared to throw his departure into doubt by raising new conditions. This was probably tactical, however, for he must have known in his innermost counsels that for him, a model of orthodoxy, there was no real choice.

IT IS A commonplace to characterize the Cardinal's life from the end of World War II until his death in 1975 as a great human tragedy, and by almost any standard such a judgment is warranted. There was crushing defeat for the Church in Hungary and for him personally at the hands of the communist regime. The Church lost not only its property and other wealth, but also its deep, traditional hold on nearly every facet of Hungarian society. The Cardinal himself surrendered great personal and political power, while suffering degradation at the hands of brutal police officials, public humiliation and obloquy, and long years of imprisonment. Then, there were the brief hopes of 1956, only to be followed by their cruel frustration and, for him, the additional years of restriction and inactivity in the American Embassy. Finally, he was faced with exile from Hungary and—the last, most crushing blow—his removal from the Primacy by Pope Paul VI. These are the obvious aspects of tragedy. Yet, for this reviewer, there were other, perhaps equally essential elements.

One element was simply the elevation of the Cardinal to the Primacy in the first place. While the Vatican was doubtless motivated in large part by Cardinal Mindszenty's strong anti-Nazi record, the wisdom of that decision—here again, with the benefit of hindsight—is open to question.

For the Cardinal, as is evident from his own witness, was peculiarly unsuited to the high responsibilities thrust upon him. Perhaps no one else in the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy was suitable either, and his was an appointment *faute de mieux.* But it is clear that this Primate was basically still a country parish priest, with little idea of how to tackle the post-World War II international complexities, other than by challenging head-on any inroad upon Church authorty. The *Memoirs* reveal that the Cardinal felt happiest and most self-confident during his long years—spanning more than a quarter of a century—of provincial parish building and pastoral work in Zalaegerszeg. (It was remarkable how often in conversation he returned to this period.) His elevation to the bishopric of Veszprem took him out of the framework he knew best, while the archibisphopric of Esztergom demanded talents he simply did not have.

The reviewer surmises that the Cardinal's greatest tragedy, however, was his decision to seek refuge in the American Embassy in 1956. That decision did not suit his temperament, which was heroic and romantic, and it would have been more in character for him to have ended his days defying Russian tanks. Certainly death had little terror for him. On this point, then, the reviewer takes issue with the judgment of Stehle, who suggests, in effect, that the Cardinal sought refuge in the Embassy because, given his past sufferings, he was unable to face the prospect of further hardships.[4] While this inference is not unreasonable, the reviewer believes it unconvincing. Rather more telling, it can be argued, are the constant references in the *Memoirs* to the theme of martyrdom. One of the Cardinal's most admired heroes, whose example is cited frequently, was Bishop Vilmos Apor of Gyor, who was shot at the door of his church by Russian troops in 1945 when he tried to protect the women of the town who had taken refuge there. This preoccupation with martyrdom suggests not lack of courage on the Primate's part but frustration at his not being able to make the ultimate sacrifice himself.

Thus, the real tragedy of Cardi-

[4] Ibid.

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nal Mindszenty, in the reviewer's opinion, is that he was a martyr manqué. He suffered quasi-martyrdom at the hands of the regime in the form of his arrest, show trial, and imprisonment in 1949, and he had the chance in 1956 to die on the streets of Budapest and go into Hungarian history and the annals of the church as hero and martyr. But he did not do so, perhaps because he hoped that the end was not imminent, that Hungary would somehow escape Soviet domination in the aftermath of the revolution, and that he would have a key role to play. If this was indeed the Cardinal's motivation in seeking refuge in the Embassy, he must have regretted it bitterly in the succeeding years as memory of the revolution faded and he himself was forgotten and deprived of any influence in affairs. The fate of a martyr manqué is not a happy one.

IT STRIKES THIS reviewer forcibly that, despite the extent of self-revelation in the *Memoirs,* some important aspects of the Cardinal's character nevertheless fail to emerge clearly. American Embassy representatives in Budapest were frequently the object of commiseration from diplomatic colleagues who, not without a certain *Schadenfreude,* were apt to enlarge on the difficulties that the Cardinal's presence entailed for the Embassy. In fact, the sympathy was somewhat misplaced, and here an important distinction should be made between the Cardinal in his personal capacity and as public figure. Most people assumed that his intransigence in Church-State matters carried over into personal relations, and it was this extrapolation which underlay the expressions of sympathy. But nothing could have been farther from the truth.

The Cardinal privately was the least demanding of men. He possessed all the traditional Hungarian finesse in personal relations. His personal needs—for food and drink, clothing, and services—were the simplest. Plain Hungarian meals, prepared by a small, faithful group of Hungarian women who doubled as Embassy snack bar cooks, and served on coarse china, were brought up from the basement kitchen and handed over on the third floor to be taken to the Cardinal in his quarters by an American member of the staff. The Cardinal daily permitted himself about a quarter of a small bottle of beer and one cigar, cut in two (he smoked a popular American brand). On the occasional visits of Francis Cardinal König of Vienna, the American ladies in the Embassy might offer a fancier meal, served on good china, with silver, fine glassware, flowers on the table, and a decent wine. They felt that Cardinal Mindszenty should be seen entertaining in a manner proper to his station and that it would reflect adversely on the Embassy if his modest, everyday standards of cuisine and service were imposed on his distinguished visitor. The Cardinal put up with the extra attentions with as good grace as possible, for he was incapable of impoliteness to those he felt were trying to render him a kindness. Still, it often seemed that he was uncomfortable with the fuss and was relieved to be able to return to his usual more modest way of living, once his visitor had left.

IN THE REVIEWER'S memory of the Cardinal, the latter's personal traits stand out more sharply than do the political and policy issues with which the Primate was inextricably bound. Perhaps this has proved a disability, to the extent that this review has tended to focus on the individual, rather than on the Cardinal as churchman and political figure. On the other hand, the Cardinal's place in history is already well documented, while his personal qualities have been less clearly defined.

Thus, it seems appropriate to end with a few of the reviewer's more personal recollections: The Cardinal's deep emotion when his small American congregation surprised him at Christmas midnight mass by singing in Hungarian the traditional hymn, "Pasztorok, Pasztorok." His handing out chocolate candy to the small children of Embassy families after Sunday mass, and his somewhat disconcerting habit of pinching the children smartly on the cheek while doing so. A birthday party for the Cardinal which the Embassy staff arranged in the snack bar, complete with cake and candles. His pleasure at receiving a bunch of wild flowers which someone had picked for him in the Buda Hills. His ill humor over the annual ceremony at the Soviet War Memorial in the square in front of the Embassy (he habitually kept closed the shutter on the window that looked directly out on the monument, which he could not abide). His excessively long Sunday sermons — the longest during the reviewer's residence at the Embassy was clocked at just short of 45 minutes. His sudden flashes of humor. His habit during his evening walk, escorted by an Embassy officer in the small, dreary, inner Embassy courtyard, of deliberately raising his voice to make a point critical of the regime

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for the benefit of the Hungarians possibly listening (the courtyard had Embassy walls on three sides and Hungarian apartments on the fourth). The wailing, screeching sound when the Cardinal turned up the volume of the radio in his quarters to drown out any Hungarian monitoring of conversation (it also usually impeded intelligible discourse in the room itself).

Finally one last vignette deserves to be recorded. A few days before he left the Embassy, the Cardinal asked rather formally if he could consult with an Embassy officer on a matter of urgency. The officer in question wondered whether the Cardinal had not changed his mind again about leaving. When the Cardinal paid his visit, it indeed appeared that he might have done so, for he began by saying that he had serious misgivings about leaving his Embassy parish. The parish would now be without the ministrations of an English-speaking priest, he warned. It was not enough for the members of the congregation to be able to go to mass in a Hungarian church; the essential thing was for them to have weekly instruction in their own language. He evidently had pondered the matter at length and had reached the conclusion that the Embassy should approach the Hungarian government with a request that an English-speaking priest be permitted to come into the Embassy to say Sunday mass after the Cardinal himself had left. It was clear that the Cardinal attached special importance to this suggestion which in the circumstances, as might be imagined, struck the Embassy officer as bizarre in the extreme.

The incident underscored at once the Cardinal's remoteness from realities and the pastoral sense which was central to his whole being. He was narrow, stubborn, obtuse, tough-minded, yet warm-hearted and of great personal charm. It was not difficult to disagree with him or criticize his judgment. It was also impossible, for the reviewer at least, not to feel a deep affection for a simple, brave, tormented man and priest.

Djilas: Odyssey of a Revolutionary

By Dennis Reinhartz

MILOVAN DJILAS. *Land Without Justice*. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1958.
MILOVAN DJILAS. *Memoir of a Revolutionary*. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.
MILOVAN DJILAS. *Wartime*. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
MILOVAN DJILAS. *Parts of a Lifetime*. Ed. by Michael and Deborah Milenkovitch. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.

THE YUGOSLAV revolution—from its early stirrings in the 1920's and 1930's during the royal dictatorship, through the hardfought victorious Partisan campaigns against Fascism in World War II and the dark days of the successful separation from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1948, to the movement into self-management and nonalignment—is one of the major chapters in the history of communism. Like many of the national epics of the 20th century which now stand as classic monuments to human courage and sacrifice, the drama of the fashioning of today's communist Yugoslavia was often one of heroic grappling, striking achievement, and stark disappointment, acted out in a pervasive atmosphere of cruelty, violence, and horror. The sought-after goals of national liberation, ideological purity, and human freedom frequently were in conflict with each other and were severely chastened by the fury of the revolutionary process–and

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were thereby altered. But the individual costs were far greater. Many lives were shattered in organizing the revolution; large numbers of people were killed during World War II; and still others were destroyed when the revolution they had helped to create was institutionalized and began to devour its own.

Milovan Djilas—soldier, statesman, writer, and philosopher—is one of the best known Yugoslav revolutionaries consumed by communism. The first three published installments of his autobiography —*Land Without Justice, Memoir of a Revolutionary,* and *Wartime* —and the previously unpublished related material in the anthology *Parts of a Lifetime* provide a rare opportunity to view a national communist revolution from its inception to its initial success and translation into an actual state system through the experiences and thoughts of one of its most prominent founding fathers. Perhaps more important, these four volumes offer an account of a visionary interacting with his times and of his intellectual odyssey from youthful idealistic romanticism to Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, Titoism, and, currently, a combination of what he refers to as "existential humanism" and "democratic socialism." In a much broader sense Djilas' story is also one of the failure of a totalitarian idea and the system spawned by it to establish their supremacy over an individual.

Land Without Justice is a unique, intricate, and personal work and the most literary of the four. It is first the story of the opening years (1911-28) of Djilas' life. But it is also the story of his clan, the Djilasi, sketched back to their historical-legendary origins, and the story of Montenegro. Unlike *Memoir of a Revolutionary* or *Wartime, Land Without Justice* is extremely rich in Montenegrin motifs. In fact, it is more about Djilas' beloved homeland than about Djilas himself. But while *Land Without Justice* is a "personal-lyric-epic-story," it also "is by a politician and has some political motives." Whereas the initial chapters provide the rude setting, the center stone is Djilas' youth. His account is a case study of the tortuous and sometimes brutal modernization of a Balkan rustic during World War I and the 1920's.

Although *Land Without Justice, Memoir of a Revolutionary,* and *Wartime* are three volumes of reminiscences about the same life, they are three different books dealing with three different segments of that life. *Memoir of a Revolutionary* covers the years 1928-41, from Djilas' entrance into Belgrade University, through the era of the Great Depression and the turbulence of the 1930's, Djilas' imprisonment under the royal dictatorship, and his existence as a professional revolutionary, to the outbreak of World War II and the Yugoslav Partisan-revolutionary struggle. This book is especially valuable because it provides some deep personal insights by a major participant into the events, individuals, strategies, and emotions that generated the successful Yugoslav revolution. *Memoir of a Revolutionary* is a primer on communist revolution, in which the author attempts to recapture, often with notable success, some of his own highly politicized feelings of times past and ideas changed or rejected.

Wartime continues from where *Memoir of a Revolutionary* leaves off, and relates Djilas' years as a leader of the Partisan struggle in occupied Yugoslavia from the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 to the German surrender in May 1945. Djilas recounts his participation in major events from the early armed resistance in Montenegro and Serbia, through the fruitless Partisan negotiations with the Germans and Italians and the desperate hours of the fourth and fifth Fascist offensives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, to the bitter-sweet liberation of Belgrade and the final victories in Croatia and Slovenia. Djilas' first two diplomatic missions to the Soviet Union and his startling encounters with Stalin, so vividly described in *Conversations with Stalin*,[1] also are detailed.

Concurrently, Djilas presents numerous highly personalized portraits of Josip Broz (Tito), Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Rankovic, Mosha Pijade, and other leaders of the Yugoslav revolution. Interestingly, these are often somewhat guarded. Yet at various junctures in the book Djilas does not hesitate to voice his displeasure with lesser figures whom he was close to during the war and who turned against him in 1954. When questioned recently about his rather naive kindness toward those top leaders who were his close comrades and then overthrew him and continue to vilify him publicly in the press and their own published memoirs,[2] Djilas responded simply that *Wartime* contains "only truth, not kindness." [3]

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[1] *Conversations with Stalin,* New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962.

[2] See, for example, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, *Revolucija koja tece: memoari* (The Ongoing Revolution: Memoirs), 2 vols. Belgrade, Komunist, 1971.

[3] Personal interview with Milovan Djilas in Belgrade, June 11, 1977.

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During the war Djilas also suffered many personal misfortunes: friends and family members perished, his first marriage began to disintegrate, and his faith in the Soviet Union and Stalin was shaken. But throughout the hard times Djilas was sustained by his idealism and vision of a communist Yugoslavia. *Wartime* is more massive and concentrated and better documented than the preceding two volumes of Djilas' memoirs. He is chronicling the Yugoslav revolution, and, notwithstanding the loss of confidence in communism and the persecution and humiliation which he has suffered since, he remains a Yugoslav patriot and is unashamed of his part in the great national epic struggle.

At present Djilas is completing the fourth volume of his autobiography. Tentatively entitled *Party State,* it will concentrate on the significant developments in his life and in Yugoslavia during 1945-67—e.g., the establishment of postwar Yugoslavia, its conflict with the Soviet Union, Djilas' fall from grace into a state of heresy, and his subsequent imprisonments. At least until this volume's publication, *Parts of a Lifetime* has special value, for in addition to selected excerpts from Djilas' better-known writings and translations of his prewar literary and political works, it contains critical source materials in print for the first time concerning Djilas' dissent. Undoubtedly, the most important of these are "Nordic Dream" (pp. 238-64)—a dramatic revealing essay written, and explaining his state of mind, at the time of his official condemnation in January 1954—and his "Jail Diary" for 1958-61 and 1962-66 (pp. 105-26 and 265-99).

DESPITE THE flexibility that Djilas' former comrades-in-arms like Tito, Kardelj, and others have demonstrated by their ideological innovativeness and apparent willingness to experiment with communism, Djilas remains the only true visionary of the surviving leadership of the Yugoslav revolution. Through the upheavals of his childhood and the sufferings and dislocation of his youth, his idealism grew, only to be tempered, tested, and retested during World War II and the cold war by enemies, adversary covisionaries, and alleged friends. Although he altered his viewpoint about the best means of achieving his final objective several times, the objective never changed. In "Jail Diary" he recorded the following realization:

History is not only created by the victors, but also by vanquished visionaries. Although I am not a creator of history, I am one of the visionaries—one of the smallest and least significant ones. (p. 289)

Now, matured, more assured, and confronted by like circumstances, Djilas faces the future with the same hopes and determination that first energized him half a century ago. He endures as a tireless champion of the individual. For Djilas, human rights long has been a basic issue. But the belief that "man is all-important" largely continues to be a utopian illusion at this critical juncture for human civilization, where the individual stands for less and less against global "isms," processes, and structures.

At present Djilas is committed to a form of democratic socialism stressing permissiveness toward human individualism, as an antidote to communist bureaucratic despotism. Democratic socialism differs substantially from contemporary social democracy in that the aim of the latter is to reform capitalism, whereas the aim of the former is to reform communism. As Djilas explained in a recently published article, "democratic socialism should stand for greater security for the individual, better organized production, a fairer sharing, and—seen as a whole—a more rational society." [4] He also believes that Europe has already entered the era of democratic socialism and that Eurocommunism is an important factor contributing to the transformation taking place.

Milovan Djilas epitomizes the individual cast into insurrection and has offered himself selflessly for almost 50 years. He is a transcendent revolutionary, and while his autobiography is written with flare, it is without pretense or bitterness. In these four books he proffers no excuses or apologies for his conduct or his times, only insight. To Djilas,

The twilight of the ideologies does not mean an end to Utopia. They are not the same—though every ideology contains within itself something of a Utopia—for Utopias are enthusiasm and impulse in the struggle for good and for happiness of men and of nations. New Utopias will be born inspired by the cosmic potential of mankind.[5]

[4] Milovan Djilas, "Where Is Eurocommunism Leading?" *Playboy Deutschland* (Hamburg), June 1977, p. 181.

[5] Milovan Djilas, "There'll Be Many Different Communisms in 1984," *The New York Times Magazine,* March 23, 1969, p. 140.

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Politics in East European Economics

By Andrzej Korbonski

MARIE LAVIGNE. *The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union and Europe.* Tr. by T. G. Waywell. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1974.
MARIE LAVIGNE. *Le Comecon.* Paris, Editions Cujas, 1973.
JOZEF M.P. VAN BRABANT. *Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration in Eastern Europe.* Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1974.
J. WILCZYNSKI. *Technology in Comecon.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

RESEARCH ON Eastern Europe is now a global phenomenon. While the largest volume of publications on the area still originates in the United States and Canada, increasing numbers of scholars in Western Europe and in other parts of the world have entered the field. Indicative of this trend are the four books under review on the economies of Eastern Europe —two of which were written by a French scholar, one by a Dutchman, and one by an Australian.

It was interesting to see how these authors—all of whom, one might suspect, have had either direct exposure to, or close contact with, the communist world—would approach their subjects. Their works tend to confirm the reviewer's impression that, by and large, non-American social scientists (be they economists, sociologists, or political scientists) favor a more historical and descriptive approach than that employed by their more analytical counterparts in the Western hemisphere. Each of the volumes deals with various aspects of Soviet or East European economic life from a basically historical-descriptive perspective. It is unfortunate to have to report that for the most part, these features have been discussed and analyzed before in a superior fashion by a number of other writers.

The first of the two selections by Ms. Lavigne is essentially a description of the socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and an account of their performance since the end of World War II. One may question the utility of translating this 1970 work into English in 1974, especially since there already were available a number of excellent English-language sources on the topic.[1] Despite the translator's claim that the author had since 1970 "revised the book and brought both statistical material and commentary up to date," one is struck by the fact that nearly all the statistical data in the study appear to go back to the mid-1960's—i.e., are at least ten years old. Moreover, most of the documentation on the economies of Eastern Europe is taken from Soviet sources.

The second of the works of Ms. Lavigne reviewed here, *Le Comecon,* is a fairly straightforward discussion of the past and present performance of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The book apparently was intended as a commentary on the so-called "Complex Program of Socialist Integration" approved by CMEA members in 1971 and hailed by them as opening a new stage in East European economic cooperation. In fact, however, the bulk of the study is focused on past CMEA achievements (or rather, lack of them), with little attention being paid to the future of the organization. On balance, the book adds little to the able analyses of CMEA's trials and tribulations provided by John Montias, Henry Schaefer, and M. C. Kaser.[2]

[1] Outstanding examples are the three compendia of papers published under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress: *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974; and *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977.

[2] John M. Montias, "Obstacles to the Economic Integration of Eastern Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), July-October 1969, pp.
(continued on p. 74)

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Jozef Van Brabant's *Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration in Eastern Europe* is a collection of papers—published in a variety of West European journals between 1970 and 1974—on various aspects of CMEA policies such as trade, planning, banking, and price formation. The author is a careful, methodical, and well-organized scholar, clearly very much at home in CMEA affairs. His documentation is impeccable, and he is also well-versed in economic theory and methodology. He is obviously fascinated with his topic and, unlike the other authors represented here, considers it his duty to ask some basic and often difficult questions, which he makes a sincere effort to answer, albeit not always satisfactorily.

As a group, Van Brabant's essays suffer from one important shortcoming—the author's failure to suitably define the concept of integration. The only hint he provides is the following statement: "Unfortunately, until very recently the CMEA has not been set up along similar lines as, for example, the European Communities (EEC). But there is very little doubt that the ultimate goals of both institutions are parallel, if if not exactly identical" (p. 1). Apart from failing to understand why lack of institutional congruence between the EEC and the CMEA should be viewed as "unfortunate," the reviewer cannot fathom why Van Brabant even believes that the goals of the two organizations are identical. Had Van Brabant perused the already fairly substantial literature on the theory and practice of regional integration, he might have avoided such an incomprehensible pronouncement. (More than 18 years ago Frederic Pryor warned us against comparing CMEA with the integrative efforts in Western Europe,[3] an admonition that has stood the test of time.)

Despite this flaw, Van Brabant's essays remain a significant addition to the slowly growing literature on CMEA. The same, alas, cannot be said about Professor Wilczynski's volume on *Technology in Comecon*, which is subtitled *Acceleration of Technological Progress Through Economic Planning and the Market.* Wilczynski is one of the most prolific writers on East European economics (this volume makes his fifth book in as many years), but, unfortunately, quantity does not seem to guarantee quality. The present study is long on detailed statistics but short on basic economic analysis. Every conceivable piece of factual information supposedly related to the structure and performance of the East European economies in the 1960's and early 1970's is heaped on the reader. Next to a discussion of the problems of research and development, automation, and computerization — clearly relevant to the "acceleration of technological progress"—one finds a comparison of Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces. While the volume may be of some use to a Western businessman innocent of East European economic complexities yet eager to sell some equipment to CMEA members, it is of relatively little value to someone wishing to delve seriously into the impact of the "scientific-technological revolution" on East European economies and on the process of economic integration in the region.

WHATEVER THEIR level of analysis and sophistication, all four studies display one major weakness: they tend to treat the economic processes and policies in Eastern Europe as taking place in a political vacuum. To be sure, now and then some of the authors refer to Marxist-Leninist ideology or mention the influence of East-West détente, but more often than not they seem to do so as an afterthought. To read these volumes, one would get the feeling that the frequently profound changes in Eastern Europe's economic systems—be it the economic reforms, the expansion of East-West trade, or other attempts to improve the performance of the national economies—were occurring autonomously and spontaneously, instead of being part and parcel of what may be called the process of sociopolitical change, modernization, or development, in which a variety of factors—political, economic, and social—interact. (One might add that to ignore the political dimension in this manner is to fall into the position of economic determinism, which implicitly flies in the face of the long-standing principle of the "primacy of politics" in communist societies.)

This narrowness of perspective on the part of the authors has unfortunate consequences. For example, the East European economic reforms are discussed

38-60; Henry W. Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1972; M.C. Kaser, *Comecon*, 2nd rev. ed., London, Oxford University Press 1967. Another excellent commentary, which appeared after Ms. Lavigne's volume, is Jozef M. P. Van Brabant's "On the Origins and Tasks of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (Stuttgart), September 1974, pp. 182-209.

[3] Frederic L. Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist Bloc: A Survey," *Soviet Studies*, (Glasgow) October 1959, p. 180.

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without taking cognizance of the major changes in the political environment which made the attempts at systemic transformation possible in the first place. This is particularly true in Ms. Lavigne's discussion of the Czechoslovak economic reforms, probably the most interesting attempt to revamp a traditional centralized planned economy. They are described without the slightest reference to the crucial political developments in Prague between January and August 1968. The workers' riots in Poland in December 1970 are largely dismissed without comment, despite the fact that these events were strongly conditioned by economic factors and in turn had their impact on future economic policies. Similarly, the political turmoil in Yugoslavia triggered by events in Croatia in the fall of 1971 is ignored even though economic considerations clearly played a major role in stimulating nationality awareness in that country and even though the goals of the national groups included reordering of investment allocations. Finally, Ceausescu's economic policy—reflecting a quest for a basis for expanded Romanian political maneuver—also gets short shrift from these authors.

The conscious or unconscious ignoring of the process of sociopolitical change is particularly disappointing in the case of Wilczynski's study. Anyone familiar with recent communist discussions of technological change could not help noticing the growing preoccupation of East European leaders with the impact of the "scientific-technological revolution" on their respective societies. Frequent ex cathedra pronouncements focused on the concept of "developed socialist society" convey a deep-seated sense of insecurity on the part of political decision-makers and ideologues over the possibility that changes in the economic substructure induced by scientific and technological progress might lead to embourgeoisement of socialist societies and to their convergence with Western societies, rather than to the creation of a new, higher stage on the road to a communist millennium. As a result of these fears, such authorities have repeatedly stressed the leading role of the local Communist parties, characterizing them as the only force capable of securing the stability of the society (by fostering participation and "socialist democracy") while engineering improvement of economic performance by taking full advantage of technological progress. Such a perspective gives a good indication that political considerations do and will affect the nature and pace of technological change in Eastern Europe, and one would have thought that Wilczynski would pay the subject more heed.

THIS ONE-SIDED approach simply will not do. One cannot analyze and discuss economic processes in Eastern Europe in a credible and convincing fashion without taking account of the political processes occurring in the individual countries. For many years, the reviewer has been critical of his fellow Western political scientists who wrote at length about politics in Eastern Europe with nary a reference to the impact of economic development in general and of industrialization in particular on the agrarian societies in the area. Fortunately, the situation in political science has improved.[4] However, too many economists—not just the present authors—commit the converse sin of focusing too much on economics at the expense of politics.

The fact remains that in analyzing developments in Eastern Europe and, to some degree, in the Soviet Union, one should apply a synthesizing approach which takes both sets of factors—economic and political—into consideration. It is not an impossible task, as evidenced by the writings of John Montias, who in addition to being a top-notch economic theorist is also one of the most perceptive observers and analysts of the East European political scene. Other economists, such as Alec Nove and Peter Wiles, have also been able to bridge the gap between the disciplines.

In addition to bringing to bear the insights of several disciplines, scholars in the field of Soviet and East European studies should concentrate less on producing lengthy and detailed descriptions of political, economic, and social processes in the region and respond to Montias' appeal for the exploration of comparative and analytical hypotheses.[5] As the present studies amply demonstrate, the last decade has witnessed a veritable outpouring of statistical information on the socialist economies that can be used by Western scholars. What is now needed is the generation of theoretically interesting propositions which can be tested against this expanding data base.

[4] Progress in this regard has been hampered by the increasing requirement in modern economics for a thorough grounding in quantitative methods which are beyond the ken of the older generation of specialists on communism who still tend to dominate the field of Soviet and East European studies.

[5] J. M. Montias, "Modernization in Communist Countries: Some Questions of Methodology," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter 1972, p. 413.

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In the illustration of "Electoral Strength of the Italian Communist Party in 1946, 1963, and 1976," appearing on page 29 of the November-December 1976 issue of *Problems of Communism,* the legend entries "30-30.9" and "40-40.9" are incorrect. They should be "30-39.9" and "40-49.9" respectively.

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